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DEFENSING THE INDEFENSIBLE: EXCEPTIONS TO
D'OENCH AND 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)
CHRIS ATKINSON
Onward Banking Soldiers,
Marching as if to war,
With D'Oench, Duhme and Congress
We'll prevail for sure.
We needn't worry,
We will win the fight
Since we lack accountability,
We are always right...1
INTRODUCTION
For half a century, in common law or statutory form, the D'Oench
doctrine2 has provided protection to federal deposit insurers3 after
they have taken over failed banks.' In the wake of the spectacular
crash of the thrift industry5 and the rash of commercial bank failures
1. RTC v. Ocotillo W. Joint Venture, 840 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (D.N.M. 1993)
(Conway, J.) (RTC fight song to the tune of "Onward Christian Soldiers").
2. In this Note, the term "D'Oench" or "D'Oench doctrine" will refer to the
doctrine in either its common law or statutory avatars. See infra notes 33-39. The
doctrine is named for D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
"D'Oench" is pronounced "dench." American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Em-
ployees v. FDIC (In re NBW Commercial Paper Litig.), 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1454 n.8
(D.D.C. 1992). "Duhme" is normally pronounced to rhyme with "room," leading to
bad puns by all three branches of government. See Jones v. RTC, 7 F.3d 1006, 1013
(11th Cir. 1993) ("Duhme and Gloom"), rev'd sub nom. RTC v. Dunmar Corp., 43
F.3d 587 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc); 139 Cong. Rec. S16,478 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993)
("time to eliminate the 'doom' in 'D'Oench Duhme' "); David Lawrence III,
D'Oench Spells Doom in Litigation Against Federal Banking Agencies, Fla. BJ., Feb.
1994, at 36 (outside counsel for RTCIFDIC describes doctrine).
3. The term "insurer" is used in this Note in a broad sense embracing the insurer
(or, pre-FIRREA, insurers) of depository institutions in their capacity as receivers or
conservators of the institutions, the parties statutorily designated to act in such capaci-
ties on behalf of the insurer (i.e., RTC), and such insurer(s) in corporate capacity
acting as insurer. See infra notes 17, 19-21. Where distinctions need be drawn be-
tween or among these roles, the appropriate role will be stated.
4. The term "bank" is used in this Note in a broad sense embracing both feder-
ally and state chartered commercial banks, savings banks and thrifts. The term is thus
coextensive with "depository institution" as used in 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1) (Supp. V
1993).
5. The collapse of the S&L industry at the hand of inflation, mismanagement,
funny-money accounting, go-go lending practices, and asset/liability mismatch is a
story too well known to be here retold. See generally Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and
Loan Crisis, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S7 (1991) (describing roots of the thrift crisis). Per-
haps the best-known account of thrift mismanagement is Frank Capra's It's a Wonder-ful Life. This sordid tale of incompetence, lax accounting standards, and speculative
real estate development lending, culminating in the entire populace being compelled
to furnish large amounts of cash in aid of the hapless Bailey, eerily presages the even-
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not seen since the Great Depression, the once-sleepy doctrine, for-
merly of interest only to students of the arcana of federal common law
and the minutie of federal banking statutes, has begun to count again
in dollars and cents.
These protections come at the expense of the rights of individuals
who had dealt with the bank prior to its demise. Under D'Oench, a
bank's debtor, such as a borrower or guarantor, who, before the bank
failed, would be able to interpose defenses to collection or make
claims or counterclaims against the bank may, after bank failure, lose
its ability to protect itself or vindicate its rights. If the agreement from
which the claim or defense arises is not documented so as to put regu-
lators on notice of its terms, upon takeover, any claims and defenses
based upon such secret treaties will not be entertained. As Judge
Goldberg expressed the principle:
Fundamentally, D'Oench attempts to ensure that FDIC examiners
can accurately assess the condition of a bank based on its books.
The doctrine means that the government has no duty to compile
oral histories of the bank's customers and loan officers. Nor must
the FDIC retain linguists and cryptologists to tease out the meaning
of facially-unencumbered notes. Spreadsheet experts need not be
joined by historians, soothsayers, and spiritualists in a Lewis Car-
roll-like search for a bank's unrecorded liabilities.6
An example of the here-today, gone-tomorrow nature of defenses is
made clear by a review of the Adams v. Madison Realty & Develop-
ment, Inc. cases.7 Borrowers claimed they had been defrauded and
refused to pay their notes, which had been sold to a bank., The Third
Circuit determined that, because the separate paper bearing the origi-
nal payee's indorsements had not been "so firmly affixed thereto as to
become a part" of the notes, as the UCC requires for such an allonge
indorsement to be effective, the bank was a mere assignee. 9 Thus the
bank was subject to all the borrowers' defenses, and the court re-
manded the case for determination of those defenses. 10 While the
case languished in the District Court, the bank became insolvent."
The borrowers attempted to interpose their fraud defenses, as the
Third Circuit had said they could, only to be defeated upon a motion
for summary judgment.' 2 When the case returned to the Court of Ap-
tual destruction of the thrift industry in the 1980's. See It's a Wonderful Life (Liberty
Films Inc. 1946).
6. Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013, 1016 (5th Cir. 1990).
7. Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., 937 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter
Adams II]; Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., 853 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988) [hereinafter
Adams I].
8. Adams 1, 853 F.2d at 164.
9. Adams 1, 853 F.2d at 166 (quoting, without attribution, U.C.C. § 3-302 (1978)
(article withdrawn 1990)).
10. Adams 1, 853 F.2d at 170.
11. Adams II, 937 F.2d at 851.
12. Adams II, 937 F.2d at 851.
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peals, the defenses were summarily rejected: D'Oench had changed
the rules of the game.13
The potential for unfairness is compounded by the fact that the ap-
plication of the insurer's protections constitutes a complicated minuet
between two inter-related "D'Oench" doctrines: statutory D'Oench,
consisting primarily of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) 4 and common law
D'Oench, the judge-made doctrine derived from the Supreme Court's
decision in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC.'5 The relationship be-
tween these doctrines is unclear, rendering their application inconsis-
tent and unpredictable. Because both D'Oench doctrines promote
the right of the insurers to rely on the written records of the bank,
allocating the risk of the deal not being reflected in writing to those
who would contract with the bank, "[o]ver the years, the case law sur-
rounding D'Oench and the statute... has cross-pollinated such that it
is very difficult to decide where the statute ends and D'Oench
begins."' 6
Serving as dancing partners to that duo are the two bedrock con-
cepts on which the D'Oench defenses rest: the concepts of asset and
agreement. The threshold questions are whether the bank holds a
note, a guaranty, or other asset, and whether the condition adverse to
the insurer's interests arises from an agreement. This distinction in-
heres in both section 1823(e), which by its terms requires an "agree-
ment" that diminishes the interest of an insurer in an "asset," and the
implications of the D'Oench opinion, which requires a scheme or ar-
rangement that misrepresents the value of the assets or securities in
the hands of a bank. In practice, the definition of the term agreement
has been so expanded that in the context of D'Oench it no longer
possesses its accustomed meaning and the necessity for the presence
of an asset is unclear under either the statutory or the common law
doctrine.
The situations in which these doctrines may be applied are near infi-
nite, because the D'Oench doctrine, in either of its forms, applies in
one way or another throughout the realm of bank insolvency and to
the acronymic creatures that inhabit it. D'Oench applied to the
FSLIC,17 before its extinction at the hands of FIRREA,'8 and it ap-
13. Adams II, 937 F.2d at 858-59.
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (Supp. V 1993), as amended by The Riegle Community
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 317,
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 2160, 2223. This provision is referred to in this Note as
"section 1823(e)." Its cousin 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A) (Supp. V 1993) will be re-
ferred to in this Note as "section 1821(d)(9)(A)."
15. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
16. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. FDIC (In re NBW
Commercial Paper Litig.), 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1457 (D.D.C. 1992).
17. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, or "FSLIC," was
chartered in 1934 to insure deposits in savings and loan associations, and was done
away with in 1989. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 401, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 183, 354-57. The pow-
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plies to FIRREA's offspring, the RTC.19 D'Oench has applied from
its very beginnings to the FDIC.2" D'Oench applies from the moment
the bank is taken over and the insurers enter the scene. D'Oench
applies when the insurers act as receiver, liquidating the bank, or in
their corporate capacity, as insurers of deposits.21 D'Oench applies
ers of the RTC were taken, Burke and Hare fashion, from the remains, as were the
FDIC's powers over thrifts.
18. "FIRREA" is the common acronym of the Financial Institutions Reform, Re-
covery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103
Stat.) 183. This statute, generally known as the thrift bailout bill, comprehensively
restructured the process of liquidating insolvent banks and now provides most of the
legal framework for federal banking regulation and deposit insurance. See generally
Anthony C. Providenti, Jr., Note, Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned: Statu-
tory Overview of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S323 (1991) (outlining key provisions of FIRREA). As will
be seen in various discussions below, the statute is not devoid of ambiguity. One
court has remarked that
FIRREA is far from being a straightforward and simplistic statute. Indeed,
it is a veritable Escher print set to words, complete with waterfalls that flow
backwards. While originally intended to establish a procedure to dispose of
the bulk of claims against failed financial institutions expeditiously and
fairly, it has instead proven to be extremely nettlesome for courts and liti-
gants alike. Its chaotic overgrowth of sections, subsections, paragraphs, and
subparagraphs has caused one court to muse that it "makes the Internal
Revenue Code look like a first grade primer."
Armstrong v. RTC, 623 N.E.2d 291, 295 (Ill. 1993).
19. The Resolution Trust Corporation, or "RTC," was established by FIRREA to
take over thrifts placed into receivership during 1989 through 1992. The RTC is pos-
sessed of the same powers as the FDIC with respect to its charges. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(b)(4) (Supp. V 1993). The RTC is not, per se, a deposit insurer, but has
access to various funds to pay off depositors under a funding scheme apparently
planned by Rube Goldberg. See generally Wayne M. Josel, Note, The Resolution Trust
Corporation: Waste Management and the S&L Crisis, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 5339 (1991)
(describing RTC).
20. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or "FDIC," is a federal corpora-
tion that is now, in one capacity or another, the sole federal bank insurer in the
United States. Originally solely the insurer of commercial banks, FIRREA gave the
FDIC dominion over savings and loan associations as well, although the insurance
funds are segregated into a bank insurance fund and a savings association insurance
fund. See generally Anne M. Taylor, Note, The FDIC's Enhanced Powers Over Sav-
ings Associations: Does FIRREA Make It "SAIF"?, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 5381 (1991)
(providing an overview of the FDIC's powers over thrifts).
21. When a bank is declared insolvent, either by the federal or state regulatory
authorities, power over the bank is given over to the applicable governmental corpo-
ration: the FDIC or RTC, or, formerly, the FSLIC. These government corporations
may take over authority either as receiver or conservator. As conservator, the insurer
is authorized to operate the bank as an ongoing business. As receiver, the insurer is
to liquidate the bank and pay its creditors. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (Supp. V 1993). The
distinction is roughly similar to the difference between a trustee in Chapter 11 and a
trustee in Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
When the bank is to be liquidated, the insurer acts in two capacities: one as the
receiver of the bank, as "FDIC-Receiver," and the other as insurer qua insurer, or
"FDIC-Corporate". FDIC-Corporate is an insurer of deposits, which pays out claims
in the amount of insured deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(0 (Supp. V 1993). "Both the
FDIC's authorizing statutes and case law recognize the dual role that the FDIC often
plays in respect to a failed bank. They provide the FDIC with two virtually separate,
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when a bank is liquidated by the receiver.' D'Oench applies when the
receiver sells the assets to itself in its corporate capacity, in a purchase
and assumption transaction.23 D'Oench applies to the bridge banks
and new banks the insurers create to smooth the process of liquidation
or sale. 4 D'Oench applies, even after the insurers have left the scene,
to those who purchase banks and assets from the insurers.
The D'Oench doctrine is "expansive and perhaps startling in its se-
verity."'  Some judges who must apply it admit it to be inequitable
legal identities .... " FDIC v. La Rambla Shopping Ctr., 791 F.2d 215, 218 (1st Cir.
1986) (Breyer, J.). In its capacity as receiver, the insurer may liquidate the bank,
parceling out its proceeds to creditors, form a bridge bank, or enter into a purchase
and assumption transaction.
22. When the bank is liquidated, the receiver pays out the funds received in ac-
cordance with applicable law, including making payments to the insurer in its corpo-
rate capacity, as subrogee of the insured depositors to whom it has made payments. 12
U.S.C. § 1821(g) (Supp. V 1993). The order of payment formerly varied by institution
type. Thus, national bank depositors and general creditors alike were paid pro rata.
12 U.S.C. § 194 (1988). Other institution types followed the priority law set out in the
state of domicile. 12 C.FL § 3203(a)(6) (1994). This is all moot with respect to fu-
ture liquidations, because there is now a national order of priority under which, after
payment of secured creditors and administrative expenses, the depositors (and the
insurer, as their subrogee) have first call on the funds. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11) (Supp.
V 1993).
23. In a purchase and assumption transaction,
the FDIC as receiver of the failed bank, sells the failing bank's "good assets"
along with any remaining "good will" to a healthy insured bank in return for
the healthy bank's promise to pay the failed bank's depositors. The FDIC,
acting as the failed bank's receiver, also formally sells its remaining "bad"
assets to the FDIC itself, acting in its corporate capacity. The FDIC, in its
corporate capacity, pays the FDIC as receiver, which in turn pays the
healthy bank enough money to make up the difference between what the
healthy bank must pay the depositors (typically a large amount) and what
the healthy bank was willing to pay for the "good" assets and the "good will"
(typically a smaller amount). The FDIC, in its corporate capacity, then tries
to realize as much money as possible from the "bad" assets that it holds; if it
realizes less than what it paid the receiver, (which paid the healthy bank), it
keeps the money; if it realizes more, it pays the excess to the receiver for
payment to the failed bank's creditors.
FDIC v. La Rambla Shopping Ctr., 791 F.2d 215, 218 (1st Cir. 1986) (Breyer, J.).
24. A "bridge bank" is a de novo temporary institution created by the insurers to
carry on the business of the defunct bank. It is exempt from most regulatory control,
but has a statutorily limited lifespan. Bridge banks can be organized by the FDIC or
RTC. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n) (Supp. V 1993) (FDIC); 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(10)(A)(v)
(Supp. V. 1993) (RTC). Similar new banks or savings and loan associations can also
be organized, either by the FDIC or RTC. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(F) (Supp. V 1993);
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(10)(A)(iv) (Supp. V 1993). These banks or savings associations
appear to function (in practice) in a manner similar to the bridge banks. Such institu-
tions are normally placed immediately in conservatorship and serve essentially as
holding tanks for assets and certain liabilities of the old institution until the insurer
can determine what to do with them. In both purchase and assumption transactions
and/or bridge bank transactions, the assets of the defunct institution are transferred,
but only certain of the liabilities are assumed. The insurers may not, however, place
the creditors of the institution in a worse position than they would have been had the
institution been liquidated. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(i)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
25. Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990).
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and confess themselves unenamored of the doctrine or its results. 26
But the doctrine is here, and unless Congress relents or one of the
intermittent Constitutional challenges to D'Oench succeeds,2 7 it is
here to stay.
D'Oench is not, however, a grant of absolute immunity to the insur-
ers. While the insurers have treated D'Oench as the legionary treated
his Eagle, a totem of victory eternal,2 the doctrine does not state that
"we're the FDIC and we always win." There are exceptions to
D'Oench and, properly catalogued and placed in a rational frame-
work, they allow the doctrine to be applied as a body of law, rather
26. FDIC v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 877 (3d Cir. 1994) ("In reaching our result, we
have not overlooked that the D'Oench Duhme doctrine and section 1823(e) can lead
to what might be considered a harsh result. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the
federal precedents... have compelled our outcome."); FDIC v. Kasal, 913 F.2d 487,
492 (8th Cir. 1990) ("While we agree that the result in the instant case may appear
harsh or inequitable to some, we nevertheless are constrained by both the statute and
federal common law."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991); American Fed'n of State,
County & Mun. Employees v. FDIC (In re NBW Commercial Paper Litig.), 826 F.
Supp. 1448, 1476 (D.D.C. 1992) ("The court is not ignorant of the unusual results
which the D'Oench doctrine generates, nor is the court enamored of them."); L & R
Prebuilt Homes, Inc. v. New Eng. Allbank for Say., 783 F. Supp. 11,14 (D.N.H. 1992)("The court has full empathy with the plaintiff's position and dilemma, but of course
is powerless under the law to grant remedial relief. The court does not quarrel with
the D'Oench doctrine, but it is appalled by the manner in which the FDIC reacts to
situations such as these."); Webb v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. Rptr. 581, 589 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) ("We sympathize with Webb. The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine is quite
harsh and in this case, where he as the borrower has made a prima facie showing that
he was not at fault, the severity of the rule is heightened. Nevertheless, we have no
choice but to apply it.").
27. A plethora of such challenges have been mounted. Claims that D'Oench con-
stitutes a violation of due process, an impairment of the obligation of contracts, a
Fifth Amendment taking-without-compensation, or that the retroactive application of
FIRREA's amendments to section 1823(e) constitutes such a taking, have all been
summarily dismissed. See, e.g., RTC v. Daddona, 9 F.3d 312, 320-21 (3d Cir. 1993)
(taking, due process); North Ark. Medical Ctr. v. Barrett, 962 F.2d 780, 789-90 (8th
Cir. 1992) (retroactive application of FIRREA); FSLIC v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 698-
99 (5th Cir. 1991) (contracts clause, due process, taking), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1163
(1992); FDIC v. State Bank, 893 F.2d 139, 145 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.)
("Congress does not violate the Constitution in holding commercial entities to the
text of instruments they signed. The Due Process Clause is not an exception to the
parol evidence rule."). But see Hood v. RTC (In re Hood), 156 B.R. 296, 298-99(Bankr. D.N.M. 1993) (invoking takings clause to bar application of D'Oench where
RTC had, post-insolvency, purchased asset from unrelated third party). The Hood
decision appears to be an anomaly. See FSLIC v. Gordy, 928 F.2d 1558,1560, 1564-65
(11th Cir. 1991) (allowing assertion of D'Oench rights under notes and guaranties
acquired from a third party after insolvency).
The Constitutional arguments are discussed, and dismissed, in Stephen W. Lake,
Note, Banking Law: The D'Oench Doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e): Overextended
But Not Unconstitutional, 43 Okla. L. Rev. 315 (1990).
28. See, e.g., RTC v. Feldman, 3 F.3d 5,8 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Nor does the RTC help
matters when it presses, as usual, a reading of D'Oench, Duhme so broad that one is
reminded of sovereign immunity claims made by independent nations."), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1187 (1994).
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than a means by which the federal bank insurers may prevail in any
and all disputes.
This Note argues that only by examining the interaction of these
doctrines and the concepts of agreement and asset can rules be de-
rived allowing for logical application of D'Oench. This Note asserts
that the question of what defenses are barred by D'Oench may be
answered only by examining whether the asserted defense is merely
an attempt to replead a forbidden agreement and determining
whether or not the agreement is in fact forbidden. Further, this Note
argues that only in situations where there is a discrete and identifiable
asset that is not asserted to be void will the more rigorous documenta-
tion requirements of section 1823(e) apply and that in any event, the
doctrine may not be used to rewrite the terms of the asset the insurer
seeks to enforce.
Part I of this Note discusses the origins and development of these
inter-related doctrines. Part I.A outlines the history of the doctrines,
commencing with the D'Oench case itself and its Congressional codifi-
cation at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e). This part then examines the develop-
ment of the common law doctrine to protect those excluded from the
statutory shield, the extension of the statutory doctrine by FIRREA,
and the persistence and expansion of the common law doctrine after
FIRREA. This part concludes with an examination of two key deci-
sions that have shaped the development of the doctrines. The Gunter
v. Hutcheson29 decision created the federal holder in due course doc-
trine, a separate, but related, protection for the insurers. The other,
the Supreme Court's decision in Langley v. FDIC,3' broadly construed
the language of section 1823(e) and resulted in an expansion of both
the statutory and common law doctrine. Part I.B. examines the ele-
ments of each of the common law and statutory doctrines, and the
vexed question of the relation among the doctrines, and part I.C sum-
marizes the concepts of asset and agreement defenses on which the
remainder of this Note builds.
Part II discusses the nature of the agreements barred by the doc-
trines. Part lI.A shows the breadth of contractual concepts that have
been included in the definition of agreement and describes two excep-
tions that have limited the reach of D'Oench over the kingdom of
contract: the limitation of D'Oench to ordinary banking transactions
and the exclusion of the application of D'Oench from certain con-
tracts taken by the bank as assignee. Part .B describes the extension
of D'Oench to cover not only contract defenses but affirmative claims
against the receiver, including those sounding in tort or lying in equity.
Part Il discusses the question of whether, and under what circum-
stances, the presence of a specific asset in the hands of the insurer is
29. 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
30. 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
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necessary for the application of the doctrines. Part III.A describes
defenses arising from defects in contract formation creating an "asset"
that is void ab initio and the effect of statutory violations on the exist-
ence of an asset. This subject continues with a discussion of voiding
conditions arising after contract formation, discussing both agree-
ments-to-void and performance as defenses to application of
D'Oench. Part III.B examines whether under statutory or common
law D'Oench an asset is truly a requisite, examining separately section
1823(e), section 1821(d)(9)(A), and common law D'Oench. Part III.C
examines the extent to which limitations imposed by the terms of the
asset itself, including unwritten terms and conditions imposed by the
surrounding law, remain enforceable against the insurer. Part IV dis-
tills the cases shown in parts II and III to propose a convenient and
consistent framework for the analysis of D'Oench questions.
I. HISTORY AND ELEMENTS OF THE DOCTRINES
Whether or not it has spoken, a mouth does not seal anything.3
Among the sources of confusion surrounding D'Oench is that there
are three intertwined doctrines-common law D'Oench, statutory
D'Oench, and the federal holder in due course doctrine. Two of these
are creatures of the courts, while the other is a creation of Congress.
To understand common law or statutory D'Oench, one must under-
stand its evolution in the Capitol and in the Court and the influence of
the federal holder in due course doctrine.
The D'Oench doctrine had its origins in a Supreme Court case and
was codified, at least in part, by a subsequent congressional enact-
ment. But because the codified version did not reach all of the situa-
tions in which the insurers might find themselves in need of
protection, the common law doctrine persisted. While many of the
common law extensions of D'Oench were ratified, or made irrelevant,
by FIRREA, a number of participants in the bank liquidation process
remain unprotected. Thus, if for no other reason, the common law
doctrine retains vitality, even in the face of arguments that jurispru-
dence has been preempted by legislative action.
The protections afforded the insurers were expanded considerably
by two court decisions, each of which rendered the insurer immune to
defenses grounded in fraudulent misrepresentation. The Eleventh
Circuit, in its Gunter v. Hutcheson32 decision, created an entirely new
common law protection, rendering the insurer the equivalent of a
holder in due course under negotiable instruments law. The Supreme
Court answered the same problem by redefining the term "agree-
ment" in section 1823(e) to include fraudulent misrepresentations. In
31. Kanuni i Lekd Dukagjinit, ch. LXXVI, § 524 (Shtjefdn Gjeqov ed., 1933),
translated in The Code of Leke Dukagjini 118 (Leonard Fox trans., 1989) (Alb.).
32. 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
[Vol. 631344
DEFENSING THE INDEFENSIBLE
so doing, the Court not only expanded the reach of the statutory doc-
trine, but of the common law doctrine as well.
A. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC and Section 1823(e)
Common law D'Oench originated in the eponymous case of
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC.3 The Supreme Court held that a
party that lends itself to a scheme likely to mislead the FDIC by
means of "secret agreements" not shown on the records of the bank is
forbidden to raise that secret agreement as a defense against the
FDIC once the bank has been taken over.-' The decision was based in
estoppel-D'Oench, having by its acts misled first the state and then
the federal banking authorities, was estopped to deny the validity of
the note by which it had deceived them.35 The only element of estop-
pel missing from this formulation was detrimental reliance-the regu-
lators did not show they had been misled by the note.' Further, in
dicta that were to have profound consequences for the development
33. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
34. D'Oench, Duhme & Company, Inc., a Missouri bond house, had sold a bond
to Belleville Bank & Trust Co., an Illinois bank, and the bond had gone into default.
Id. at 454. The customer was, naturally, not pleased at having to write off the bond,
and asked D'Oench to deliver to the bank a note in the amount of the bond to keep
the bank's balance sheet artificially inflated, hI. at 462 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
In return, the bank delivered to D'Oench a receipt in which it promised not to en-
force the note. The bank was insured by FDIC in 1934, and the D'Oench note was
charged off in 1935. After the bank became insolvent, the bank pledged the D'Oench
note to FDIC-Corporate. Id. at 454. When FDIC-Corporate sued, D'Oench asserted
lack of consideration and the receipt agreement as a defense, averring that FDIC was
not a holder in due course. Id at 456. The district court found Illinois law to apply
and found D'Oench liable. The circuit court affirmed, but on the basis of a determi-
nation under "general law" that Illinois law applied. Certiorari was applied for and
granted on the question of whether the district court, being situated in Missouri, was
required to apply the conflict of law rules of that state. Id. at 455.
What began as a case to define the contours of the then-new Erie doctrine became
something else entirely. The concurring Justices fought over the Erie field. Id. at 463-
65 (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (complaining that Court should not create federal
common law without necessity); Id. at 465-75 (Jackson, J., concurring) (confining Erie
solely to diversity suits). Mr. Justice Douglas and his majority wandered off else-
where. The Court had already located in the criminal provisions of the Federal Re-
serve Act a "federal policy" to prevent misrepresentations as to the assets of banks,
which had, in Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940), allowed the imposition of civil
liability to the receiver against one who violated it. Extending the Deitrick precedent,
the Court reasoned that, even in the absence of a penal offense (as there was in Dei-
trick), the principle of Deitrick and the reasoning of various state decisions relating to
accommodation makers of notes to banks should be applied to bar D'Oench's de-
fense. Id. at 457-58. The fact that injury could not be shown did not prevent estoppel
against the defendant; indeed, the inconvenient fact that the FDIC did not come into
existence until several years after the note was made was of no moment, the note
being a continuing misrepresentation. Id. at 459-60. Therefore, without regard to the
law of Illinois or Missouri, the defendant was estopped to deny the note.
35. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 459-60.
36. Despite these amputations, the rule remains understood as one of estoppel.
Hood v. RTC, No. 93-2260, 1994 WIL 87232, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 17, 1994).
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of the common law doctrine, the Court declared that not only would
its rule of estoppel apply to intentional inflation of the value of bank
assets, but also to those, no matter how ignorant or ill-informed, who
lent themselves to a scheme to defraud the insurer, whether or not the
insurer was in fact deceived.37
Common law D'Oench was soon joined by its statutory sibling. In
1950, Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, section
2(13)(e) of which was codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).38 Section
1823(e), in contrast to equitable D'Oench, was a rigid statute of frauds
that applied stringent execution, approval, and recordation require-
ments to any agreement diminishing the right, title, or interest of
FDIC-Corporate in any asset acquired by it. Despite their very differ-
37. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 458-59.
38. An act to amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Ch. 967, § 2(13)(e), 64
Stat. 873, 889 (1950) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). An
account of the legislative history (such as it is) of the 1950-model section 1823(e) is
provided in Marsha Hymanson, Note, Borrower Beware: D'Oench, Duhme and Sec-
tion 1823 Overprotect the Insurer When Banks Fail, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 253, 275-79
(1988). As originally enacted, section 1823(e) was part of a provision allowing the
insurers to engage in purchase and assumption transactions. In 1982, the purchase-
and-assumption language was moved to 1823(c). See generally W. Robert Gray, Limi-
tations on the FDIC's D'Oench Doctrine of Federal Common-law Estoppel: Congres-
sional Preemption and Authoritative Statutory Construction, 31 S. Tex. L. Rev. 245,
256-57 & nn.70, 73 (1990) (discussing purchase and assumption transactions and the
old 1823(e)). As will be discussed below, the act was significantly amended in 1989 as
part of FIRREA, and, more recently, albeit more narrowly, in 1994. See infra notes 40
and 216. Section 1823(e), as in effect at the end of 1994, read as follows:
(e) Agreements Against Interests of Corporation
(1) In General
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the [Federal
Deposit Insurance] Corporation in any asset acquired by it under this section
or section 1821 of this title, either as security for a loan or by purchase or as
receiver of any insured depository institution, shall be valid against the Cor-
poration unless such agreement-
(A) is in writing,
(B) was executed by the depository institution and any person claiming
an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporane-
ously with the acquisition of the asset by the depository institution,
(C) was approved by the board of directors of the depository institution
or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of
said board or committee, and
(D) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official
record of the depository institution.
(2) Public Deposits
An agreement to provide for the lawful collateralization of deposits of a
Federal, State or local governmental entity or of any depositor referred to in
[section 1821(a)(2) of this title] shall not be deemed to be invalid pursuant to
paragraph (1)(B) solely because such agreement was not executed contem-
poraneously with the acquisition of the collateral or with any changes in the
collateral made in accordance with such agreement.
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (Supp. V 1993), as amended by The Riegle Community Develop-
ment and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 317, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 2160, 2223.
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ent natures, D'Oench and section 1823(e) have remained yoked to-
gether in the ensuing half century, section 1823(e) being viewed by the
courts as D'Oench codified.
The protections provided by the statute were limited. If Congress
codified the holding in D'Oench it did no more: the D'Oench decision
applied to the FDIC in its corporate capacity as did the original sec-
tion 1823(e). Many of the common law developments in the doctrine
of D'Oench came as extensions of the doctrine's hegemony to fresh
territory, to parties such as FDIC-Receiver or FSLIC, in any capacity,
parties to which neither the Court nor the Congress had spoken.39
The passage of FIRREA in 1989 eliminated much of the impetus
for these common law conquests. First, FIRREA extended section-
1823(e)-type protections to FDIC-Receiver, RTC in either corporate
or receivership capacity, and to bridge banks.' In addition, FIRREA
39. Thus, common law D'Oench is applicable to the FDIC-Receiver. See, e.g.,
Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Serv. Bank for Say., 932 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1991)
(citing cases). An argument has been made that common law D'Oench was born
applicable to FDIC-Receiver, because much of the reasoning in that case was derived
from Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940), which had involved FDIC in that ca-
pacity. Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 685, 691 n.1 (10th Cir. 1993);
FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 514 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986). Likewise, the common
law doctrine applied to the FSLIC prior to its demise in 1989. Se4 e.g., FDIC v. Mc-
Cullough, 911 F.2d 593, 599 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991) (apply-
ing D'Oench to FSLIC); FSLIC v. Two Rivers Assocs., 880 F.2d 1267, 1274-75 (11th
Cir. 1989) (same); FSLIC v. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp. 1044, 1051 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(same). It was also extended to bridge banks. Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523,
1524, 1528 (5th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1083 (1991); Bell & Murphy & As-
socs. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, 894 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
895 (1990).
40. The extensions came by allowing section 1823(e)'s protections to FDIC-Re-
ceiver (and thus to the RTC under 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4) (Supp. V 1993), which
grants RTC powers generally identical to those of the FDIC). FIRREA also deleted
the words "right, title and" from before the word "interest" in the introductory para-
graph of section 1823(e). Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, sec. 217, § 13(e), 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 183,
256 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (Supp. V 1993), as amended by The
Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L
No. 103-325, § 317, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 2160, 2223). Most circuit courts
addressing the problem have come to the conclusion the FIRREA amendments to
section 1823(e) apply retroactively to cases then pending. FDIC v. Longley I Realty
Trust, 988 F.2d 270, 273-74 (1st Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Wright, 942 F.2d 1089, 1095-97
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992); FDIC v. Kasal, 913 F.2d 487, 493
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991). The only Circuit to have decided
otherwise is the Tenth. Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 685, 695-96 (10th
Cir. 1993). Section 1823(e) has since been narrowed by waiving the requirement that
deposit agreements be executed contemporaneously with acquisition of collateral for
collateralized deposits of governmental bodies. The Riegle Community Development
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 317, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 2160, 2223.
FIRREA extended protections similar, although not identical, to those of section
1823(e) to bridge commercial banks. The difference lies in the fact that, because the
bridge bank will be an ongoing operation, its "section 1823(e)" protections are limited
to agreements of the predecessor institution. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
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placed D'Oench-derived limitations on exceptions to the rights of the
receiver to repudiate contracts.4' Potentially more significant was the
and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, sec. 214, § 11(n) (4)(I), 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 183, 249 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(4) (1) (Supp. V
1993)). Apart from the time element, the two are twins and courts have held they are
to be construed identically. Hanson v. FDIC, 13 F.3d 1247, 1250 n.5 (8th Cir. 1994);
New Me. Nat'l Bank v. Seydler, 765 F. Supp. 770, 774 n.5 (D. Me. 1991).
These protections do not appear to have been extended to RTC- or FDIC-organ-
ized new savings associations, the functional equivalent of bridge thrifts. The courts
have stepped into the breach left by Congress's omission. See Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC,
984 F.2d 1571, 1576-77 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1993); RTC v. Crow, 763 F. Supp. 887, 892
(N.D. Tex. 1991). One court has held that merely because 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(4)(I)
expressly provides section-1823(e)-style protections to bridge banks does not mean
that bridge thrifts similarly organized should not have the express (and broader) pro-
tections of section 1823(e), since the receiver of a bridge thrift takes by purchase for
purposes of section 1823(e). Castleglen, Inc. v. Commonwealth Say. Ass'n, 728 F.
Supp. 656, 674 (D. Utah 1989), aff'd sub nom. Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984 F.2d 1571(10th Cir. 1993). Such a construction would, of course, render 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(n)(4)(I) meaningless, because a bridge bank acquires by purchase just as much
as does a bridge thrift. As a matter of strict statutory construction, it seems that sec-
tion 1823(e) should not apply to a bridge thrift, but it appears that courts will gener-
ally do so, rendering 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(4)(I) so much superfluous verbiage. Adams
v. Madison Realty & Dev., 746 F. Supp. 419, 430-31 (D.N.J. 1990), aff'd, 937 F.2d 845
(3d Cir. 1991). But cf. B.L. Nelson & Assocs. v. Sunbelt Say., FSB, 733 F. Supp. 1106,
1112 n.11 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (happening upon problem but, constrained by Fifth Circuit
precedent, ignoring it). Indeed, one court has gone so far as to state, without explana-
tion, that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(4)(I) does not apply to FDIC as receiver of a bridge
bank, and that the proper provision is section 1823(e). Hanson v. FDIC, 13 F.3d 1247,
1250 n.5 (8th Cir. 1994).
Another governmental party may remain unprotected as well: conservators, who
step in to assume the management of failing banks, although common law D'Oench
may protect them. Germania Bank v. Brehm, 763 F. Supp. 1030, 1036-37 (E.D. Mo.
1991). But see Castleglen, Inc. v. Commonwealth Say. Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. 656, 673 (D.
Utah 1989) (insisting that section 1823(e) applies to conservator), aff'd sub nom.
Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993); FSLIC v. Musacchio, 695 F.
Supp. 1044, 1048, 1050-51 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (applying common law D'Oench). Fur-
ther, the insurer must have taken possession of the assets in some capacity; a mere
midwifing of a transaction does not implicate D'Oench. Rodriguez v. Banco Central,
777 F. Supp. 1043, 1065 (D.P.R. 1991), aff'd, 990 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1993).
41. The receiver of a bank has been given the authority to repudiate contracts it
finds burdensome upon the estate, and to pay actual, compensatory damages therefor.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1), 1821(e)(3) (Supp. V 1993). These repudiation sections contain
various provisions subjecting specified classes of contracts to some or all of the
D'Oench requirements. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(e)(6), 1821(e)(8) (Supp. V 1993). This, of
course, implies that other repudiated contracts are not subject to section 1823(e), else
such language would be unnecessary.
Most of the few cases applying D'Oench to repudiated contracts have related to
situations in which the bank's counterparty had engaged in setoffs against monies due
the receivership estate, thus implicating an asset. FDIC v. Vienna Mortgage Corp.,
Nos. 92-1091 & 92-1092, 1993 WL 25459, at *2-3 (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 74 (1993); RTC v. Management, Inc., No. 8:CV91-00185, 1993 WL 666700,
at *5 (D. Neb. Apr. 22, 1993), aff'd on other grounds, 25 F.3d 627 (8th Cir. 1994).
One case has, however, summarily held, based on common law D'Oench and section
1823(e), that resort to "side agreements" to prove that what appeared to be an ordi-
nary lease, terminable without damages for future rent, was in fact part of a complex
sale/leaseback would not be permitted. Dababneh v. FDIC, 971 F.2d 428,436-37 (10th
Cir. 1992).
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addition by section 1821(d)(9)(A) of a shield, forged from the same
steel as the sword of section 1823(e), to the insurers'
armamentarium.42
Common law D'Oench continues to be applied, however. The com-
mon law doctrine is available to those still excluded from the statutory
protections, such as bank subsidiaries and private asset purchasers. 3
Further, the extension of statutory protections has not stripped the
egis of common law D'Oench from its beneficiaries, and decisions
have continued or expanded the coverage of common law D'Oench to
almost any entity involved in the resolution of insolvent
44 banks.45
Thus, the insurers are protected by both doctrines from the undocu-
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(A) (Supp. V 1993). See infra notes 210-19 and accom-
panying text (discussing section 1821(d)(9)(A)).
43. D'Oench in its various forms has been held to be available for purchasers of
assets from the insurers, whether as purchasers of a bridge bank, under a purchase
and assumption or in individual asset sales. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 11
F.3d 1260, 1268 (5th Cir. 1994); Community Bank v. FDIC, 984 F.2d 254, 256-57 (8th
Cir. 1993); Newton v. Uniwest Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 340,347 (9th Cir. 1992); FSLIC v.
Cribbs, 918 F.2d 557,560 (5th Cir. 1990); CMF Va. Land, L.P. v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp.
90, 93 (E.D. Va. 1992); Fleet Bank v. Steeves, 785 F. Supp. 209, 213-14 (D. Me. 1992);
Santopadre v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n, 782 F. Supp. 1138, 1141-42 (E.D.
La.), aff'd, 977 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1992); Alarcon v. Williams, 772 F. Supp. 334,342-44
(E.D. Mich. 1991); Adams v. Walker, 767 F. Supp. 1099, 1105-06 (D. Kan. 1991). But
see FDIC v. Dixon, 681 F. Supp. 408, 414 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (stating, in dictum, that
"[iln the hands of any party other than the FDIC that is not a holder in due course,
Dixon's assumption agreement may be subject to recission based on fraud in the in-
ducement"). The federal holder in due course doctrine is also available to private
asset buyers. FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47, 50-51 (8th Cir. 1989); B.L. Nelson &
Assocs. v. Sunbelt Say., FSB, 733 F. Supp. 1106, 1112-13 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
A number of cases have determined that D'Oench protections should be extended
to subsidiaries. Oliver v. RTC, 955 F.2d 583, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1992); Victor Hotel
Corp. v. FCA Mortgage Corp., 928 F.2d 1077, 1083 (11th Cir. 1991); Lesal Interiors,
Inc. v. RTC, 834 F. Supp. 721,730 (D.N.J. 1993); Glenborough N.M. Assocs. v. RTC,
802 F. Supp. 387, 394-95 (D.N.M. 1992); Outer Banks Contractors, Inc. v. Daniels &
Daniels Constr., Inc., 433 S.E.2d 759, 766-67 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). This has even
embraced subsidiaries of subsidiaries. Robinowitz v. Gibraltar Say., 23 F.3d 951, 956
(5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 725 (1995); Alexandria Assocs. v. Mitchell Co.,
800 F. Supp. 1412, 1423 (S.D. Miss. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 2 F.3d 598 (5th Cir.
1993).
Some extensions have been somewhat extreme. One court has permitted the
RTC's title insurer to assert, albeit unsuccessfully, the D'Oench defenses of its in-
sured. RTC v. Ford Mall Assocs., 796 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Minn. 1992). Another court
has allowed a bank that had purchased a 90% participation in loans to be sheltered by
D'Oench and section 1823(e) on the whole amount when it purchased the remaining
10% from the receiver. Alarcon v. Williams, 772 F. Supp. 334, 343-44 (E.D. Mich.
1991). Others have extended D'Oench protection to former employees of banks.
FDIC v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 875 (3d Cir. 1994) (dismissing slander claims against
directors under D'Oench-barred agreement thus holding, by implication, directors
were protected by D'Oench; one judge dissenting in n.13). But see Crowe v. Smith,
848 F. Supp. 1248, 1254-55 (W.D. La. 1994) (denying that D'Oench protected former
officers).
44. D'Oench does not protect the quick, only the dead. First Interstate Bank v.
First Nat'l Bank, 928 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1991) ("The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
protects the FDIC, not a solvent bank.").
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mented agreements of their predecessor banks, if not their own
errors.46
The continued vitality of common law D'Oench after its codifica-
tion is doctrinally troubling. Federal common law is supposed to be a
limited, interstitial remedy to protect only the most vital of federal
interests,4 7 and ought fade away should the legislature turn its atten-
tion to the subject.4 Nonetheless, arguments that common law
D'Oench has been preempted by its statutory kin have been unsuc-
cessful in stemming the tide of expansion.49 The trend seems unlikely
45. Thus, the RTC has inherited common law D'Oench protection from its intes-
tate, the FSLIC. RTC v. Hunters Ridge Income Investors, L.P., 796 F. Supp. 1261,
1263 (E.D. Mo. 1992); RTC v. Jet Stream, Ltd., 790 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (M.D. Fla.
1992); Castleglen, Inc. v. Commonwealth Say. Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. 656, 662-63 (D.
Utah 1989), aff'd sub nom. Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
Likewise, FDIC-Receiver is not deprived of these protections by the extension of
section 1823(e) to it. Carico v. First Nat'l Bank, 734 F. Supp. 768, 770 (E.D. Tex.
1990).
46. The statement that the insurer is not protected has primarily come in dictum.
FDIC v. Massingill, 24 F.3d 768,779 (5th Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Byrne, 736 F. Supp. 727,
731 (N.D. Tex. 1990); cf RTC v. Thompson, 989 F.2d 942, 943 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner,
J.) (noting, with evident approval, FDIC's concession that D'Oench did not apply).
But see Gertner v. FDIC, 814 F. Supp. 177, 179 (D. Mass. 1992) (holding D'Oench
barred claim that FDIC official had agreed that bank would honor pre-insolvency
loan commitment). Further, the insurer not being absolved, its successor can have no
greater rights. FDIC v. Perry Bros., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 1248, 1276 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
This may also apply to pre-receivership actions of the insurer. Agri-Tech, Ltd. v.
North Am. Bank, No. 1 CA-CV 89-145, 1990 WL 210645, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec.
20, 1990). The insurer obviously will not be liable for breach of a D'Oench-barred
agreement. Franklin Asaph Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC, 794 F. Supp. 402, 408-09
(D.D.C. 1992); RTC v. Crow, 763 F. Supp. 887, 893-95 n.8 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
The insurer may apparently evade all liability by doing its dirty work in the guise of
a bridge-bank conservator, and then denying all liability if the bridge bank is put into
receivership, or when it acts as a bridge bank receiver ab initio. See RTC v. Dunmar
Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 590-91 (11th Cir. 1995); FDIC v. Greenberg, 851 F. Supp. 15 (D.
Mass. 1994); Hill v. Imperial Say., 852 F. Supp. 1354, 1368 (W.D. Tex. 1992). This
proposition is dubious, at least as to section 1823(e) and bridge banks because the
extension of section 1823(e) protections to bridge banks would render 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441(n)(4)(I) redundant, a result forbidden to statutory construction.
47. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2055 (1994).
48. Id. at 2054.
49. Courts have summarily rejected arguments that common law D'Oench has
been pre-empted in 1950 with the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of
1950, in 1989 by FIRREA, or in general. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Griffin, 935 F.2d 691, 698
(5th Cir. 1991) (in general), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1163 (1992); FDIC v. Betancourt,
865 F. Supp. 1035, 1039 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (FDIA); Adams v. Madison Realty &
Dev., 746 F. Supp. 419, 425-26 (D.NJ. 1990) (FIRREA), aff'd, 937 F.2d 845 (3d Cir.
1991). Only one (Article I) court has wholeheartedly bought into the argument, and
then in mere dictum. In re Woodstone Ltd. Partnership, 133 B.R. 678, 686 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 149 B.R. 294 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). On appeal, Judge Raggi
reached out to swat down this seditious speculation. In re Woodstone Ltd. Partner-
ship, 149 B.R. 294, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Another court seemed to accept that defer-
ence to the legislature required that affirmative claims against the receivership were
governed by section 1821(d)(9)(A) and not by common law D'Oench. Fox & Lazo-
Atl. Commercial Group v. RTC, 862 F. Supp. 1233, 1241 (D.N.J. 1994). The argument
for preemption is made in Gray, supra note 38.
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to change despite the Supreme Court's recent manifestation of a hos-
tile attitude toward federal common law protections for the insurers."
In the Eighties, the protections available to the insurers were con-
siderably expanded by two courts wrestling with the meaning of the
term "agreement" in section 1823(e). These courts came to similar
solutions, but by radically different roads. One solution, the federal
holder in due course doctrine, is a result of the legislative genius of the
common law judge, the other, the Supreme Court's construction of
section 1823(e), a result of Justice Scalia's determination to seek the
true meaning of the word "agreement" in that statute. In construing
section 1823(e), courts took the term agreement to mean "covenants
to be performed in the future." It followed that an oral misrepresen-
tation made by a bank would fall outside the scope of the statute and
yet, as a fraud in the inducement, render the obligation voidable by
the debtor.5"
One solution to the "agreement"/"misrepresentation" problem re-
quired the creation of an entirely new doctrine to protect the insurers.
In Gunter v. Hutcheson,52 the Eleventh Circuit strained to the limit
the feeble and interstitial "legislative" powers retained by the judici-
ary. Seeking justification in the Congress's desire to encourage
purchase and assumption transactions, and precedent in the hoary law
of bills, notes, and drafts, the Gunter court created a fusion of the
principles of D'Oench and negotiable instruments law.53 Under later
50. The Supreme Court's recent decision in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S.
Ct. 2048 (1994), advocates a less expansive view of the federal common law rights of
the FDIC and, by extension, the RTC. In that decision, the Court determined that the
Ninth Circuit's creation of a federal common law rule barring a law firm from imput-
ing the knowledge of officers of the bank to the receiver in defense of a malpractice
action was permitted neither before nor after FIRREA. The receiver stepped into
the shoes of the bank and had no better rights than the bank would have, except
where Congress otherwise expressly prescribed. Furthermore, deference to the legis-
lative branch forbade freelance judicial lawmaking. Most of the courts that have ad-
dressed the impact of O'Melveny on D'Oenchlfederal holder in due course dabbled
with the decision for choice-of-law purposes within the federal common law frame-
work, effectively ignoring the implications of the Court's pronouncements on preemp-
tion. See FDIC v Massingill, 30 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 1994) (dictum); RTC v. Maplewood
Invs., 31 F.3d 1276 (4th Cir. 1994); FDIC v. O'Flahaven, 857 F. Supp. 154 (D.N.H.
1994) (dictum). One court has held that O'Melveny has overruled the federal holder
in due course doctrine, but went on to determine case under "the D'Oench, Duhme
Doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)." RTC v. A.W. Assocs., 869 F. Supp. 1503, 1510 (D.
Kan. 1994) (emphasis added). It is worthy of note that the Ninth Circuit, in deriving
the federal common law rule negatived by the Court, had located its authority in
D'Oench. FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744,751 n.9 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
114 S. Ct 2048 (1994).
51. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 867 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826(1982).
52. 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
53. In Gunter, defrauded securities purchasers sought to rescind their notes, which
had been acquired by FDIC-Corporate in the course of a purchase and assumption
transaction. Id at 866. The Gunter court first rejected the proposition that fraud in
the inducement was an "agreement" under section 1823(e). Id. at 867. The court then
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interpretations of Gunter, as a buyer of assets in a purchase and as-
sumption agreement, the insurer receives that most coveted of sta-
tuses, that of a holder in due course. This is a distinction of which,
under ordinary principles of law, it is utterly undeserving.-4 As a fed-
eral holder in due course, the insurer is immune from all "personal"
defenses to the enforcement of the instrument, remaining vulnerable
only to a residuum of "real" defenses.
The federal holder in due course doctrine is more constrained than
D'Oench. Federal holder in due course status is generally confined to
the insurers in their corporate rather than their receivership capac-
ity.5 5 Reflecting its genesis in negotiable instrument law, application
went on to use a Kimbell Foods analysis to make federal common law to protect the
FDIC. As described in Gunter, the Court had, in United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979), set out a multi-factor test to determine whether, when fed-
eral common law applies (as it does to the FDIC under D'Oench), such law would
adopt state law as the rule of decision or create a federal rule. The first factor is the
need for national uniformity, the second the extent to which a state rule would frus-
trate statutory objectives, and the third whether a distinct federal rule would disrupt
commercial relations. Gunter, 674 F.2d at 868. Weighing these factors, the Gunter
court determined that the FDIC, needing to act in haste to carry out purchase and
assumption transactions, would be hampered by a need to research individual state
law. Further, allowing a defense of fraud would frustrate the statutory objective of
promoting purchase and assumptions by making it impossible to evaluate the costs of
a purchase and assumption versus a liquidation. Finally, the court determined that
because a note could always be transferred to a holder in due course, cutting off the
defense of fraud, no disruption of commercial expectations would ensue. Id. at 869-73.
The court thus held that when the FDIC acquires a note in a purchase and assumption
transaction for value, in good faith and without actual knowledge of defenses it takes
the note free of state and common law fraud defenses and is an innocent transferee
for purposes of § 29 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 873-75. While the
rule in Gunter is often applied on the basis of state law holder-in-due course princi-
ples, the Gunter court itself appears to have tailored the rule to mesh not with state
law, but rather with the requirements of § 29. Id. at 876 (distinguishing UCC's notice
test).
54. The FDIC takes the instruments in a bulk sale of the entire insolvent bank
and, because most of the notes it takes are nonperforming, it takes the instruments
with notice of their dishonor. FDIC v. Percival, 752 F. Supp. 313, 325 (D. Neb. 1990).
These would prevent the FDIC from achieving holder in due course status. Under
§§ 3-302(3)(c) and 3-302(1)(c) of the UCC, a holder who takes the instrument in a
bulk sale not in the ordinary course of business of the transferor or with notice that
the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored is disabled from being a holder in
due course. Interestingly, the drafters of the UCC believed that § 3-302(c) "applies to
a purchaser at ... a sale by a state bank commissioner of the assets of an insolvent
bank." U.C.C. § 3-302 cmt. 3 (1978) (article withdrawn 1990). Claims that an insurer
or its assignee as bulk transferees with notice of delinquency could not take as holders
in due course have explicitly been rejected. FSLIC v. Cribbs, 918 F.2d 557, 559 (5th
Cir. 1990); FSLIC v. Hsi, 657 F. Supp. 1333, 1336-37, 1338 n.2 (E.D. La. 1986). One
court has gone so far, in dictum, as to waive these and the requirement that the trans-
feree be unaware of the claims of third parties. Sunbelt Say., FSB v. Montross, 923
F.2d 353, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1991). There is even some authority that the insurer need
not even prove itself a holder. See RTC v. Maldonado, 595 So. 2d 774, 776 (La. Ct.
App. 1992) (Lobrano, J., dissenting).
55. Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust (In re 604 Co-
lumbus Ave. Realty Trust), 968 F.2d 1332, 1352-53 (1st Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Laguarta,
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of the federal holder in due course doctrine is normally limited to in-
struments that are negotiable.56 Similarly, the insurer's knowledge of
defenses may be relevant, because a holder in due course must take
the instrument without knowledge of third-party claims or borrower
defenses.5 7 The question of the operation of the federal holder in due
939 F.2d 1231, 1239 n.19 (5th Cir. 1991); Beitzell & Co. v. FDIC (In re Beitzell & Co.),
163 B.R. 637, 645 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1993); Gallant v. Kanterman (In re Kanterman), 97
B.R. 768, 777 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 108 B.R. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). But see First-
south, F.A. v. Aqua Constr., Inc., 858 F.2d 441,443 (8th Cir. 1988) (according FSLIC-
Receiver federal holder in due course status). Even in circuits that do not normally
permit the extension of federal holder in due course status to receivers, an exception
may exist for receivers of institutions that acquired the asset in question in a purchase
and assumption transaction. Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. 604 Columbus Ave. Realty
Trust (In re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust), 968 F.2d 1332, 1351 n.14 (1st Cir 1992)
(parsing, and following, Fifth Circuit cases).
56. Under the UCC, an instrument is negotiable if it "contain[s] an unconditional
promise... to pay a sum certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation or
power.... UCC § 3-104(1)(b) (1978) (article withdrawn 1990). Various instruments
that are, by their nature, beyond the pale of commercial paper are excluded from the
corresponding federal protections. The most typical example is a guaranty, which is a
contingent obligation rather than unconditional obligation to pay. FDIC v. Payne, 973
F.2d 403, 408 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The FDIC is no alchemist and thus has no philoso-
pher's stone with which to transform... [a] guaranty into a negotiable instrument.");
FDIC v. Percival, 752 F. Supp. 313, 324 (D. Neb. 1990). But see FDIC v. Turner, 869
F.2d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1989); Firstsouth, F.A. v. Aqua Constr., Inc., 858 F.2d 441,443
(8th Cir. 1988); FDIC v. Morrison, Nos. 85-5272 & 85-5273, 1987 WL 37065, at *5 (6th
Cir. Apr. 14, 1987). Recitals that the note is subject by its terms to other agreements,
thus containing promises, orders or obligations not authorized by the UCC, have also
precluded according federal holder in due course status to the insurer. RTC v. Fox,
No. CLV. A. 91-1457, 1993 WL 189494, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 1993); RTC v. 1601
Partners, 796 F. Supp. 238, 240-41 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
Notes are excluded if they do not provide for payment of a sum certain and are thus
non-negotiable. This includes notes bearing a variable interest rate, to the extent ex-
cluded from negotiability by relevant state statute law or precedent. Sunbelt Say.,
FSB v. Montross, 923 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1991); Desmond v. FDIC, 798 F. Supp.
829, 840-41 (D. Mass. 1992); 1301 Conn. Ave. Assocs. v. RTC (In re 1301 Conn. Ave.
Assocs.), 126 B.R. 823, 831 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991). Likewise, notes also may be ex-
cluded if they allow for advances from time to time. RTC v. Oaks Apartments Joint
Venture, 966 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1992); 1301 Conn. Ave. Assocs. v. RTC (In re
1301 Conn. Ave. Assocs.), 126 B.R. 823, 831 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991).
57. The courts have continued to follow Gunter's '34-Act-derived "actual knowl-
edge" test rather than the UCC's notice requirement. FDIC v. Turner, 869 F.2d 270,
273 (6th Cir. 1989). But see FDIC v. Orrill, 771 F. Supp. 777, 779-80 (E.D. La. 1991)
(implying even possession of actual notice is irrelevant), aff'd sub nor. American
Bank & Trust v. Orrill, 978 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1992). Actual knowledge presents a
high hurdle for borrowers to leap. Notice may not be imputed to the insurer because
information sufficient to charge it with knowledge of the defense could be found in
the bank's files. FDIC v. Gilbert, 9 F.3d 393, 395 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1993); FDIC v.
Binion, 953 F.2d 1013, 1017 (6th Cir. 1991); see also FDIC v. Caledonia Inv. Corp.,
725 F. Supp. 90, 95 (D.P.R. 1989) (dictum). But see Albuquerque Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Deville, 615 So. 2d 1002, 1008-09 (La. Ct. App. 1993). Similarly, the mere
filing of an action prior to takeover of the institution is insufficient to charge the
insurer with knowledge. RTC v. Jet Stream, Ltd., 790 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (M.D. Fla.
1992).
Further, courts have reversed the normal rule under the UCC and held that such
forbidden knowledge is for the defendant to plead and prove. Compare U.C.C. § 3-
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course doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note, although the doc-
trine cannot pass unremarked given its influence on the statutory and
common law D'Oench doctrines and the defenses available against
them.
In Langley v. FDIC58 the Court solved, in Gordian-knot fashion,
the "agreement" problem that had consumed so much jurisprudential
ingenuity in Gunter. Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court,
held that the term "agreement" in section 1823(e) should be con-
strued to include fraudulent misrepresentations that induced the exe-
cution of the contract. Because the plain meaning of the word
"agreement" might not seem to include a fraudulent luring into con-
tract,5 9 Justice Scalia reached this conclusion by reasoning that fraud
was the functional equivalent of an unwritten warranty on which per-
formance was conditioned, and thus an "agreement. ' 60 Looking be-
307(3) (1978) (article withdrawn 1990) and Thomas M. Quinn, 1 Quinn's Uniform
Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest I 3-307[A][6], 3-307[B][6] (2d ed.
1991) (discussing burden of proof of lack of knowledge and providing case annota-
tions) with RTC v. Jet Stream, Ltd., 790 F. Supp. 1130,1138 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (insisting
that knowledge is defendant's proof) and B.L. Nelson & Assocs. v. Sunbelt Say., FSB,
733 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (same). But see Lassiter v. RTC, 610 So. 2d
531, 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (placing burden on insurer).
This absence of knowledge may apply only to the insurer, and not the bank. The
court in St. Bernard Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cella, 826 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. La. 1993),
held that where the defunct bank took with notice of dishonor, the RTC could not
become a federal holder in due course. Id. at 987. This opinion is, however, somewhat
casuistical in its reasoning generally: it held that because the note itself did not com-
ply with section 1823(e) and because the note, having matured, tended to diminish the
interest of the RTC in the note, the note was therefore invalid as to the RTC, thus
precluding the RTC from holder in due course status. Id. at 986.
58. 484 U.S. 86 (1987). The Langleys had purchased land from Planters Trust &
Savings Bank of Opelousas, Louisiana, and had given in payment their note and cer-
tain guarantees. The note was repeatedly renewed, and after the last renewal, the
Langleys refused to pay any more. Claims and counterclaims were brought, the com-
plaint of the Langleys being that Planters had misrepresented the size of the parcel
and the unencumbered nature of its mineral rights. The FDIC learned of these claims
during its examination of the bank. The FDIC transferred the liabilities and certain of
the assets to another bank in a purchase-and-assumption transaction, keeping for it-
self, inter alia, the Langley note. The case reached the Court after the District Court
had granted summary judgment in favor of FDIC and was affirmed, the Fifth Circuit
holding that a misrepresentation was an "agreement" for purposes of section 1823(e).
Id. at 88-90.
59. See RTC v. Ehrenhaus, 34 F.3d 441, 442 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.) (laying
at the feet of Langley "[t]he fiction that a contract induced by fraud is an 'agreement'
within the meaning of section 1823(e) but that a forged contract is not (or, we dare-
say, one induced by a threat)"); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees
v. FDIC (In re NBW Commercial Paper Litig.), 826 F. Supp. 1448,1462 (D.D.C. 1992)
("There is no question that Langley expands the definition of 'agreement' in § 1823(e)
beyond the traditional meaning of the word.").
60. Langley, 484 U.S. at 90-93. Prior to Langley,
courts [had] distinguished between two types of fraud in the inducement: (1)
promissory fraud-an oral promise by the bank to perform a duty in connec-
tion with the execution of a note that the bank does not intend to perform-
which [could not] be asserted against the FDIC; and (2) factual fraud-a
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yond a narrow definition of the word "agreement," Justice Scalia
examined the intention of the legislature in imposing the restrictions
of section 1823(e). In so doing, the Justice construed D'Oench, much
as one might examine a legislative history, to determine such intent, a
stratagem that led to revisions in the lower courts' views of the com-
mon law doctrine as well as the statute.6 Further, he reasoned that,
because section 1823(e) spoke of the FDIC's interest in an asset, only
if there was an infirmity in the asset that rendered it utterly void could
the FDIC be defeated; a mere voidability was insufficient.6 - Thus the
insurers, like a holder in due course, were to be protected from any
defenses that would render the instrument merely voidable. Ex-
tending the estoppel argument from D'Oench, Justice Scalia also
stated that not only is a showing of reliance on the validity of the note
unnecessary, but even knowledge by the FDIC of misrepresentations
that would render the note voidable is irrelevant.6
B. The Two Doctrines
The common law and statutory doctrines are directed to the same
evils and share the same principles. Under the common law doctrine,
a party must have lent itself to a scheme that could deceive the bank-
ing authorities. Statutory D'Oench fossilizes this principle by setting
out a series of execution, approval, and record retention require-
ments. If an agreement fails even one of these tests, it is barred. The
relationship between the two doctrines is somewhat unclear. Often
courts will borrow requirements from the statutory provision as if the
common law and statute were one. Other courts will recognize that
the two are distinct and that to utilize Congress's formulations in situ-
ations in which the legislature did not mandate that the statute apply
factual misrepresentation by the bank not involving the undertaking of any
contractual duty-which [could] be asserted against the FDIC
FDIC v. Amberson, 676 F. Supp. 777,780 (W.D. Tex. 1987). See also FDIC v. Gallo-
way, 856 F.2d 112, 113-15 (10th Cir. 1988) (illustrating operation of distinction and
effect of Langley). Commentators have attempted to criticize or confine the scope of
Scalia's construction by claiming that it is limited by the sources it cited. See Gray,
supra note 38, at 266-68, 285-86; Hymanson, supra note 38, at 308. This has not been
followed in the courts, which have read Justice Scalia to mean that Congress intended
the word "agreement" not be read with the scrivener's parsing of conditions prece-
dent, concurrent, and subsequent, of representations or of warranties, of covenants,
and pious wishes. See infra notes 92-113 (discussing various contract defenses barred
by D'Oench).
61. See infra note 80 (discussing incorporation of Langley into common law
D'Oench).
62. Langley, 484 U.S. at 93-94. It should be noted that the fraud in the factum
exception is actually grounded in a concession by Mr. Taranto, counsel for the FDIC.
Langley, 484 U.S. at 93-94.
63. Langley, 484 U.S. at 94-95. This was not new;, a number of lower courts had
also so held. See, e.g., FDIC v. MM & S Partners, 626 F. Supp. 681, 684 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (citing cases); FDIC v. Gardner, 606 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 (S.D. Miss. 1985)
(holding knowledge irrelevant).
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is not to apply the common law, but to rewrite the statute. In many
cases, the distinctions are irrelevant, because in principle the animat-
ing spirit of the two doctrines is the same, and in practice, in cases in
which the requirements of neither is met, it is irrelevant which is em-
ployed. The remaining distinctions appear to lie in the less formal
documentation requirements of common law D'Oench and the re-
quirement of section 1823(e) that an asset be implicated by the barred
agreement.
1. Elements of Common Law D'Oench and Section 1823(e)
Common law D'Oench embodies not so much a rule as a principle.
As the Court stated in D'Oench,6 "It would be sufficient in this type
of case that the maker lent himself to a scheme or arrangement
whereby the banking authority.., was or was likely to be misled."65
Lending oneself to a scheme or arrangement merely refers to any un-
written arrangement of which the insurer would not have been imme-
diately aware; "[s]imply put, transactions not reflected on the bank's
books do not appear on the judicial radar screen either. '6 6 Further-
more, the deception need not be advertant or even actual. The poten-
tial that "the banking authority ...was likely to be misled,"'67 is
sufficient to render a claim vulnerable to common law D'Oench. 8 In
64. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
65. Id. at 460.
66. Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013, 1016 (5th Cir. 1990). To borrow from the
language of the criminal law, D'Oench is an offense of general rather than specific
intent. The mere act of entry into an unshriven agreement with a bank is sufficient to
trigger liability under D'Oench. McMillan v. MSank Fort Worth, N.A., 4 F.3d 362,
368-69 (5th Cir. 1993); Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., 937 F.2d 845, 852 (3d Cir.
1991); Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Serv. Bank for Say., 932 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir.
1991); FSLIC v. Gemini Management, 921 F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1990); FSLIC v.
Two Rivers Assocs., 880 F.2d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 1989). But see FDIC v. Bravo
Leather Corp., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 88,151, at
96,488 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 1990) (Kram, J.), vacated on motion for reconsideration sub
nom. FDIC v. Engel, 746 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); New York v. Harris Home
Design, Inc., [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,807, at
95,462 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1989) (Kram, J.).
67. D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 460.
68. The "tending to deceive" element is viewed from an objective, FDIC-centric
perspective; the question is not whether the FDIC's opponent intended to deceive.
Bell & Murphy & Assocs. v. Interfirst Bank Gateway, 894 F.2d 750, 753-54 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990). It is not even whether the opponent did in fact
deceive. FDIC v. Investors Assocs. X., Ltd., 775 F.2d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1985). But
see Bradford v. American Fed. Bank, 783 F. Supp. 283, 285 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (stating
that where documents in file and board approval showed usurious arrangement, ac-
tual knowledge by FDIC would preclude enforcement of note). Knowledge by the
insurer that the agreement existed, whether actual or constructive, is thus utterly irrel-
evant. Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Serv. Bank for Say., 932 F.2d 46,50-51 (1st Cir.
1991); Shuler v. RTC, 757 F. Supp. 761,766 (S.D. Miss. 1991); Castleglen, Inc. v. Com-
monwealth Sav. Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. 656, 669-70 (D. Utah 1989), aff'd sub nom.
Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993). Before Langley, there was
support for the proposition that knowledge of the defense would take it out of the
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sum, while the courts use the language of schemes, secrets, and deceit,
under recent precedents, the sole element of common law D'Oench is
simply that the party, however innocently, has entered into an agree-
ment not explicitly reflected in the records of the bank.6 9
In contrast, section 1823(e) is a statute of frauds, to be strictly con-
strued.70 Any agreement, to be enforceable, must be in writing, and
must have been executed 7' by the bank and the party claiming the
adverse interest thereunder contemporaneously' with the acquisition
ambit of common law D'Oench if it did not arise from a collateral agreement. See
FDIC v. MM & S Partners, 626 F. Supp. 681, 684-85 & n.2 (N.D. Il. 1985) (citing
cases but holding otherwise). The act is culpable if it had the potential, at the time
done, to deceive. A white-hands-empty-head defense is not available. FSLIC v. Grif-
fin, 935 F.2d 691, 698-99 (5th Cir. 1991), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 1163 (1992); Twin
Constr., Inc. v. Boca Raton, Inc., 925 F.2d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Neither the
intent to deceive nor fraud are requisites for the application of D'Oench."); FDIC v.
Investors Assocs. X., Ltd., 775 F.2d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[The borrower's] good
faith is simply irrelevant.").
69. Certain cases, particularly older ones, have implied that intent or at least reck-
lessness was required. Buchanan v. FSLIC, 935 F.2d 83, 85-86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1005 (1991); FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (5th Cir. 1988); FDIC
v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1986); New York v. Harris Home Design,
Inc., [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 87,807, at 95,462
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1989). This no longer appears necessary. Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d
1013, 1017 (5th Cir. 1990).
70. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 95 (1987).
71. Execution has been held to include the bank's preparation of a document and
its presentation to the borrower for execution simultaneously with the note. FDIC v.
Cremona Co., 832 F.2d 959, 963 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed sub nona. Gonda v.
FDIC, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988). But see FDIC v. Allen, 801 F.2d 863, 864-65 (6th Cir.
1986) (insisting guaranties were barred because unexecuted by the bank). Nor need
the documents executed by the bank and the borrower be a single document. See
Bank One Tex. Nat'l Ass'n v. Morrison, 26 F.3d 544, 550 (5th Cir. 1994). Similarly,
where actual execution by a party would be "nonsensical," one court has held execu-
tion by the appropriate parties sufficient, notwithstanding the wording of the statute.
RTC v. Ocotillo W. Joint Venture, 840 F. Supp. 1463, 1478 (D.N.M. 1993). But see
Lesal Interiors, Inc. v. RTC, 834 F. Supp. 721,732 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding non-execu-
tion of agreement by purported third-party beneficiary renders it unenforceable by
such party). An even more extreme view was taken by the Second Circuit, which has
held that signature by a party's agent is insufficient to show compliance with the exe-
cution requirement. FDIC v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that,
even where general partners executed on behalf of limited partnership, limited part-
ners had not executed).
Execution is viewed in the sense of signing of documents not performance of the
contract, and arguments based in execution-by-performance or execution-by-detri-
mental-reliance have been rejected. Twin Constr., Inc. v. Boca Raton, Inc., 925 F. 2d
378,384 (11th Cir. 1991); Franklin Asaph Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC, 794 F. Supp. 402,
405 & n.2 (D.D.C. 1992). But cf RTC v. J.B. Centron Dev. Co., 637 N.E.2d 23, 28
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (noting that since agreement was neither signed nor performed,
exact meaning of execution need not be reached).
72. "Contemporaneously" has never been adequately defined. Periods of mere
weeks have been deemed to have failed this prong of the test. Cardente v. Fleet Bank,
796 F. Supp. 603, 611 (D. Me. 1992) (18 days); Fleet Bank v. Prawer, 789 F. Supp. 451,
456 n.7 (D. Me. 1992) (two weeks), aff'd on different grounds, 991 F.2d 786 (1st Cir.
1993); RTC v. Dubois, 771 F. Supp. 154, 155-56 (M.D. La. 1991) (two weeks). But see
Lassiter v. RTC, 610 So. 2d 531, 536-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (11 days). Indeed,
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of the asset by the bank. The agreement must have been approved by
the board of directors or loan committee and recorded in its min-
utes,7 3 and the writing must have been kept continuously74 as an offi-
one court has required that, even where the asset was pledged to a bank, it is the time
of that pledge that controls. FDIC v. Friedland, 758 F. Supp. 941,944 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Other courts have, however, adopted a standard of contemporaneity that takes into
account commercial reality. RTC v. Midwest Fed. Say. Bank, 36 F.3d 785,797-98 (9th
Cir. 1993). Another court has held that, even if a document was created (and signed)
prior to the closing of the loan, if it is incorporated by reference and physically ap-
pended to the final loan documents, it will be deemed "executed" contemporaneously
for purposes of section 1823(e). Erbafina v. FDIC, 855 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. Mass. 1994).
This is one of the few section 1823(e) problems on which legislative history may
shed any light. (Such resort is legitimate given that the exact meaning of "contempo-
raneously" is opaque.) What became section 1823(e) originally required simultaneity
rather than contemporaneity. The provision was altered at the instance of Represen-
tative Walter, on the grounds that legitimate transactions would be barred if exact
simultaneity were required. "Under the.., bill, this agreement must be entered into
simultaneously with the recording and other conditions. It is quite obvious that is
impossible. Bank directors usually meet once a week. ... This language contem-
plates that ... these agreements ... may be approved contemporaneously ... at a
time approximating when they were entered into." FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Ctr.
766 F.2d 744, 753 n.26 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting 96 Cong. Rec. 10,731 (1950)). While
Representative Walters was laboring under a misapprehension of the language of sec-
tion 1823(e) (contemporaneity not being required for board approval), it appears the
word "contemporaneously" was deliberately selected to embody a "rule of reason"
with respect to execution.
The contemporaneity requirement has recently been narrowed to allow the security
interest of governmental units in collateral underlying collateralized deposits to sur-
vive notwithstanding a non-contemporaneous acquisition of collateral. The Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-325, § 317, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 2160, 2223. This was intended to over-
turn the specific holding of North Arkansas Medical Center v. Barrett, 962 F.2d 780
(8th Cir. 1992). H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-652, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1994), re-
printed in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1977, 2004.
73. Mere knowledge of the transaction by the board is irrelevant. Belsky v. First
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 80, 84 (D. Neb. 1986), aff'd, 818 F.2d 661 (8th Cir.
1987). Likewise, mere unrecorded approval by the board members is generally held
to be insufficient. FDIC v. Krause, 904 F.2d 463, 466 (8th Cir. 1990). One court has,
however, allowed actions by the bank that are consistent with approval having been
obtained to substitute for minutes. See Bank One Tex. Nat'l Ass'n v. Morrison, 26
F.3d 544, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1994).
The minutes must be the official minutes of the board not draft or unsigned min-
utes. RTC v. Ruggiero, 977 F.2d 309, 316 (7th Cir. 1992); American Say. Bank v.
Saleski Dev., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 28, 30-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
The existence of the minutes is sufficient; if there is an ambiguity in their meaning,
there will remain a factual question as to whether the transaction has been approved,
precluding summary judgment. Park Club, Inc. v. RTC, 967 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir.
1992) (applying common-law D'Oench). One court has, however, held that the spe-
cifics of the agreement sought to be enforced must be found therein, which could tend
to weaken such a rule. FDIC v. Gardner, 606 F. Supp. 1484, 1488 (S.D. Miss. 1985).
Further, mere reference to a document in the minutes does not constitute approval.
FDIC v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1994).
In RTC v. Midwest Federal Savings Bank, 36 F.3d 785, 796-800 (9th Cir. 1993), the
court considered the records of, execution by, and board approval on behalf of, the
wholly-owned subsidiary from which the bank had purchased the loan in determining
that the loan complied with section 1823(e). See also Lesal Interiors, Inc. v. RTC, 834
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cial record75 of the bank from the time of its execution. Failure to
meet any one of the four requirements is fatal.7 6
2. Are the D'Oench Doctrines of One Substance?
What then is the relationship between common law and statutory
D'Oench? If the doctrines differ and are solely of similar substance,
then only claims expressly made subject to section 1823(e) are subject
to its formalistic statute of frauds and claims subject to common law
D'Oench are subject to the more flexible equitable principle originally
promulgated by the Supreme Court.77 If the statute is a codification
F. Supp. 721,732 (D.N.J. 1993) (indicating, in dictum, that where section 1823(e) is to
be applied to a subsidiary of a bank that the relevant approval is that of the board or
committee of the subsidiary).
74. One court has crafted a presumption that, if the instrument is found in the files
when the bank is closed, it will, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be assumed
to have continuously resided in such file. FDIC v. Cremona Co., 832 F.2d 959, 963
(6th Cir. 1987), cerL dismissed sub nom. Gonda v. FDIC, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988). If,
however, bank officers play "hide-the-document" with the examiners, even though
the document was originally placed in the file it will be ineffective against the insurer.
FDIC v. Diamond C Nurseries, Inc., 629 So. 2d 157, 159-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
The bank's counterparty thus becomes, in essence, a guarantor of the efficiency of the
bank's file clerks and the honesty of its officers.
75. The definition of "official record" is also not clear;, however, a document held
in the draft documents file of the bank's outside counsel clearly falls without its ambit.
RTC v. McCrory, 951 F.2d 68, 71-72 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 459 (1992). It
has been indicated in dictum that a bank president's personal files may also be ex-
cluded. FDIC v. Diamond C Nurseries, Inc., 629 So. 2d 157, 159-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993). Apparently, there is some unclear distinction between a bank's general
records and its "official records." Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 856 F. Supp. 111,
117 (N.D.N.Y. 1994). A similar distinction between the bank's general records and its
loan files has been drawn in one common law D'Oench decision as well. RTC v. Oaks
Apartments Joint Venture, 966 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1992).
76. FDIC v. Wright, 942 F.2d 1089, 1101 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1937 (1992); FDIC v. Manatt, 922 F.2d 486, 488 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250
(1991); FDIC v. Mr. "T's", Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (M.D. La. 1991); FDIC v.
O'Malley, 618 N.E.2d 818, 829 (IML App. Ct. 1993), aff'd, No. 76106, 1994 WL 587659
(M. Oct. 27, 1994).
77. Such a view may be seen in separate analyses of common-law, or by explicit
statements of the separateness of the doctrines. See Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v.
FDIC, 987 F.2d 685, 690-96 (10th Cir. 1993) (separate analyses); Hall v. FDIC, 920
F.2d 334,339 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1231 (1991); Beener v. LaSala, 813
F. Supp. 303, 307 n.3 (D.N.J. 1993); Stebbins Realty Corp. v. FDIC, Civ. No. 91-568-
JD, 1994 WL 287742, at *2 (D.N.H. June 29, 1994); OPS Shopping Ctr. v. FDIC, No.
89-30142-RV, 1992 WL 489719, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 1992) (separate analyses),
aff'd on different grounds, 992 F.2d 306 (11th Cir. 1993); Agri Export Coop. v. Uni-
versal Say. Ass'n, 767 F. Supp. 824, 833-34 (S.D. Tex. 1991); RTC v. Wellington Dev.
Group, 761 F. Supp. 731, 735 (D. Colo. 1991); Tuxedo Beach Club Corp. v. City Fed.
Say. Bank, 749 F. Supp. 635, 642 (D.NJ. 1990); Castleglen, Inc. v. Commonwealth
Say. Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. 656, 662-64 (D. Utah 1989) (separate analyses), aff'd sub
nom. Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993); Weber v. New W. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 474-75 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
An extreme example is presented by two cases decided by Judge Kram in the
Southern District utilizing an pre-Langley understanding of common law D'Oench,
she dismissed FDIC-Receiver's interposition of common law D'Oench because there
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of the D'Oench decision, then common law and statutory D'Oench
are of one substance and a claim once brought within the ambit of the
former becomes subject to the strictures of the latter.7 8
was no showing of scienter on the borrower's part, but, upon FDIC's motion for re-
consideration, she dismissed the same claims by retroactively applying the no-fault
regime of the amended section 1823(e). Compare FDIC v. Bravo Leather Corp.,
[1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 88,151, at 96,488-89
(S.D.N.Y. May 15, 1990) (Kram, J.), vacated on motion for reconsideration sub nom.
FDIC v. Engel, 746 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) with FDIC v. Engel, 746 F. Supp.
1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). A learned discussion of the subject of common law and statu-
tory D'Oench, the distinctions between them and the territory occupied by each was
provided by Judge Lamberth in American Federation of State, County & Municipal
Employees v. FDIC (In re NBW Commercial Paper Litigation), 826 F. Supp. 1448
(D.D.C. 1992).
A similar problem is presented by the federal holder in due course doctrine, which
is seen by some courts to be distinct from the D'Oench doctrines. FDIC v. Byme, 736
F. Supp. 727, 731 n.6 (N.D. Tex. 1990); FDIC v. Percival, 752 F. Supp. 313, 328-29 (D.
Neb. 1990). Other courts treat the doctrines as identical. RTC v. Midwest Fed. Say.
Bank, 36 F.3d 785, 799 n.6 (9th Cir. 1993); Milligan v. Gilmore Meyer Inc., 775 F.
Supp. 400, 403-10 (S.D. Ga. 1991); FDIC v. Orrill, 771 F. Supp. 777, 780 (E.D. La.
1991), aff'd sub nom. American Bank & Trust v. Orrill, 978 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1992);
FDIC v. Newhart, 713 F. Supp. 320, 323 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.
1989).
This conflict recalls that, occasioned by another triune mystery, between the Homo-
ousions and the Homoiousions which so roiled the domestic tranquillity of the Asiatic
and African provinces of the Empire. The former, and victorious, party urged that
the Trinity was consubstantial, the latter that among the Three there was similarity
rather than identity. 1 Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire
684-90, 716-22 (Modem Library 1932) (1788).
78. The courts have applied pieces of the statute, such as the contemporaneity or
board-approval requirements, in common law cases, or have redrafted the statute
wholesale. See FDIC v. Camp, 965 F.2d 25, 30-31 (5th Cir. 1992) (wholesale); Car-
teret Sav. Bank v. Compton, Luther & Sons, 899 F.2d 340, 343-44 (4th Cir. 1990)
(contemporaneity); Firstsouth, F.A. v. Aqua Constr., Inc., 858 F.2d 441, 443 (8th Cir.
1988) (wholesale); Fleet Bank v. Steeves, 785 F. Supp. 209, 215 (D. Me. 1992) (con-
temporaneity); Oliver v. RTC, 747 F. Supp. 1351, 1354-55 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (whole-
sale), aff'd, 955 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1992); FSLIC v. Port Allen Dev. Corp., 684 F. Supp.
439, 440 (M.D. La. 1988) (board approval); cf. University Drive Professional Com-
plex, Inc. v. FSLIC (In re University Drive Professional Complex, Inc.), 101 B.R. 790,
797-98 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (noting, in dictum, that board approval should be
required).
Courts appear to become mesmerized by the concept of codification, and treat sec-
tion 1823(e) as if it had merely outfitted Justice Douglas' opinion with paragraphs,
subparagraphs, and the other paraphernalia of statute law. Nonetheless, other ob-
servers have recognized the distinctions: "The often recited statement that § 1823(o)
is a codification of D'Oench, Duhme does not bear analysis. The specific require-
ments of § 1823(e) are in no way provided, or even mentioned, in D'Oench,
Duhme .... These are exclusively the work of Congress." Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907
F.2d 1523, 1529-30 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990) (Brown, J. dissenting), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1083 (1991). Chief Judge Posner has expressed similar sentiments.
But the policy behind a statute and the statute itself need not be and in this
instance are not identical. Often, legislators, to make assurance doubly sure,
draft a statute that goes further than the goal they wanted to achieve; they
overshoot the mark to make sure they won't undershoot it. This seems to be
what happened in 1950 when Congress set about to codify D'Oench, Duhme
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Because the principle enunciated in D'Oench and the intent animat-
ing the statute are the same, concepts leak from section 1823(e) juris-
prudence to common law D'Oench decisions.79 Thus, the common
law doctrine has incorporated the definition of agreement and the ir-
relevance of notice propounded in Langley, although Justice Scalia
had purported to do no more than construe the language of section
1823(e). 80
In practice, the separation of the doctrines is irrelevant (and
unanalyzed)81 in many, or indeed most, cases. This can be seen in the
fact that the analysis of any D'Oench problem normally commences
with an examination of the presence or absence of a written agree-
ment, which is sine qua non of compliance with either the statutory or
common law D'Oench. 2 Similarly, section 1823(e), under the void/
voidable distinction drawn in Langley, provides protections to the in-
surer that are at the least similar to the protections extended to a
holder in due course. 3
A distinction appears to remain in many cases as to the formality of
documentation required. Common law D'Oench appears to require
.... The statute makes the common law principle both more encompassing
and more precise.
FDIC v. O'Neil, 809 F.2d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1987).
79. Olney Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Trinity Banc Say. Ass'n, 885 F.2d 266, 274 (5th
Cir. 1989); Royal Bank of Can. v. FDIC, 733 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (N.D. Tex. 1990);
FSLIC v. Hsi, 657 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D. La. 1986). The same may be said of
D'Oench and the federal holder in due course doctrine. Porras v. Petroplex Say.
Ass'n, 903 F.2d 379, 381 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990).
80. See FDIC v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1991) ("The Supreme
Court... decided... as a matter of strict statutory construction, and thus did not
completely foreclose the argument that the result would be different under the federal
common law doctrine of D'Oench, Duhme." (citation omitted)). Nevertheless, Lang-
ley has been seen as dispositive of the scope of the term "agreement" for purposes of
common law D'Oench. See, e.g., Century Centre Partners v. FDIC (In re Century
Centre Partners), 969 F.2d 835, 838-39 (9th Cir. 1992) (looking to Langley for mean-
ing of agreement), cerL denied, 113 S. CL 2997 (1993); Adams v. Madison Realty &
Dev., 937 F.2d 845,853-55,858 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); FSLIC v. Lafayette Inv. Proper-
ties, Inc., 855 F.2d 196, 198 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988) (same). It has been applied to the
question of whether fraud in the factum is a defense to common law D'Oench. Capi-
tol Bank & Trust Co. v. 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust (In re 604 Columbus Ave.
Realty Trust), 968 F.2d 1332, 1346 (1st Cir. 1992); FSLIC v. Maio, 736 F. Supp. 1039,
1041 (N.D. Cal. 1989). It has also been applied to the question of whether the knowl-
edge of the insurer is relevant. Robinowitz v. Gibraltar Say., 23 F.3d 951, 956-57 (5th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 725 (1995); Twin Constr., Inc. v. Boca Raton, Inc.,
925 F.2d 378, 383 (11th Cir. 1991); Oliver v. RTC, 747 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 & n.6 (E.D.
Mo. 1990), aff'd, 955 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1992).
81. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. FDIC (In re NBW
Commercial Paper Litig.), 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1457 (D.D.C. 1992).
82. RTC v. Murray, 935 F.2d 89, 93 n.3 (5th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Perry Bros., Inc.,
854 F. Supp. 1248, 1277 n.10 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Murphy v. FDIC, 829 F. Supp. 3, 6 n.5
(D.D.C. 1993); RTC v. Hunters Ridge Income Investors, L.P., 796 F. Supp. 1261, 1264
(E.D. Mo. 1992); RTC v. Ford Mall Assocs., 796 F. Supp. 1233, 1237 n.4 (D. Minn.
1992).
83. Newton v. Uniwest Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 340, 343 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992).
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only that documentation sufficient to have warned the insurers of the
agreement be in the files of the bank; lack of the formal requisites of
execution, contemporaneity, and approval will not necessarily permit
the invocation of the common law doctrine. 4 Thus, for example,
while resort to minutes of a board meeting may not be had to prove
the terms of an agreement under section 1823(e), the same is not true
of common law D'Oench. 5 An additional distinction may be found in
the requirement of section 1823(e) that an "asset" be implicated, a
subject this Note will explore later.8 6 The distinction in documenta-
tion requirements seems necessary and appropriate if the judiciary is
not to usurp the privileges of the legislature. While courts have ac-
cepted the idea that common law D'Oench has a life independent of
its "codification," to impose the formalistic recording requirements
imposed by the legislature on classes of transactions it did not see fit
to include comes perilously close to rewriting rather than supplement-
ing the statute.
C. Asset and Agreement Exceptions
Except for the widely discredited "innocent borrower" exception,
all exceptions to D'Oench may be classed as either "asset" or "agree-
ment" defenses. The innocent borrower defense, a creation of the
84. See, e.g., Bradford v. American Fed. Bank, 783 F. Supp. 283,284-85 (N.D. Tex.
1991) (looking to letters and other documents in file and minutes of board meetings
to determine if D'Oench applied); Germania Bank v. Brehm, 763 F. Supp. 1030, 1036-
37 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (denying concerns of common law D'Oench were implicated
where letter agreement recorded in bank's files and RTC was mere conservator of
assets); First Tex. Say. Ass'n v. Comprop Inv. Properties Ltd., 752 F. Supp. 1568, 1574
(M.D. Fla. 1990) (including written records, correspondence and proposals as writings
sufficient for common law D'Oench); Illinois ex rel Hartigan v. Commonwealth
Mortgage Corp. of Am., 723 F. Supp. 1258,1262 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (proposing to inquire
into generalized "written records" to determine compliance with common law
D'Oench); Lassiter v. RTC, 610 So. 2d 531, 535-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (consid-
ering loan approval letter and escrow instructions to determine compliance with com-
mon law D'Oench; but to show compliance with section 1823(e) remand was
necessary for further fact finding on status of loan approval letter); First Heights Bank
v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 608 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (looking to records of wire
transfers as records of the type ordinarily contained in loan files). One decision has,
however, required that the documents be contained in the loan file rather than gen-
eral bank records in order to be given any effect under common law D'Oench. RTC v.
Oaks Apartments Joint Venture, 966 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1992).
85. Armstrong v. RTC, 623 N.E.2d 291,298-99 (Ill. 1993) (rejecting board minutes
under section 1823(e) because unexecuted by the borrower and under common law
D'Oench because contents were too ambiguous to put insurer on notice). Compare
RTC v. Carr, 13 F.3d 425, 428 (1st Cir. 1993) (barring minutes that, not being exe-
cuted by the obligor, did not satisfy section 1823(e)) with Cohen v. RTC, No. CIV. 90-
1065-R(P), 1993 WL 282051, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 1993) (allowing resolution of
board to defeat common law D'Oench).
86. See infra notes 156-231 and accompanying text (discussing whether presence
of an "asset" is a requisite for application of section 1823(e) and common law
D'Oench).
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Ninth Circuit in its case FDIC v. Meo,l posits that D'Oench cannot
be applied to bar defenses that arise against the insurer without fault
on the borrower's part. The defense is either extinct' or so impossi-
ble of practical application 89 as to be irrelevant.
87. 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974). In Meo, a borrower made a note to a bank for
purchase of its stock. The bank actually issued voting trust certificates, and the bor-
rower refused to pay, citing a failure of consideration. Id. at 791. The receiver sought
to avoid the defense by interposition of common law D'Oench. The Ninth Circuit,
looking to California law to give shape to the federal common law, determined that
Meo was not negligent and was not a party to any deceptive scheme, so that the lack
of consideration defense survived. Id. at 792-93 & n.4.
88. The defense has been expressly rejected as a pre-Langley relic in a number of
Circuits, and its status is questionable in others. Dendinger v. First Nat'l Corp., 16
F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1994); Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. 604 Columbus Ave. Realty
Trust (In re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust), 968 F.2d 1332, 1347-48 (1st Cir. 1992);
FSLIC v. Gordy, 928 F.2d 1558, 1567 n.14 (11th Cir. 1991). Even the Ninth Circuit
may no longer swear allegiance. Compare Falk v. Mt. Whitney Say. & Loan Ass'n, 983
F.2d 156, 160 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding Meo barred invocation of D'Oench), opinion
amended and reissued 5 F.3d 347 (9th Cir. 1993) with Falk v. Mt. Whitney Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 5 F.3d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1993) (deleting all reference to Meo). The Circuit has
stated that specific parties are ineligible for the exception, but this can hardly be taken
as a holding that the exception still exists. See Ninth Circuit cases cited infra note 89.
Further, the en banc decision in Murphy v. FDIC, 38 F.3d 1490 (9th Cir. 1994), while
it cited Meo repeatedly, did so in the context of a transaction documented (albeit not
to section 1823(e) standards) in the bank's files and a jury finding that the plaintiff
had not lent himself to a scheme, and thus can stand for no more than the proposition
that if D'Oench does not apply, then D'Oench does not apply. Certainly, Murphy's
discussion of the obligations of borrowers makes it clear that there is no such thing as
an "innocent borrower" qua borrower in the Ninth Circuit.
In any event, the defense always has been inapplicable under the federal holder in
due course doctrine. Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 873 n.15 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
89. While the defense is frequently raised, because the failure to reduce any agree-
ment or representation to writing is deemed to be fault, the facts are rarely found to
reveal the requisite near-hagiographical degree of innocence. FDIC v. Bathgate, 27
F.3d 850, 867 (3d Cir. 1994); Century Centre Partners v. FDIC (In re Century Centre
Partners), 969 F.2d 835, 839 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 2997 (1993); FSLIC
v. Gemini Management, 921 F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1990); Maniar v. Capital Bank,
No. C-89-2774 MIP, 1993 WL 515880, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1993); Adams v.
Walker, 767 F. Supp. 1099, 1108 (D. Kan. 1991); Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev.,
746 F. Supp. 419, 427-28 (D.NJ. 1990), aff'd, 937 F.2d 845 (3d Cir. 1991); FSLIC v.
Maio, 736 F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Castleglen, Inc. v. Commonwealth
Sav. Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. 656, 669 (D. Utah 1989), aff'd sub nom. Castleglen, Inc. v.
RTC, 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
Before it became clear that there was no test of scienter in common law D'Oench,
courts were more willing to entertain the defense in theory, although rarely in prac-
tice. Buchanan v. FSLIC, 935 F.2d 83, 85-86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005
(1991); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 516-17 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1986); FDIC v.
Bravo Leather Corp., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L Rep. (CCH)
88,151, at 96,488-89 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 1990), vacated on motion for reconsideration
sub nora FDIC v. Engel, 746 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In addition, a review of
the cases purporting to apply the defense reveals that it is most often asserted as an
additional justification in situations in which an "asset" or "agreement" defense has
already been held available. See Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 685, 690-
95 (10th Cir. 1993); Kingsway Revocable Trust v. FSLIC (In re C.P.C. Dev. Co. No.
5), 113 B.R. 637, 641 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990). Other courts have cited the case as
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In contrast, such defenses as may be useful can be broadly grouped
under the headings of agreement or asset. This analysis is derived in
large part from the reasoning of Justice Scalia in Langley. In that
opinion, the court undertook to analyze the fraud claims of the Lang-
leys under two rubrics: whether the fraud asserted constituted an
agreement that would need to comply with the recording scheme of
section 1823(e) and whether the fraud was so fundamental as to
render their note, the asset, non-existent and thus bar assertion of the
section altogether. Thus, an agreement defense is one that seeks to
assert that the defense or counterclaim is not an "agreement," or in
the language of common law D'Oench, a "scheme." An asset defense,
on the other hand, is one that asserts that D'Oench does not apply
because there is no asset in the hands of the insurer. Thus, in the case
of statutory D'Oench, the requisites of section 1823(e) are not met
and, in the case of common law D'Oench, the public policy adverted
to by Justice Douglas in D'Oench, that the assets of the bank are not
misrepresented, may not be implicated.
II. NATURE OF CLAIMS BARRED As "AGREEMENTS"
"[T]he person who made the promise must keep it, since 'A promise
is at the bottom of the bag.' "90
In its origins, the D'Oench doctrine was closely tied to contract and
more specifically to defenses to liability under contract-"agree-
ments" or "schemes." The expansive definition of "agreement" pro-
pounded by the Court in Langley has been thoroughly accepted by the
lower courts, which have barred an extensive list of contract defenses
as arising from forbidden agreements. Limitations on the definitions
of contractual covenants as agreements do exist. One is the new con-
cept of ordinary banking transactions, which limits the reach of
D'Oench to those transactions that the insurers could reasonably ex-
pect to be recorded in the bank's files. Another limitation sporadi-
cally protects the interests of parties whose loans, unknown to them,
were transferred to the bank after they were made.
Attempts to plead lead into gold by asserting defenses barred by
D'Oench as affirmative counterclaims have led the courts to derive
the "mirror-image" rule.91 This prevents a party from asserting
against the insurer as an affirmative claim that which would have been
barred by D'Oench if denominated as a defense. The bar on counter-
weak or analogous support for their positions. Cote d'Azur Homeowners Ass'n v.
Venture Corp., 846 F. Supp. 827, 840 & n.24 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Gallant v. Kanterman
(In re Kanterman), 97 B.R. 768, 776-77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 108 B.R. 432
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
90. Kanuni i Lekd Dukagjinit, ch. LXXXIV, § 516 (Shtjefdn Gjegov ed., 1933),
translated in The Code of Lekd Dukagjini 114 (Leonard Fox trans., 1989) (Alb.).
91. First City, Tex.-Beaumont, N.A. v. Treece, 848 F. Supp. 727, 742 (E.D. Tex.
1994).
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claims applies not only to claims in contract, but to those that sound in
tort as well. There is not, however, a blanket prohibition on tort
claims, only those that constitute artful repleadings of barred contract
claims. If the tort arises from an independent duty, it will not be
barred by D'Oench. These principles also apply to the trustee's rights
in bankruptcy and to requests for relief from the Chancellor as well.
A. Contract Defenses
D'Oench has barred, as forbidden agreements, a variety of claims
and defenses arising from defects in contract formation or from altera-
tions of the terms of contracts after formation. Thus, D'Oench, in its
various forms, has been used to bar claims or defenses grounded in
defects in contract formation, such as fraudulent inducement (by act 92
or omission, 93 including acts of parties other than the bank)," uncon-
scionability,95 mistake,96 nondelivery,97 failure98 or want 9 of consider-
92. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987); Randolph v. RTC, 995 F.2d 611,615 (5th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1294 (1994); FDIC v. Cardinal Oil Well Servicing
Co., 837 F.2d 1369, 1372 (5th Cir. 1988); RTC v. Wilson, 851 F. Supp. 141 (D.NJ.
1994). The fraudulent inducements are normally, but need not be, oral, and may in-
clude separate written certifications of fact. FSLIC v. Gordy, 928 F.2d 1558, 1560,
1564-65 (11th Cir. 1991).
93. RTC v. Ehrenhaus, 34 F.3d 441,442 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.) (insisting, in
light of Langley, that fraudulent omissions are covered by section 1823(e), because to
do otherwise would be to make of the law "'a ass, a idiot' "); McCullough v. FDIC,
987 F.2d 870, 872 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing cases); FDIC v. State Bank, 893 F.2d 139, 144
(7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) ("If the debtor can't use the bank's lies to block
repayment, it can't use material omissions either-for the half-truth is one form of
lie."); FDIC v. Bell, 892 F.2d 64, 66 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 496 U.S. 913
(1990); FDIC v. Hudson, 800 F. Supp. 867, 870-71 (N.D. Cal. 1990). But see Grant
County Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. RTC, 770 F. Supp. 1374, 1379-82 (E.D. Ark. 1991), rev'd
on other grounds, 968 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1992); Kingsway Revocable Trust v. FSLIC
(In re C.P.C Dev. Co. No. 5), 113 B.R. 637, 640-41 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990); cf. John v.
RTC, 39 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 1994) (contending that where fraudulent omission is not
inconsistent with written provisions of agreement, it is not an agreement under com-
mon law D'Oench); Desmond v. FDIC, 798 F. Supp. 829, 835-36 (D. Mass. 1992)
(theorizing, in dictum, that where misrepresentation was both an omission and pe-
ripheral to the bargain of the parties, Langley's inclusion of misrepresentation in
"agreement" might not apply).
94. Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., 937 F.2d 845, 857-58 (3d Cir. 1991); Bohm
v. Forum Resorts, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 705, 710-11 (E.D. Mich. 1991); FDIC v. Dixon,
681 F. Supp. 408, 411-12 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
95. Clay v. FDIC, 934 F.2d 69, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1991).
96. FDIC v. Lands, No. 91-16335, 1993 WL 360781, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 1993);
First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, Civ. A. No. 92-12222-Y, 1993 WL 443917, at *4 (D. Mass.
Sept. 30, 1993).
97. Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mulderig, 742 F. Supp. 358, 361 (E.D. La.
1989); Opton, Inc. v. FDIC, 647 A.2d 1126, 1128-32 (D.C. 1994).
98. RTC v. Camp, 965 F.2d 25, 30 (5th Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Wright, 942 F.2d 1089,
1098 (7th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992); FDIC v. Stith, 772 F. Supp.
279, 282 n.11 (E.D. Va. 1991) (citing cases); NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Goldencrest
Joint Venture, 761 F. Supp. 32,34 (N.D. Tex. 1990); FSLIC v. Maio, 736 F. Supp. 1039,
1041 (N.D. Cal. 1989); FSLIC v. Wilson, 722 F. Supp. 306, 312-13 (N.D. Tex. 1989);
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ation, usury'0° or undue influence;' claims that contractual rights
have been created by the acts of the bank, such as oral contracts evi-
denced by performance" or under theories of promissory estoppel'0 3
or unjust enrichment;'O° and claims that the contract has been varied
after formation, by means of oral agreements, 10 5 side agreements, 0 6
FSLIC v. Ziegler, 680 F. Supp. 235, 237 (E.D. La. 1988); FDIC v. Amberson, 676 F.
Supp. 777, 778, 780 (W.D. Tex. 1987).
99. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942); FDIC v. Lands, No. 91-
16335, 1993 WL 360781, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 1993) ("[T]he defense ... is pre-
cluded as a matter of law."); FDIC v. Bernstein, 944 F.2d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 1991);
CMF Va. Land, L.P. v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. 90, 94 (E.D. Va. 1992); FDIC v. Fisher,
727 F. Supp. 1306, 1310 (D. Minn. 1989); see also RTC v. Juergens, 965 F.2d 149, 155
(7th Cir. 1992) (dictum). But see Community Bank v. McKenzie, No. 90-0621-CV-W-
9, 1992 WL 457513, at *6 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 1992) (indicating, in dictum, that "[i]f ..
the agreement was not valid because there was no consideration at all.., this defense
... would render § 1823(e) inapplicable"), aff'd on different grounds sub nom. Com-
munity Bank v. FDIC, 984 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1993).
100. Porras v. Petroplex Say. Ass'n, 903 F.2d 379, 380 & n.2, 381 (5th Cir. 1990);
NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Goldencrest Joint Venture, 761 F. Supp. 32, 34 (N.D. Tex.
1990); FDIC v. Julius Richman, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 114, 117-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on
different grounds, 666 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1981).
101. FSLIC v. Maio, 736 F. Supp. 1039,1041 (N.D. Cal. 1989); FSLIC v. Musacchio,
695 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
102. Community Bank v. FDIC, 984 F.2d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1993).
103. Texas Refrigeration Supply, Inc. v. FDIC, 953 F.2d 975, 983 (5th Cir. 1992);
Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 1990); Krebs v. FDIC, 851 F. Supp.
430, 431-32 (M.D. Fla. 1994); RTC v. Miller, No. C 93-20205 JW, 1993 WL 315463, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 1993); Holden v. FDIC, Civ. A. No. 91-11737-Z, 1993 WL
81459, at *2-3, n.1 (D. Mass. Mar. 3, 1993).
104. FDIC v. Kisosoh Realty Corp., No. 90 CIV. 7900(PKL), 1994 WL 702026, at
*4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1994) (unjust enrichment); Winterbrook Realty, Inc. v. FDIC,
820 F. Supp. 27, 32 (D.N.H. 1993) (quantum meruit and unjust enrichment). But see
FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (see infra note 107).
105. Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 92 (1987).
106. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 451-52 (1942); RTC v. Toler,
791 F. Supp. 649, 652 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
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waiver,10 7 estoppel,108 course of conduct' °9 or custom,110 release of lia-
bility,"1 accord and satisfaction,' 2 or other settlement agreement." 3
Nevertheless, the "agreements" barred by D'Oench do not compre-
hend every contract; restrictions seem to flow from limitations on the
reliance interest of the insurer and protection of the reliance interest
of the debtor. If a transaction is not of the sort one would expect to
find memorialized in banking records, the doctrine may not apply. In
a recent development, courts have begun to apply the doctrine, in
both common law and statutory forms, to "ordinary banking transac-
tions" only." 4 Thus, the class of agreements that would fall within the
ambit of D'Oench are those that one would expect to be approved by
a loan committee or for knowledge of which the banking records
would be relied upon by the insurers and not every possible contract
107. Lake Forest Devs. v. FDIC, 989 F.2d 197,200-01 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 114 S.
Ct. 385 (1993); FDIC v. MM & S Partners, 626 F. Supp. 681, 685-87 (N.D. Il. 1985);
see also Fleet Bank v. Matthews, 795 F. Supp. 492,497-98 & n.15 (D. Me. 1992) (dic-
tum). One commentator has argued that waiver and estoppel should fall outside of
the scope of section 1823(e). See Gray, supra note 38, at 288-89 (hypothesizing that
because waiver and estoppel are not based on mutual assent, the defenses should
survive); cf FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (depre-
cating claims that waiver, estoppel, and unjust enrichment were "agreements" for pur-
poses of section 1823(e), because, based on pre-Langley logic, like fraud in the
inducement they lacked element of mutual asset; nonetheless claims were barred by
federal common law).
108. FSLIC v. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
109. RTC v. Wellington Dev. Group, 761 F. Supp. 731, 736 (D. Colo. 1991); FDIC
v. Bowles Livestock Comm'n Co., 739 F. Supp. 1364, 1369-70 (D. Neb. 1990), rev'd,
937 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1991).
110. Swedbank (Sparbankernas Bank) v. FDIC, No. 93-1338, 1994 WVL 183542, at
*4 (1st Cir. May 13, 1994); FDIC v. Hamilton, 939 F.2d 1225, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1991);
FSLIC v. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
111. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
113. FDIC v. Bezahler, No. 91-5313, 1992 WVL 336988, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 10,
1992); Fleet Bank v. Matthews, 795 F. Supp. 492,497 & n.12 (D. Me. 1992); Morgan v.
Heights Say. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 620, 622 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
114. The "non-banking transaction" limitation on statutory D'Oench arose in
Thigpen v. Sparks, 983 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1993) and was expanded and extended to the
common law doctrine in Alexandria Associates v. Mitchell Co., 2 F.3d 598, 602 (5th
Cir. 1993). In Thigpen, a bank had sold an entire subsidiary. The purchaser had de-
manded a warranty that the charter of the subsidiary had never lapsed, which war-
ranty was made in a separate officers' certification. The warranty was, in the event,
untrue. When the purchaser sued the receivership estate for breach of the warranty,
the FDIC defended on the basis of section 1821(d)(9)(A). Thigpen, 983 F.2d at 645.
The Thigpen court determined that section 1823(e) "does not apply to a claim arising
from a bank's sale of an asset in a nonbanking transaction." kle at 646-47. As such,
the claim did not fall within the scope of section 1823(e), and thus derivatively, of
section 1821(d)(9)(A). Id. at 646-49. Although Thigpen had concentrated on the is-
sue of the asset requirement for section 1823(e), the court in Alexandria Associates
focused on the non-banking language of Thigpen in barring a claim against a third-
generation bank subsidiary for fees payable in connection with a real estate syndica-
tion. Alexandria Assocs., 2 F.3d at 599-600, 602-03.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
into which the bank may enter.115 Ordinary banking transactions ap-
pear to exclude both such ordinary-course-of-business matters as em-
ployment 1 6 and such non-banking activities as real estate sales and
development ventures)17 The exception has frequently been applied
to transactions by bank subsidiaries."" Transactions that do constitute
ordinary banking business include lending, 1 9 the purchase of fidelity
insurance,'20 and the issuance of letters of credit.12 1 Transactions
where loans were made may be excluded if the primary focus of the
deal was not lending.'2 The ordinary banking business rule may have
the effect of limiting the reach of statutory D'Oench but also may re-
sult in both an expansion and limitation of common law D'Oench.
Courts have utilized the ordinary banking transactions rubric to ex-
pand the reach of common law D'Oench to cases in which no asset is
implicated and to tell D'Oench-barred torts from their more fortunate
siblings."2 Where the banking business rule is imposed as a limitation
by courts who have already crossed the no-asset Rubicon, it is done
for many of the same prudential reasons that cause other courts to
limit the reach of D'Oench to cases involving assets.'
24
115. Alexandria Assocs. v. Mitchell Co., 2 F.3d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1993).
116. Bender v. CenTrust Mortgage Corp., 833 F. Supp. 1525, 1529-32 (S.D. Fla.
1992) (refusing to extend D'Oench without further fact-finding and briefing); see also
Cabarrocas v. RTC, 840 F. Supp. 888, 891-92 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (stating that contract for
payment of architect is not an "agreement" for purposes of section 1823(e)).
117. John v. RTC, 39 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 1994); Cote d'Azur Homeowners Ass'n v.
Venture Corp., 846 F. Supp. 827, 840-41 (N.D. Cal. 1994); cf. Levy v. FDIC, 7 F.3d
1054, 1058 n.7 (1st Cir. 1993) (refusing to reach unbriefed issue of whether ordinary
banking transactions exception would allow property purchaser to prevail on breach
of warranty claim).
118. Alexandria Assocs. v. Mitchell Co., 2 F.3d 598, 602-03 (5th Cir. 1993); In re
New Valley Corp., 168 B.R. 82, 84, 87-88 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994). But cf. Robinowitz v.
Gibraltar Say., 23 F.3d 951, 957 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying the applicability of non-
banking transactions exception to real estate development sub-subsidiary where the
development project was financed by the ultimate-parent bank), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 725 (1995).
119. Robinowitz, 23 F.3d at 957; Lesal Interiors, Inc. v. RTC, 834 F. Supp. 721, 731
& n.7 (D.N.J. 1993).
120. FDIC v. Oldenburg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1553 (10th Cir. 1994).
121. OPS Shopping Ctr. v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 306, 310-11 (11th Cir. 1993) (common
law D'Oench).
122. Compare In re New Valley Corp., 168 B.R. 82 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (holding
that where bank subsidiary had sold non-banking business, transaction was M&A and
not banking, and D'Oench did not apply to transaction, notwithstanding that note was
given in payment) with Robinowitz v. Gibraltar Sav., 23 F.3d 951 (5th Cir. 1994) (stat-
ing that even though transaction was real estate development joint venture with sub-
sidiary of bank and plaintiff owed no debt to bank, gravamen of complaint arose out
of lending function and was per se banking transaction), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 725
(1995).
123. OPS Shopping Ctr. v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 306, 309-11 (11th Cir. 1993).
124. Compare Alexandria Assocs. v. Mitchell Co., 2 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1993)
(circumscribing scope of common law D'Oench to ordinary banking business because
"[r]equiring bank boards or loan committees to consider, approve, and record every
transaction ... would make virtually impossible the performance ... management
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The reliance interest of borrowers who did not deal with the bank is
also protected by excluding agreements not made with a bank from
the scope of D'Oench. A bank may acquire assets that are subject to
or created by agreements with parties other than the bank. Typical
examples include the purchase of a note in the secondary market, the
financing of a purchase from a third party, or the taking of a note as
collateral. From the perspective of common law D'Oench, a party
that is guilty of no more than a failure to prognosticate the future
involvement of a bank in a transaction can hardly be said to have lent
itself to a scheme to deceive unforeseen regulators. Courts also have
been reluctant to read section 1823(e) to catch third-party agreements
in its net. Most of the cases, despite broad language about "any agree-
ment," seem to find an agreement only where the party made the note
to a bank or was aware that the note would be sold or pledged to a
bank.' 25 Where, however, the involvement of a bank was unknown to
the borrower, the courts might not impose liability.'2 6 Likewise,
and policymaking functions") with Agri Export Coop. v. Universal Sav. Ass'n, 767 F.
Supp. 824, 834 (S.D. Tex. 1991) ("Would the RTC have boards of directors operating
en banc as tellers, approving and contemporaneously recording each and every bank
transaction ... ?").
125. See FDIC v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying section 1823(e)
where notes were made to partnership, but were to be assigned to a bank to secure
further funding); Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., 937 F.2d 845, 857-58 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding where notes were made to banks and then sold to defunct bank, mis-
representations by promoters of underlying securities constituted agreements under
section 1823(e)); FDIC v. Friedland, 758 F. Supp. 941, 943-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (man-
dating that where borrower executed estoppel letter in favor of bank, defense against
liability based on agreement between the maker and the original payee referenced
therein should be barred as not recorded in accordance with section 1823(e)); Bohm
v. Forum Resorts, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 705, 710-11 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (barring interposi-
tion of defenses to note made to bank based on misrepresentations of promoters of
securities); FDIC v. Dixon, 681 F. Supp. 408, 411-12 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (same).
126. RTC v. 1601 Partners, 796 F. Supp. 238, 240 (N.D. Tex. 1992); First Fin. Say.
Bank v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 783 F. Supp. 963, 967 (E.D.N.C. 1991); Park
Tucson Investors Ltd. Partnership v. Ali, 770 F. Supp. 531, 536-38 (D. Ariz. 1991);
Citytrust v. Clark & Fray Constr. Co., No. 58545, 1992 WL 98046, at *4 (Conn. Super.
Ct. May 1, 1992); cf. RTC v. Liberty Homes, Inc., No. 90-2255, 1991 WL 163055, at *3
(10th Cir. Aug. 23, 1991) (allowing intentional interference with contractual relations
claim, based on agreement between bank and third party to cut plaintiff out of deal,
which was not an "agreement" for purposes of D'Oench). But cf. Blackman v. United
Capital Invs., Inc., 12 F.3d 1030, 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that where
notes were given to promoter of venture and then assigned to bank, fraud in the
inducement defense would not stand; opinion does not specify whether the investors
knew their notes would be pledged). The principle that section 1823(e) does not ap-
ply where the obligation was acquired by pledge has been explicitly expressed by one
state court. Albuquerque Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Deville, 615 So. 2d 1002, 1007 n.1
(La. Ct. App. 1993).
There are unfortunate exceptions to the rule, seemingly confined to land sales. Mil-
ligan v. Gilmore Meyer Inc., 775 F. Supp. 400 (S.D. Ga. 1991) (holding that where
plaintiffs had purchased land from a developer, who did not have title, title being in
an affiliate of the developer that had mortgaged the land, bank was a "holder in due
course" of land received at foreclosure and commenting that the RTC would not have
been put on notice of the plaintiff's interest because the bank had not been involved
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where a non-signatory attempts to introduce an agreement for eviden-
tiary rather than enforcement purposes, one court has held that this
use of an agreement is excluded from the ambit of D'Oench.2 7
B. Counterclaims, Claims and Claims Sounding in Tort
D'Oench applies not only to defenses to, but also to affirmative
claims against, the insurer. The courts have held that "[t]o allow a
claim against the FDIC asserting the very grounds that could not be
used as a defense to a claim by the FDIC is to let technicality stand in
the way of principle."'" Older cases allowed counterclaims relating
to an asset to proceed, but only against the estate of the defunct
bank.12 9 The more modem trend is to disallow such counterclaims in
in the transaction between the plaintiff and the seller of the land); Ajootian v. Lamont
Lions Club (In re Ajootian), 119 B.R. 749 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that
where local charity had donated land to builder on the condition, memorialized in
unrecorded closing instructions, that the builder erect a clubhouse for charity and
devote the remainder of the land to housing for the poor, transfer documents were
"agreements" for purposes of section 1823(e), notwithstanding that the charity had no
dealings with the bank).
127. RTC v. Ocotillo West Joint Venture, 840 F. Supp. 1463, 1477 (D.N.M. 1993).
Even for those uninterested in the particulars of the case, it is well worth the attention
of connoisseurs of judicial invective. But cf. Notrica v. FDIC, 2 F.3d 961, 964-66 (9th
Cir. 1993) (repulsing claims by plaintiff second lienor that first lienor bank and prop-
erty owner were engaged in joint venture as undocumented in bank's files and con-
trary to express term of loan agreement, and thus barred by D'Oench); Murphy v.
FDIC, 829 F. Supp. 3, 6-8 (D.D.C. 1993) (rebuffing defrauded investor's claims that
bank and promoter of limited partnership were joint venturers because joint venture
was not documented in bank's files); FDIC v. Bodin Concrete Co., 869 S.W.2d 372,
381 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to entertain attempts by mechanics' lienors to as-
sert that an agreement between a borrower and the bank was void, and thus improve
their lien position, because "this party-nonparty dichotomy is a distinction without a
difference because the federal policy underlying section 1823(e) would be violated if
either a party or nonparty to an undocumented agreement were permitted to assert
the agreement against the FDIC").
128. Beighley v. FDIC, 676 F. Supp. 130, 132 (N.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 776
(5th Cir. 1989).
129. This approach was particularly common in federal holder in due course cases,
displaying the continuing influence of negotiable instruments law: while the maker of
a note is forbidden from asserting its defenses against the holder in due course, it
remains free to assert them as claims against the party to whom the note was origi-
nally made. FDIC v. Byrne, 736 F. Supp. 727, 730-31 (N.D. Tex. 1990); FSLIC v.
Smith, 755 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Ark. 1989). There appeared to be a split among Fifth
Circuit panels as to whether a D'Oench-barred defense could be asserted against the
receiver. See FDIC v. Texas Country Living, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 984, 989-90 (E.D. Tex.
1990) (discussing divergence). It now appears fairly well established that D'Oench
bars the claim in toto. As a practical matter, being limited to a claim against the
receivership was cold comfort indeed: even if the counterclaim succeeded, the obligor
could expect to receive at most pennies on the dollar of its award, if anything at all.
Cf. FDIC v. Rivera-Arroyo, 645 F. Supp. 511, 522-23 (D.P.R. 1986) (asserting that,
with or without section 1823(e), where advance of further funds was not of such reci-
procity as to give other party a right to cancel, or rescindir, its obligations upon non-
performance, i.e., was not a condition precedent of the obligation to repay prior loans,
suit for damages on loan agreement could not be maintained against FDIC-Corpo-
rate, but only against receiver), aff'd sub nom. FDIC v. Bracero & Rivera, Inc., 895 F.
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their entirety, so that they may not be asserted even against the re-
ceiver.130 Courts barring such counterclaims express a reluctance to
allow the rule of their decision to be determined by "artful pleading."
A defense that would fail because of D'Oench will not be allowed to
prevail under the heading "counterclaim.
13 1
Such affirmative claims include those sounding in tort, as well as
contract claims. Courts do not look with favor on attempts to evade
the reach of D'Oench by rebottling breaches of contract as tort claims.
Courts refuse tort claims if they are no more than artful repleadings of
barred contractual claims. 32 Thus, claims of conversion, 33 fraud or
2d 824 (1st Cir. 1990); RTC v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 596-97 & n.6 (11th Cir.
1995) (calculating that if D'Oench were not to bar counterclaims, the defendant
would remain liable to the RTC dollar-for-dollar, but could offset liability by a lesser
amount equal to a pro-rated share of the estate, but setting aside such speculation on
the ground that D'Oench does bar counterclaims); FDIC v. Brodie, 602 So. 2d 1358,
1360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (permitting counterclaim for services rendered bank
unrelated to note, and thus not barred by D'Oench or section 1823(e), to go forward,
but only against receivership estate).
130. It is unclear why this sea change occurred. Certain courts seemed to feel that
to allow the counterclaim to go forward was the same as permitting a defense. See
Castleglen, Inc. v. Commonwealth Sav. Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. 656, 664 (D. Utah 1989),
aff'd sub nom. Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993); Beighley v.
FDIC, 676 F. Supp. 130,132 (N.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1989). This
appeared to imply that, in contrast to the counterclaims-payable-only-from-the-re-
ceivership approach, that a counterclaim could be offset dollar for dollar against an
award of damages to the receiver. Cf FDIC v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 872 (3d Cir.
1994) (refusing to reach issue as irrelevant, because all counterclaims were barred
under D'Oench); Mainland Sav. Ass'n v. Riverfront Assocs., 872 F.2d 955 (10th Cir.)
(denying under common law D'Oench affirmative claims brought by way of setoff),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890 (1989).
131. FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 17 F.3d 715,719 (4th Cir. 1994)
(implying that, if based in an unwritten agreement, counterclaim would be barred by
common law D'Oench); Abrams v. FDIC, 944 F.2d 307, 310 (6th Cir. 1991); RTC v.
Murray, 935 F.2d 89, 94 (5th Cir. 1991); Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Serv. Bank
for Sav., 932 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1991); Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1528 (5th
Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1083 (1991). But see Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151,
1159 (10th Cir. 1989) ("By its very terms, however, the D'Oench rule only prevents
parties from raising defenses against the FDIC."). The Tenth Circuit has limited
Grubb's reach to cases where the agreement was voided by entry of judgment prior to
takeover, although the original opinion contained no such limiting language.
Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984 F.2d 1571, 1578 (10th Cir. 1993).
132. If one is going to agree that D'Oench may serve as a shield as well as a sword,
then Langley also compels the conclusion that fraud (there used as a shield by defend-
ants) is equally unavailing when used as a sword by plaintiffs. See Timberland Design,
Inc. v. First Serv. Bank for Say., 932 F.2d 46,50 (1st Cir. 1991) ("D'Oench is generally
said to apply to tort claims. Although not decided under [common law] D'Oench, the
Supreme Court's decision in Langley v. FDIC supports this conclusion by holding that
§ 1823(e) bars fraud claims that are premised upon an oral agreement." (citation and
footnote omitted)). As Chief Judge Posner has pointed out, "[it is no doubt odd that
the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and its statutory codification, which say nothing about
tort remedies, should extinguish borrowers' fraud remedies; but the Supreme Court
crossed that bridge in Langley, and we must follow quietly." RTC v. Ehrenhaus, 34
F.3d 441, 442 (7th Cir. 1994).
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negligent misrepresentation,'3 4 unjust enrichment, 135 negligence,'136
breach of a fiduciary duty,137 or other business tort 138 will be barred as
surely as the forbidden agreements from which they arose.139
The prohibition extends to statutory tort claims and defenses.
D'Oench may defeat such federal heavyweights as the Securities Act
133. FDIC v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 1994); FDIC v. White, 820 F.
Supp. 1423, 1428-29 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Holden v. FDIC, Civ. A. No. 91-11737-Z, 1993
WL 81459, at *2-3 & n.1 (D. Mass. Mar. 3, 1993); Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 755, 774 & n.8 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
134. Vasapolli v. Rostoff, 39 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 1994) (negligent misrepresenta-
tion); Mainland Say. Ass'n v. Riverfront Assocs., 872 F.2d 955, 956 (10th Cir.) (fraud),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890 (1989); Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 856 F. Supp. 111,
117-18 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (fraud and negligent misrepresentation); FDIC v. Rusconi,
808 F. Supp. 30, 39 & n.19 (D. Me. 1992) (fraud); Torke v. FDIC, 761 F. Supp. 754,
755, 757 (D. Colo. 1991) (deceit and negligent misrepresentation).
135. Winterbrook Realty, Inc. v. FDIC, 820 F. Supp. 27,32 (D.N.H. 1993); AmWest
Sav. Ass'n v. Farmers Mkt. of Odessa, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
136. RTC v. Allen, 16 F.3d 568, 574 (4th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Wilson, 851 F. Supp.
141 (D.N.J. 1994) (negligence and gross negligence). But see New Conn. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Stadium Management Corp., 132 B.R. 205, 209-10 (D. Mass. 1991)
(negligence).
137. Such claims have been bottomed on the terms of the loan, such as claims that
an equity kicker in the underlying development created a joint venture. RTC v. Wel-
lington Dev. Group, 761 F. Supp. 731,737 (D. Colo. 1991); Tuxedo Beach Club Corp.
v. City Fed. Sav. Bank, 749 F. Supp. 635, 646 (D.N.J. 1990). Others have attempted to
show the existence of the relationship from the course of dealings between debtor and
creditor. RTC v. Wellington Dev. Group, 761 F. Supp. 731,736 (D. Colo. 1991); FDIC
v. Delco Dev. Co., No. CV-90-303743, 1993 WL 343873, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug.
30, 1993). Claims have been brought in the very teeth of the loan papers themselves.
RTC v. Allen, 16 F.3d 568, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1994); Baumann v. Savers Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1516 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1936 (1992);
Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Amberley Huntsville, Ltd., 934 F.2d 1201, 1207-08
(11th Cir. 1991); RTC v. Jet Stream, Ltd., 790 F. Supp. 1130, 1137 (M.D. Fla. 1992);
Torke v. FDIC, 761 F. Supp. 754, 757 (D. Colo. 1991). Even if there is a true breach
of fiduciary duty, if it leads to execution of an agreement settling claims under the
agreement creating that duty, the claim will be barred as an assertion of oral misrep-
resentations in derogation of the insurer's rights under the settlement agreement. Ro-
binowitz v. Gibraltar Sav., 23 F.3d 951, 955 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 725
(1995).
138. FDIC v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 870-72 (3d Cir. 1994) (trade libel, slander of
credit, slander of title, and unlawful interference with prospective economic advan-
tage); Dahlstrom v. FDIC, No. 91-4006, 1992 WL 107354, at *1-2 (10th Cir. May 15,
1992) (estoppel, bad faith, duress, and conspiracy); RTC v. Wilson, 851 F. Supp. 141
(D.N.J. 1994) (civil conspiracy); RTC v. Palmetto Fort, 831 F. Supp. 510, 516-17
(D.S.C. 1993) (defamation); NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Goldencrest Joint Venture, 761
F. Supp. 32, 34 (N.D. Tex. 1990) ("intentional tortious acts (of unknown variety)");
RSR Properties, Inc. v. FDIC, 706 F. Supp. 524, 530-32 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (negligent
and grossly negligent breach of assorted duties to debtor); FSLIC v. Musacchio, 695 F.
Supp. 1044, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (undue influence and breach of duty to
renegotiate).
139. Here too, the distinction between D'Oench and section 1823(e) on the one
hand, and the federal holder in due course doctrine on the other, may determine the
outcome: if the defense arising from the non-agreement right, such as a lack of au-
thority in the signatory, is deemed personal, it will not stand against the federal
holder. First Fed. Bank v. Realty Capitol Assocs., No. CV90 304321, 1993 WL 524965
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1993).
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of 1933,14 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,141 ERISA, 142 and
even RICO. 43 Even other sections of the banking laws are not im-
mune; an alleged tying agreement will not prevail as a defense against
the insurer.1" Thanks to the Supremacy Clause, D'Oench also trumps
rights under state law, such as claims of consumer fraud or deceptive
140. Alexandria Assocs. v. Mitchell Co., 800 F. Supp. 1412 (S.D. Miss. 1992), rev'd
on other grounds, 2 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1993); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun.
Employees v. FDIC (In re NBW Commercial Paper Litig.), 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1467-71
(D.D.C. 1992).
141. Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1525 n.2, 1528-29 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1083 (1991); Alexandria Assocs. v. Mitchell Co., 800 F. Supp. 1412
(S.D. Miss. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 2 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1993); McCaugherty v.
Siffermann, 772 F. Supp. 1128, 1133-34 (N.D. Cal. 1991); FDIC v. Hudson, 800 F.
Supp. 867-871 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
142. Belsky v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 80, 85 (D. Neb. 1986) (dictum),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1987)
143. First City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 730 F. Supp. 501,510-11 (E.D.N.Y.
1990). This case is particularly notable in that, unlike many civil RICO suits, it in-
volved actual mobsters. See First City, 730 F. Supp. at 505 ("On August 8, 1987, Irwin
Schiff was assassinated while dining at the Bravo Sergio restaurant in New York City.
An investigation into his murder peeled back layers of criminal fraud like the skin of
an onion. One of these skins involved First Inter-County Bank of New York ....").
It may be that First City is not, in fact, a pure D'Oench case, as this Note discusses
infra note 225, so the reader should see Bohm v. Forum Resorts, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 705
(E.D. Mich. 1991), and dicta in Mery v. Universal Savings Ass'n, 737 F. Supp. 1000,
1005 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
144. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 11 F.3d 1260, 1268 (5th Cir. 1994) (12
U.S.C. § 1972); NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. King, 964 F.2d 1468, 1469-71 (5th Cir. 1991)
(12 U.S.C. § 1972), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2305 (1992); Newton v. Uniwest Fin. Corp.,
967 F.2d 340, 345-46 (9th Cir. 1992) (12 U.S.C. § 1464(q)); Gustin v. FDIC, 835 F.
Supp. 503, 510-11 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (12 U.S.C. § 1972); Diamond v. Union Bank &
Trust, 776 F. Supp. 542, 543 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (12 U.S.C. § 1972); Yankee Bank for
F'm. & Say. v. Task Assocs., No. 88-CV-224, 1989 WL 87430, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4,
1989) (12 U.S.C. § 1464(q)). These provisions of the banking laws do for extensions
of credit, sales or leases of property or provision of services by banks what § 3 of the
Clayton Act does for more tangible commerce, disallowing conditioning extensions of
credit on the taking of other goods or services. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(q) (Supp. V 1993)
(thrifts); 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (commercial banks).
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trade practices, 45 state securities law claims, 46 or claims for violations
of state "Little RICO" statutes. 47
Only claims that arise from artful pleading are barred. If an alleged
breach of duty constitutes a "free standing tort,' 48 it is not an "agree-
145. FDIC v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 58 (2d Cir. 1994) (Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act); Sweeney v. RTC, 16 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.) (Massachusetts deceptive
trade practices law), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 291 (1994); Timberland Design, Inc. v.
First Serv. Bank for Say., 932 F.2d 46, 47, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1991) (same); Celtic Dev.
Corp. v. FDIC, 836 F. Supp. 926, 936 (D. Mass. 1993) (same); Tuxedo Beach Club
Corp. v. City Fed. Say. Bank, 749 F. Supp. 635, 648 & n.12 (D.N.J. 1990) (New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act); Illinois ex reL Hartigan v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. of
Am., 723 F. Supp. 1258, 1259, 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act). This
remains true even if the state consumer law claims are asserted by the State itself or
as parens patriae. Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. of Am.,
723 F. Supp. 1258, 1259 & n.1, 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
146. FDIC v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 58 (2d Cir. 1994) (Connecticut Uniform Se-
curities Act); Murphy v. FDIC, 829 F. Supp. 3,7 (D.D.C. 1993) (Virginia and Florida
blue-sky laws).
147. RTC v. Wilson, 851 F. Supp. 141 (D.NJ. 1994) (New Jersey RICO).
148. This phrase derives from Vernon v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1993)
[hereinafter Vernon II]. Vernon sued the receivership (as opposed to the bridge bank
claims disposed of in Vernon v. RTC, 907 F.2d 1101 (11th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter
Vernon 1], which is discussed infra note 223) for various securities law violations unre-
lated to a specific asset of the bank. The FDIC again attempted to defend on the
basis of D'Oench, as it had in Vernon L Vernon II, 981 F.2d at 1231-32. The claim was
dispatched swiftly, the court pointing out that it had already determined in Vernon I
that Vernon's claims survived D'Oench. Vernon II, 981 F.2d at 1233-34. The court did
"not think the D'Oench doctrine operates to bar free standing tort claims that are not
related to a specific asset." Vernon II, 981 F.2d at 1233-34. This fateful phrase was
taken up in OPS Shopping Center v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 306 (11th Cir. 1993), when a
beneficiary under a letter of credit attempted to assert that his was an affirmative
claim unrelated to any asset. The court held that the liability was contractual and
therefore not a free standing tort protected by the Vernons. The letter of credit was
precisely the sort of ordinary banking transaction an examiner would expect to see
memorialized in the bank's files, and there it must be memorialized if it is to have any
effect. OPS Shopping, 992 F.2d at 309-11. The Eleventh Circuit has apparently im-
posed a relatedness test. In FDIC v. Govaert (In re Geri Zahn, Inc.), 25 F.3d 1539
(11th Cir. 1994), the court adopted a standard in which the tort must be one that is not
intertwined with ordinary banking business such that one would expect its underpin-
nings to be reflected in the bank's records. Govaert, 25 F.3d at 1543-44 ("One obvious
indicia [sic] of relatedness would be whether the oral representations were of matters
that would generally be reflected in the records of ordinary banking transactions.").
See also Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 39 F.3d 292 (11th Cir.
1994) (holding that where passive financial backers of auto dealership claimed that
failure of bank to properly audit dealership and to report "out-of-trust" sales consti-
tuted breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, tort was sufficiently free-standing to
survive D'Oench). This analysis has been ratified by the Eleventh Circuit en banc in
RTC v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 595 (11th Cir. 1995).
A peculiar variation on this theme was found in FDIC v. Rusconi, 808 F. Supp. 30
(D. Me. 1992). The court barred resort to tort claims under the state deceptive trade
practices act, but only to the extent that the claims were in essence alternate pleadings
of fraud in the inducement. Claims under the statute bottomed on actions asserted to
be fraud in the factum were permitted to go forward. This seems to conflate the
"asset" and "agreement" sides of the test. If there was a factual question as to the
existence of an asset in the first instance, then all of the tort claims should be permit-
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ment" and is allowed to proceed.14 9 The distinction between attempts
to enforce barred contract claims under other rubrics and the enforce-
ment of rights arising independently of agreements also applies to
other non-tort rights and remedies. Examples of such rights are those
of a trustee in bankruptcy with respect to voidable preferences and
fraudulent conveyances. 150 These rights are held to arise indepen-
ted to go forward, because, the asset being proven non-existent, the "agreements"
plead in tort do not affect an interest in it and should not be barred.
149. Hanson v. FDIC, 13 F.3d 1247, 1251-52 (8th Cir. 1994); Garrett v. Common-
wealth Mortgage Corp. of Am., 938 F.2d 591, 594-95 (5th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Eltrex
Int'l Corp., No. CIV. 91-434-JD, 1994 WL 258673, at *5 (D.N.H. Feb. 1, 1994); St.
Bernard Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Robin Seafood, Inc., CIV. A. Nos. 91-4655 & 92-38,
1993 WL 21328, at *3-4 (E.D. La. Jan. 25, 1993); New Bank of New Eng. v. Callahan,
798 F. Supp. 73,76-77 (D.N.H. 1992); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Em-
ployees v. FDIC (In re NBW Commercial Paper Litig.), 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1467-71
(D.D.C. 1992) (see discussion infra at notes 268-69); Claim of Citizens Bank (In re
Liquidation of City & County Bank), 856 S.W.2d 137, 141-42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that theft was not an "agreement" or "scheme"); RTC v. Cook, 840 S.W.2d
42, 47-49 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that bank subsidiary's practice of calling preg-
nant debtor late at night and usingracial slurs was not an "agreement"); cf Albuquer-
que Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Deville, 615 So. 2d 1002, 1008 (La. Ct. App. 1993)
(stating that where land sellers failed to deliver legally-mandated disclosure docu-
ments, the fact that the statute rendered transaction merely voidable was irrelevant
because the "statute clearly does not constitute an 'agreement' subject to the applica-
tion of D'Oench, Duhme and § 1823(e)").
The importance of the determination of whether or not a breach of duty sounds in
"agreement" may be seen in Desmond v. FDIC, 798 F. Supp. 829 (D. Mass. 1992).
Here we enter the terrain of duress, which will become familiar in its status as a "real"
defense negativing the existence of an asset. See infra notes 170-75 and accompanying
text. Here there is a difference: the duress is asserted not to show an agreement void,
but as an independent tort. Desmond was attempting to work out a settlement of his
debt with the bank. On the eve of execution of the agreements, the bank suddenly
demanded that Desmond's counsel (whose firm represented the bank on unrelated
matters) withdraw from representing Desmond. Uncounselled and unfamiliar with
the papers, Desmond mortgaged everything he owned. Desmond, 798 F. Supp. at 831.
The court noted that the D'Oench inquiry is, in accordance with Langley, bifurcated.
Id. at 837 n.4. While the duress asserted by Desmond was insufficient under state law
to void his obligations under the "asset" prong, it was sufficiently peripheral to the
terms of the parties' bargain as not to constitute an "agreement" for that prong of the
inquiry, and thus survived D'Oench. Id. at 836-39. But see Gustin v. FDIC, 835 F.
Supp. 503, 509-11 & n.13 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (rejecting Desmond).
150. Jobin v. RTC, 160 B.R. 161, 168-70 (D. Colo. 1993); Gallant v. Kanterman (In
re Kanterman), 97 B.R1 768, 777 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 108 B.R. 432 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); First City Fn. Corp. v. FDIC (In re First City Fi. Corp.), 61 B.R. 95, 97
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1986); La Mancha Aire, Inc. v. FDIC (In re La Mancha Aire, Inc.), 41
B.R. 647, 648-49 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
There is an exception to the power of the trustee to reclaim property, embodied in
11 U.S.C. § 550(b), which shields property held by an innocent purchaser for value
from the trustee's reach. One bankruptcy court has held that, as a matter of law, the
insurer is just such an innocent purchaser. Osherow v. First RepublicBank San
Antonio, NA. (In re Linen Warehouse, Inc.), 100 B.R. 856 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
Contra FDIC v. Wright (In re Still), 124 B.R. 24 (N.D. Tex. 1991), aff'd, 963 F.2d 75
(5th Cir. 1992); Thistlethwaite v. FDIC (In re Pernie Bailey Drilling Co.), 111 B.R.
565, 575-76 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1990); Gallant v. Kanterman (In re Kanterman), 97
B.R. 768, 776-77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 108 B.R. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The diffi-
culty with the Linen Warehouse reasoning is that, in contrast to the situation under
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dently of any agreement between the debtor and the bank and thus
not to be subject to D'Oench. In contrast, the power of equitable sub-
ordination in bankruptcy prevails over D'Oench only if the inequita-
ble conduct did not arise from a barred agreement. 1' 1 This is
consistent with the treatment of equitable subordination in non-bank-
ruptcy courts152 and of equitable remedies generally. 153 Likewise,
liens and encumbrances and other interests in property created by
mechanics' liens or other priority-setting statutes also survive
D'Oench if they arise from independent rights under state law or not
from forbidden agreements. 5 4 Even where the provision is couched
the "asset" prong of D'Oench, where determination of whether an innocent pur-
chaser for value could take free and clear of a specified defense may determine
whether D'Oench applies (see infra notes 178-181, 187), the rights of the trustee do
not arise out of an "agreement" but rather from the mere fact of payment on an
antecedent debt under the requisite circumstances.
151. Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust (In re 604 Co-
lumbus Ave. Realty Trust), 968 F.2d 1332, 1353-56 (1st Cir. 1992); Kingsway Revoca-
ble Trust v. FSLIC (In re C.P.C. Dev. Co. No. 5), 113 B.R. 637, 642-43 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1990); see also Holt v. FDIC (In re CTS Truss, Inc.), 868 F.2d 146, 149-50 (5th Cir.
1989) (dictum).
152. Compare Lawlor Corp. v. FDIC, 848 F. Supp. 1069, 1072-73 (D. Mass. 1994)
(Young, J.) (permitting equitable subordination because, under Massachusetts equita-
ble principles, equitable subordination may be invoked only where there is no agree-
ment, and, as such, is not barred by D'Oench; if the officers of the bank acted
inequitably so as to trigger the equitable subordination, D'Oench did not bar its appli-
cation) with First Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, Civ. A. No. 92-12222-Y, 1993 WL 443917, at *4
(D. Mass. Sept. 30, 1993) (Young, J.) (holding that where claim for equitable subordi-
nation was grounded in "mistake" under unwritten agreement, claim was barred by
D'Oench). But cf First Heights Bank v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 613 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993) (denying applicability of common law D'Oench to equitable subordination as
"without merit as equitable subordination is a remedy and not a claim," but finding
that grounds for remedy were, in any event, sufficiently documented in bank's files).
153. Such claims would be permitted where the wrongs to be righted by the con-
science of equity have arisen from compliant agreements and barred where they did
not. RTC v. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank, 36 F.3d 785, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (allowing
reformation); Hanson v. FDIC, 13 F.3d 1247, 1251-52 (8th Cir. 1994) (indicating con-
structive trust could be imposed); Winterbrook Realty, Inc. v. FDIC, 820 F. Supp. 27,
32 (D.N.H. 1993) (barring unjust enrichment and quantum meruit); McCaugherty v.
Siffermann, 772 F. Supp. 1128, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (refusing constructive trust).
Further, if the equitable right exists separate and apart from an artful pleading of a
forbidden agreement, it will be allowed. Empire State Bank v. Citizens State Bank,
932 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (8th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Beam, No. CV92 29 13 52, 1993 WL
286636, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 16, 1993).
154. Such decisions have been grounded in the theories that the particular agree-
ment was not an agreement for purposes of D'Oench or that the rights of the
mechanic arise by operation of law and not agreements. Cabarrocas v. RTC, 840 F.
Supp. 888, 892-93 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding agreement between bank and architect
was not an agreement under D'Oench); RTC v. Ford Mall Assocs., 796 F. Supp. 1233,
1236-41 (D. Minn. 1992) (rejecting interposition of D'Oench on the ground that
mechanic's liens arose from state law and were not agreements); Bascom Constr., Inc.
v. FDIC, 777 F. Supp. 123, 125-26 (D.N.H. 1991) (finding right of mechanic to chal-
lenge price received at foreclosure sale did not arise from "agreement" and, FDIC's
purported "federal" defense being inapposite, remand of case to state courts was
proper); Citytrust v. Clark & Fray Constr. Co., No. 58545, 1992 WL 98046, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 1, 1992) (stating that agreement between mortgagor and con-
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in terms of consent, in the absence of true agreement with the bank,
state-law lien-setting priorities are apparently immune from
D'Oench155
Yet, in addition to the restrictions on D'Oench imposed by the
broad outer limits of the term agreement, an additional genus of ex-
ception exists: the asset defenses. These are defenses based on the
non-existence of an asset or the breach, not of a condition of an agree-
ment affecting an asset, but of the very asset itself. It is to that second
genus that this Note now turns.
III. AssET DEFENSES TO THE APPLICATION OF D'OENCH
"Plunder is not taken in repayment of a debt. , 56
The very words of section 1823(e) require the presence of an asset
to be diminished by the forbidden agreement. Similarly, the principle
located by Justice Douglas in the Federal Reserve Act requires a mis-
representation of the value of the assets in the hands of a bank.
Claiming that the asset under which they appear obligated is no asset
tractor was between third parties and thus did not implicate D'Oench). But cf L & R
Prebuilt Homes, Inc. v. New Eng. Allbank for Sav., 783 F. Supp. 11, 12, 14-15 (D.N.H.
1992) (holding that where bank cozened contractor into continuing work, representa-
tions were an agreement and the resultant lien fell to D'Oench). Twin Construction,
Inc. v. Boca Raton, Inc., 925 F.2d 378, 379-80 (11th Cir. 1991), is not authority to the
contrary, because the construction company had already waived its statutory rights in
favor of the lender long prior to (non-)execution of the letter agreement in issue in
that case.
Even where the right arises from a forbidden agreement, if the same effect would
be had in its absence, the right's invocation is permitted. Thus, where encumbered
swine were sold and the proceeds remitted to the borrower under a tacit agreement
between the auctioneer and the bank, the auctioneer could not be held for conver-
sion, as state law also gave him the right to sell free and clear. Compare FDIC v.
Bowles Livestock Comm'n Co., 937 F.2d 1350, 1353-56 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that
under Nebraska law, incorporated in federal common law, that auctioneer could sell
free and clear) with Bowles Livestock, 937 F.2d at 1356-57 (Gibson, John R., J, dis-
senting) (complaining that his brother judges ignored the fact that the bank's consent
to the sale of its pigs was unwritten and thus section 1823(e) should impose liability)
and FDIC v. Bowles Livestock Comm'n Co., 739 F. Supp. 1364, 1368-1375 (D. Neb.
1990), rev'd, 937 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1991) (imposing liability for conversion based on
section 1823(e) and rejecting defendant's claim of non-liability under Nebraska law,
because the case was controlled by federal common law imposing strict liability for
conversion). But cf Winterbrook Realty, Inc. v. FDIC, 820 F. Supp. 27, 32 (D.N.H.
1993) (denying statutory right to recover brokers' fees).
155. Bateman v. FDIC, 970 F.2d 924 (1st Cir. 1992) (Breyer, Ci.) (holding that
mechanics' lien arose from state priority of lien requirements, which one would not
expect to see memorialized in bank files, and did not arise from an agreement,
notwithstanding provision for "consent" in statute, where consent had been construed
to constitute mere constructive notice). See also Villafane-Neriz v. FDIC, 20 F.3d 35,
41 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Here, the state law mechanism whereby the certificate of deposit
was created, assigned to the Commissioner, and further protected from levying by
creditors is similar to the state mechanic's lien system in Bateman.").
156. Kanuni i Leke Dukagjinit, ch. CXIV, § 800 (Shtjefdn Gjerov ed., 1933), trans-
lated in The Code of Leke Dukagjini 158 (Leonard Fox trans., 1989) (Alb.).
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at all, parties have attempted to avoid the application of D'Oench by
raising "real" defenses. Such defenses assert that a quondam asset in
the hands of the insurer is no asset at all because it was void ab initio.
Such defenses have included fraud in the factum, duress, insanity, and
illegality. In addition, various statutory provisions may render an as-
set void. Thus, a violation of statute law requires the violator to pay
damages, or where the violation makes an asset voidable rather than
void, the asset remains viable and D'Oench will apply. If the asset is
in fact void, while statutory D'Oench may not apply, common law
D'Oench will.
A. "Asset" Defenses Claiming that an Asset was Void at Takeover
1. Assets Void Ab Initio
In Langley the Court indicated, albeit on the basis of a concession
by FDIC counsel, that a defense based on fraud in the factum might
defeat section 1823(e). 57 Fraud in the factum would defeat the inter-
ests of the insurer because where the agreement is void, there is no
asset and thus nothing in which the insurer may have an interest to be
" 'diminsh[ed] or defeat[ed].' "158 A variety of other defenses based
on voidness have also been asserted, and the "no asset" exception is
generally recognized by the courts.159 Given the broad definition of
157. The Court, responding to the Langleys' claims that an intentionally fraudulent
misrepresentation should take the agreement out of section 1823(e), pointed out that,
while a fraudulent misrepresentation was an "agreement" for purposes of section
1823(e),
[t]he presence of fraud could be relevant, however, to... the requirement
that the agreement in question "ten[d] to diminish or defeat the right, title or
interest" of the FDIC in the asset.
[The FDIC] conceded at oral argument that the real defense of fraud in
the factum-that is, the sort of fraud that procures a party's signature to an
instrument without knowledge of its true nature or contents-would take
the instrument out of § 1823(e), because it would render the instrument en-
tirely void, thus leaving no "right, title or interest" that could be "dimin-
ish[ed] or defeat[ed]." Petitioners have never contended... that the alleged
misrepresentations ... constituted fraud in the factum. It is clear that they
would constitute only fraud in the inducement, which renders the note void-
able but not void. The bank therefore had and could transfer to the FDIC
voidable title, which is enough to constitute "title or interest" in the note.
Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1987) (citations omitted).
158. Langley, 484 U.S. at 94 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1982)).
159. Courts have occasionally noted that this alleged exception is rooted in a con-
cession at oral argument by Mr. Taranto, counsel for the FDIC, and is "[t]hus, an
acknowledgment of what one party in the case conceded [which] certainly does not
rise to the level of a dispositive holding, and arguably does not even rise to the level
of indicating, however tentatively, the Court's views on the issue." Templin v. Weis-
gram, 867 F.2d 240, 242 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). The Templin
court appears to been the only court to have actually held the "no asset" exception to
be myth. Templin, which actually involved not fraud in the factum but a lien void
under the Texas homestead laws, is discussed below. In any event, the Fifth Circuit
has apparently backed away from this position. See infra notes 182 and 187.
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"asset" under D'Oench, 16 it is in these defenses that refuge for those
litigating against the insurers may be found. It is, however, important
to note that the asset defenses are not the only ones available against
D'Oench, despite certain ill-considered language in the reports.161
The real defenses are one form of the no-asset exception. A
number of so-called "real" defenses exist, arising from defects in con-
tract formation so severe that a contract may not be said to have been
formed at all. Here the statutory and common law doctrines work in
relative unison. Each of these defenses may render an obligation
void, barring resort to statutory D'Oench under Langley's dictum.
Nor can a person who signs in excusable ignorance, with a knife to his
throat, or because so ordered by voices in his head, properly be said to
have lent himself to a "scheme" under common law D'Oench. It is in
these defenses that the similarities between common law and statutory
D'Oench on the one hand and the federal holder in due course doc-
trine on the other reach their apex.
Other courts have expressed similar sentiments, but have been willing to assume
the existence of the exception for argument's sake or as the basis for an alternate
holding. FSLIC v. Gordy, 928 F.2d 1558, 1565 (11th Cir. 1991); McLemore v. Landry,
898 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 966 (1990); RTC v. Wilson, 851 F.
Supp. 141 (D.N.J. 1994); Milligan v. Gilmore Meyer Inc., 775 F. Supp. 400,407 (S.D.
Ga. 1991); FSLIC v. Wilson, 722 F. Supp. 306, 314-15 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
160. Courts have, for purposes of common law and statutory D'Oench, found a
variety of types of contracts to be assets. See, eg., FDIC v. Oldenburg, 34 F.3d 1529,
1552-53 (10th Cir. 1994) (fidelity bond); FDIC v. Payne, 973 F.2d 403, 406 (5th Cir.
1992) (guaranty agreement); Castleglen, Inc. v. Commonwealth Say. Ass'n, 728 F.
Supp. 656, 671 (D. Utah 1989), aff'd sub nor. Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984 F.2d 1571
(10th Cir. 1993) (reimbursement obligation for draws under letter of credit); Cutler v.
FDIC, 796 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D. Me. 1992) (real property); FDIC v. Dixon, 681 F.
Supp. 408, 412-13 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (assumption of liability agreement). Likewise,
claims that common law or statutory D'Oench applies only to classes of obligation,
such as negotiable instruments or notes, have been rejected. FDIC v. P.L.M. Int'l,
Inc., 834 F.2d 248,254-55 (1st Cir. 1987) (negotiable instruments); FDIC v. Dixon, 681
F. Supp. 408,412-13 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (notes). But cf. FDIC v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 947 F.2d 196, 205 n.9 (6th Cir. 1991) (arguing section 1823(e) should be confined
to negotiable instruments or instruments that resemble them). The case is, of course,
different with respect to federal holder in due course, which may be so confined. See
supra note 56.
Similarly, claims that because an asset had been written off or down on the books of
the bank, D'Oench did not apply are summarily rejected. FDIC v. Kratz, 898 F.2d
669, 671 (8th Cir. 1990); FDIC v. Fisher, 727 F. Supp. 1306, 1310 (D. Minn. 1989);
Stiles v. RTC, 831 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 867
S.W.2d 24 (Tex. 1993). Such claims are particularly risible, in that in D'Oench itself
the note had been written off years before the bank was taken over. D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 454 (1942). Some of these attempts have been quite
creative. See FDIC v. Powers, 576 F. Supp. 1167, 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("[Defendants]
cite an old Wisconsin case which holds that uncollectible loans are not assets for pur-
poses of determining whether a bank's assets exceed its liabilities. Observing that
they have refused to make payments under the guarantees, the [defendants] conclude
that their... guarantees should not be considered assets under § 1823(e)."), aff'd, 753
F.2d 1076 (7th Cir. 1984).
161. RTC v. Colorado 126 Partnership, 746 F. Supp. 35 (D. Colo. 1990).
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The defenses that might prevail against a holder in due course have
been recognized under common law and statutory D'Oench. The real
defenses asserted tend to follow those set out in the UCC: fraud in
the factum, duress, and mental incapacity.162 Similarly, the defense of
forgery has been recognized as efficacious against the insurer, as it
would be against a holder in due course, 63 but, as with a holder in due
course, fraudulent alteration in the agreement has not prevailed, as
being occasioned by the negligence of the maker.16' The defenses of
lack or limitation of agent authority have also been recognized, 65
162. U.C.C. § 3-305 (1978) (article withdrawn 1990). Note that the UCC remits the
question of whether or not infancy, insanity or duress will constitute a real defense to
the contract law of the signatory state. UCC § 3-305 cmt. 5 (1978) (article withdrawn
1990). Everything that is not a "real" defense is denominated personal and will not
stand against a holder in due course, or, under Langley, the insurers. "The real de-
fenses are few in number and can be readily listed in 3-305(2)(a) to 3-305(2)(c). All
other defenses are 'personal' .... Simply put, they include most defenses ... since
any defense available in an action on a simple contract will suffice. All are severed
." Quinn, supra note 57, at I 3-305[A][3].
163. U.C.C. §§ 3-403, 3-404 (1978) (article withdrawn 1990). That forgery would
be a defense against D'Oench has been frequently recognized in dictum. RTC v
Ehrenhaus, 34 F.3d 441, 442 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795
F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1986); FSLIC v. Doyle, No. CIV. A. 87-3979, 1988 WL 59852,
at *3 (E.D. La. June 6, 1988); FDIC v. Powers, 576 F. Supp. 1167, 1171 (N.D. I11.
1983), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1076 (7th Cir. 1984); FDIC v. Jahner, 506 N.W.2d 57, 61 (N.D.
1993). In one case the issue has been confronted directly, and it indeed appears that
forgery will stand against D'Oench and section 1823(e), because it renders an instru-
ment void ab initio. Commonwealth Land Title Co. v. Nelson, No. A14-92-01204-CV,
1994 WL 531267, at *8-10 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1994) (opinion not yet released for
publication). Dictum indicates that the same rule might apply to a federal holder in
due course. FDIC v. Adam, 803 F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
164. U.C.C. § 3-407(2)(a) & cmt. 4 (1978) (article withdrawn 1990). The D'Oench
cases seem to treat signature of blank instruments or pages as being negligent per se.
FDIC v. Plato, 981 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Caporale, 931 F.2d 1, 2 (1st
Cir. 1991); FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (5th Cir. 1988); FDIC v. Inves-
tors Assocs. X., Ltd., 775 F.2d 152, 154-56 (6th Cir. 1985); FDIC v. Powers, 576 F.
Supp. 1167, 1170-72 (N.D. I11. 1983), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1076 (7th Cir. 1984); National
Loan Investors, L.P. v. Martin, 488 N.W.2d 163, 166-67 (Iowa 1992); FDIC v. Central
Wine & Liquor, 589 N.Y.S.2d 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). Other courts have gone so
far as to apply this without reference to whether the alteration was facilitated by the
borrower or no. AmWest Say. Ass'n v. Farmers Mkt. Market of Odessa, Inc., 753 F.
Supp. 1339, 1345 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
165. U.C.C. § 3-403 (1978) (article withdrawn 1990). See McLemore v. Landry, 898
F.2d 996, 1000-02 (5th Cir.) (holding that where mandates, or powers of attorney,
were referenced in operative documents and such documents were signed in represen-
tative capacity, defenses grounded in lack of authority were not barred by D'Oench),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 966 (1990); FSLIC v. Port Allen Dev. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 439,
440-41 (M.D. La. 1988) (stating that executing officer had authority to execute note,
and therefore guarantors of corporation's debt were liable); see also Andrew D. Taylor
Trust v. Security Trust Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 844 F.2d 337, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1988)
(indicating, in dictum, that act of trustee in excess of authority would be a real de-
fense, taking transaction outside of common law D'Oench); First Fed. Bank v. Realty
Capitol Assocs., No. CV90 304321, 1993 WL 524965, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 8,
1993) (stating defenses based on lack of authority of partner were not based in agree-
ments and thus not barred by D'Oench or section 1823(e), but were barred by federal
holder in due course). The reverse has also been held to be true, as one court has
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although other courts have barred the organic documents or resolu-
tions of borrowers' as forbidden side agreements.16
Fraud in the factum is fraud so severe that the very intention to
contract is justifiably absent. 67 Given the stringency of the test for
fraud in the factum, it is a rare case in which it will be found, and thus
even courts willing to credit the Langley dictum will rarely have occa-
sion to implement it." Nonetheless, the defense has succeeded under
both common law D'Oench and section 1823(e). 69
denied limited partners, as non-signatories, standing to assert an agreement entered
into with the bank on behalf of the partnership. FDIC v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 56
(2d Cir. 1994).
166. FDIC v. Cremona Co., 832 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir. 1987) (partnership agree-
ment), cert. dismissed sub nom. Gonda v. FDIC, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988); FDIC v. Allen,
801 F.2d 863, 864-65 (6th Cir. 1986) (same); First City, Tex.-Beaumont, N.A. v.
Treece, 848 F. Supp. 727, 737-38 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (corporate resolutions).
167. Fraud in the factum, as distinguished from fraud in the inducement, is fraud so
severe that the very existence of the contract, as opposed to its incidents, can be said
to have been tainted. It is important to distinguish mere fraud in the inducement,
which is barred by D'Oench. As one commentator has described it: "A classic illus-
tration of fraud in the inducement is had with the poor dummy who is conned into
buying the Brooklyn Bridge and writes out a check in payment," while fraud in the
factum is "where some poor dummy is induced to sign what purports to be a mere
receipt or some other innocuous sort of document which is, in fact, a negotiable in-
strument." Quinn, supra note 57, at I 3-305[A][6][b]. The test is similar outside of the
realm of negotiable instruments as well. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 249-50 (2d
ed. 1990). Not only must the defrauded party be clueless, there must also be no way,
in the reasonable exercise of diligence, he could have procured a clue.
168. Vasapolli v. Rostoff, 39 F.3d 27, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Lands, No. 91-
16335, 1993 WL 360781, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 1993); Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984
F.2d 1571, 1577-78 (10th Cir. 1993); Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. 604 Columbus Ave.
Realty Trust (In re 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust), 968 F.2d 1332, 1346-47 (1st Cir.
1992); FDIC v. O'Flahaven, 857 F. Supp. 154, 160 (D.N.H. 1994); RTC v. Davies, 824
F. Supp. 1002, 1012 (D. Kan. 1993); Alten v. T.A.E.I., Inc., No. CIV. A. 87-8343, 1993
WL 53566, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 1993); Simms v. Biondo, 816 F. Supp. 814, 824-25
(E.D.N.Y. 1993); Washington Properties Ltd. Partnership v. RTC, 796 F. Supp. 542,
548-49 (D.D.C. 1992); Covell v. Photo Images, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 308, 312 (D. Kan.
1991); National Loan Investors, L.P. v. Martin, 488 N.W.2d 163, 167-68 (Iowa 1992);
FDIC v. Jahner, 506 N.W.2d 57, 61 (N.D. 1993).
This is the case with fraud in the factum generally, not just in D'Oench cases.
Quinn, supra note 57, at 3-305[A][6][b]; Farnsworth, supra note 167, at 250.
169. In FDIC v. Rusconi, 808 F. Supp. 30 (D. Me. 1992), the defendant guarantors
asserted that they had been assured by the bank that liability under the guaranty
would be limited to liability under a single note (although the guaranty was actually
continuing), and that they had not intended to execute a guaranty. Id. at 35 n.7. They
also asserted that the bank failed to supply them copies of the closing documents,
including the guaranty, at the closing and for some considerable period of time there-
after. Id. at 39 n.20. Under these circumstances, the District Court found that an issue
of material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment was presented. Id. at 40.
The defense has also succeeded in a federal holder in due course decision, with
implications that it would have succeeded under D'Oench. In FDIC v. Turner, 869
F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1989), Turner had executed a guaranty in blank, which was fraudu-
lently completed by a bank officer, and used the guaranty for a transaction utterly
unrelated to Thrner's loans. Id. at 272. The court chose to analyze the case under the
federal holder in due course doctrine, extending, without analysis, prior cases relating
to notes to the contingent obligations of a guarantor. Id. at 273 (citing Tenn. Code
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Duress also has been asserted as an asset-voiding defense to
D'Oench. Typically, claimants have tried to use an "economic duress"
defense, claiming that they were pressed so hard by the bank that they
had no choice but to sign the agreement the insurer now seeks to en-
force. As a general "hornbook" matter, however, only duress by
physical compulsion rather than duress by threat to person or prop-
erty would render a contract void.170 These claims have succeeded (at
least to the extent of surviving summary judgment) but rarely. They
have been barred as a matter of law by courts holding duress to be a
personal defense. 71 Other courts have barred such defenses as a mat-
ter of fact in the particular circumstances. 72 Nonetheless, if proven as
a matter of fact and permitted as a matter of law, the defense will
prevail against statutory and common law D'Oench.173 Other courts
have demanded that duress, not specified as to whether by compulsion
or by threat, be documented and approved in the records of the bank
in order to survive D'Oench. 74 This insistence on documentation is
Ann. § 47-3-305(2)(c)). The court also noted that Turner had not engaged in conduct
likely to mislead banking authorities, and distinguished his conduct from that which
had imposed liability in a number of cases invoking D'Oench and section 1823(e). Id.
at 275-76. Although Turner was decided two years after Langley, and involved an
obligation subject to section 1823(e), nowhere in the majority opinion is the Langley
dictum addressed. The dissenting judge, while he disagreed with the majority's con-
clusion that Turner was not negligent and thus not liable to the federal holder, would
have dismissed the D'Oench defenses on the basis that D'Oench barred only personal
defenses and Turner's was a real defense. Id. at 277 n.1 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Judge
Ryan did not cite any cases for the proposition that common law D'Oench does not
bar "real" defenses, but it is likely that Langley was meant.
170. Compare Farnsworth, supra note 167, at 272 ("[D]uress by physical compul-
sion results in no contract at all or in what is somewhat anomalously described as a
'void contract.' ") with Farnsworth, supra note 167, at 282 ("Duress by threat...
makes the resulting contract voidable at the instance of the victim.").
171. Vasapolli v. Rostoff, 39 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 1994); First City, Tex.-Beaumont,
N.A. v. Treece, 848 F. Supp. 727, 738 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Gustin v. FDIC, 835 F. Supp.
503, 509-11 (W.D. Mo. 1993); FDIC v. Rusconi, 808 F. Supp. 30, 40-41 (D. Me. 1992);
Diamond v. Union Bank & Trust, 776 F. Supp. 542, 543 (N.D. Okla. 1991); FDIC v.
Meyer, 755 F. Supp. 10, 12-14 (D.D.C. 1991); B.L. Nelson & Assocs. v. Sunbelt Say.,
FSB, 733 F. Supp. 1106, 1108, 1111-13 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (federal holder in due course);
FSLIC v. Maio, 736 F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
172. RTC v. Ruggiero, 756 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd, 977 F.2d 309
(7th Cir. 1992).
173. In Thistlethwaite v. FDIC (In re Pernie Bailey Drilling Co.), 111 B.R. 565
(Bankr. W.D. La. 1990), the court determined that a defense of economic duress
raised issues of material fact for trial. The court determined that the defense was not
barred by section 1823(e), because the defense went to the underlying validity of the
agreement. Nor was it barred by common law D'Oench, because one signing under
duress may not be lending himself to a scheme. The court also held the defense effec-
tive against the federal holder, because duress was a defense available against a
holder in due course under state law, summary judgment was unavailable on this
ground. Id. at 573.
174. Without the slightest explanation, in FDIC v. Gettysburg Corp., 760 F. Supp.
115 (S.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd without opinion sub nom. Unitedbank v. Gettysburg Corp.,
952 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 70 (1992), the court stated that under
D'Oench and section 1823(e), the defense of duress "cannot be used against the
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utterly inconsistent with the statements of Justice Scalia in Langley;
175
the Court did not insist that unless the bank had somehow recorded
that its borrowers had been hornswoggled, fraud in the factum would
not be an effective defense.
There have been few cases in which the obligor has attempted to
avoid his debt on the grounds of his own madness. Of these few cases,
all have been determined under federal holder in due course princi-
ples, rather than under common law D'Oench or section 1823(e).176
In all cases, the defense has been found to be barred as a matter of
law as a personal defense unavailing against a holder in due course.
Illegality is another of the "real" defenses, although it has been little
used.177
FDIC unless Defendant can show, in writing from the Board of Directors or Loan
Committee minutes evidence which supports the validity" of the defense. Id at 117.
Presumably, a minute authorizing officers of the bank to make the debtor an offer he
couldn't refuse would be necessary to pass this test. The court appears to have con-
fused these committees with the Commission of the Five Families. The court went on
to hold that "[t]he claim of economic duress is also barred" by Langley. Id The court
did not clarify exactly how a claim of economic duress would be barred by Langley,
although one may presume its status as a personal defense was meant.
175. See supra note 157 (quoting Langley).
176. One of the cases, FDIC v. Ohlson, 659 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Iowa 1987), was
decided before Langley. The court held that the defenses of fraud in the inducement,
as in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982),
and of mental incapacity were indistinguishable defenses to contract formation. Ohl-
son, 659 F. Supp. at 491. The court did mention in a footnote that a contract made by
an incompetent being merely voidable under state law, but solely as a means of justi-
fying its federal common law rule as not upsetting settled commercial expectations.
Id at 492 & n.3. In FSLIC v. Wilson, 722 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Tex. 1989), the court
held that not only need the incompetent "prove his complete 'innocence' in incurring
the obligation .... he must also establish that the basis of his innocence is a defense
available against a holder in due course." Id at 317. The court went on to point out
that a holder in due course takes free of the defense of incapacity, citing Ohison, the
Texas version of the UCC and Texas case law. Id at 318. FSLIC v. Smith, 755 F.
Supp. 1432 (E.D. Ark. 1989), is even more inconclusive. The court admitted that the
defense of incapacity might be available against FSLIC as a federal holder in due
course, but refused to determine the issue because neither party had briefed the issue.
Id at 1441.
177. The normal example in the treatises is a gambling debt, which is void in certain
states. Quinn, supra note 57, at I 3-305[A][7]. The "rule" is so riddled with excep-
tions, however, as to hardly be a rule at all Castleglen, Inc. v. Commonwealth Sav.
Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. 656, 671 (D. Utah 1989), aff'd sub nor. Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC,
984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993) (Utah law). Some courts have held that a violation of
statute, even one that merely creates a right of recision or to damages in the bor-
rower, may be sufficient illegality to void the instrument for purposes of D'Oench or
the federal holder in due course doctrine. FDIC v. Allen, No. CIV-88-361-W, 1988
WL 361044, at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 3, 1988); Albuquerque Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Deville, 615 So. 2d 1002, 1007-08 (La. Ct. App. 1993). These appear to be isolated
cases, as will be seen below. The theory that an underlying illegality would prevail
over D'Oench is not uniformly held. Notrica v. FDIC, 2 F.3d 961, 964-65 (9th Cir.
1993) (insisting, in dictum, that even if failure of bank to be licensed in California
rendered all of its transactions void, D'Oench would still bar illegality defense).
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Statute law has been interposed as a defense to D'Oench. The rem-
edy provided by the statute is what determines whether it survives
D'Oench. It is clear that where a statute merely permits a victim to
mulct the violator in damages, as in the case of the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act, 78 D'Oench will bar resort to the defense.179 Similarly,
where an act creates a right of recision, rendering the underlying con-
tract voidable, generally 80 D'Oench will bar the defense. This is true
even if the statute speaks in terms of "void" obligations, if the words
of the law have received a judicial gloss allowing mere voidability.
Such is the lesson of the better-founded decisions on section 29 of the
'34 Act, 181 although other courts have provided more dubious reason-
ing in deciding that section 29's protections do not survive
D'Oench.'1 Decisions also have been handed down under laws actu-
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1988).
179. CMF Va. Land, L.P. v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. 90, 94-97 (E.D. Va. 1992); see
also Diamond v. Union Bank & Trust, 776 F. Supp. 542, 543-44 (N.D. Okla. 1991)
(dictum). But see FDIC v. Allen, No. CIV-88-361-W, 1988 WL 361044, at *2-3 (W.D.
Okla. Nov. 3, 1988) (holding violation of ECOA rendered contract void); FDIC v.
Notis, 602 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Me. 1992) (holding ECOA claim, as a matter of law,
survived 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(n)(4)(I) and 1823(e)). One court has held that because
the complaining spouse had signed the note her claim was not based on an unwritten
agreement. Thus, her counterclaim for violation of ECOA, and a parallel state stat-
ute, were not barred by D'Oench. FDIC v. Piccolo, No. CV94-0310755S, 1994 WL
324488, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 28, 1994). Other cases have also allowed the
counterclaim to survive, in contrast to the normal "mirror-image" rule. CMF Va.
Land, L.P. v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. 90, 94-97 (E.D. Va. 1992).
180. But see Albuquerque Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Deville, 615 So. 2d 1002, 1008
(La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that even though violation of consumer protection laws
rendered note merely voidable, statute was not an "agreement" and defense would
prevail against D'Oench).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1988). FDIC v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 58 (2d Cir. 1994);
FDIC v. Hudson, 800 F. Supp. 867, 871 (N.D. Cal. 1990). In Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907
F.2d 1523 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083 (1991), the dissent quite strongly
pointed out that the "voidability" of these void agreements ran only in favor of the
defrauded party to prevent a wrongdoer, having accidentally made a contract
favorable to his victim, from asserting his own sin and profiting by his own wrong.
Kilpatrick, 907 F.2d at 1531-32 & n.11 (Brown, J., dissenting). This seems to ignore
that all voidable contracts give the defrauded a put against the fraudfeasor; the same
argument could be made of fraud in the inducement.
182. In Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1083 (1991), the Fifth Circuit ignored a similar argument, treating fraud in the induce-
ment in a sale of securities as identical with fraud in the inducement in the sale of
land. Kilpatrick, 907 F.2d at 1527-29. The Circuit more explicitly rejected the argu-
ment four years later in Dendinger v. First National Corp., 16 F.3d 99 (5th Cir. 1994),
when the borrowers asserted that by filing suit prior to the failure of the bank they
had elected to void their note and thus that the receiver took no asset. Dendinger, 16
F.3d at 101 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)). In response,
the court stated that
[t]he Supreme Court in Langley did conclude that the FDIC does not take
title to void obligations, but it explained that a transaction is void only if a
plaintiff successfully asserts a fraud in the factum defense .... In contrast,
Appellants assert that... [the bank] fraudulently induced them to execute
the promissory notes, a defense that makes the notes merely voidable.
Dendinger, 16 F.3d at 101 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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ally rendering obligations void,ls" most notably the homestead provi-
sions of the Texas Constitution. 18 While the Fifth Circuit's
homestead decisions are not entirely consistent, they do suggest a
rule. If the voidness is intentionally created by an "agreement to
void," statutory D'Oench will apply and the insurer will prevail; how-
ever, a simple misrepresentation will not trigger the statute's applica-
tion.18 5 Common law D'Oench may provide a defense even if the
Similar sentiments had been more obliquely expressed by the Kilpatrick court. Kil-
patrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1527 n.6 (5th Cir. 1990), cerL denied, 498 U.S. 1083
(1991). In fine, we have a third version of the Fifth Circuit's view of voidable obliga-
tions; that voidness may arise only from fraud in the factum. Compare Kilpatrick (im-
plying only fraud in the factum survives section 1823(e)) with Templin v. Weisgram,
867 F.2d 240, 242 (5th Cir.) (implying not even fraud in the factum survives section
1823(e), see infra note 185), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989) and Patterson v. FDIC,
918 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1990) (allowing application of statute rendering obligations
void to bar invocation of section 1823(e), see infra note 185).
183. Brogdon v. Exterior Design, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1396, 1398-1400 (W.D. Ark.
1992).
184. Because perhaps the most comprehensive meditation on the void has been
provided in cases relating to the homestead right under the Texas Constitution, a swift
review of its provisions is in order. The constitution renders void liens against the
homestead, unless such lien is for purchase money, home improvements or the pay-
ment of taxes. See Patterson v. FDIC, 918 F.2d 540, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1990). Even an
affirmative misrepresentation by the borrower will not always remove its paternalistic
protections. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit has located a few exceptions to the rule:
representations that the property is not homestead, when the facts are such as to
support the representation, where the lien is created by means of a sham sale, and
when an owner represents that a mechanics' lien note is properly secured. See Smith
v. United Nat'l Bank-Denton (In re Smith), 966 F.2d 973, 976-77 (5th Cir. 1992).
185. Templin v. Weisgram, 867 F.2d 240 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989),
held that the no-asset dictum of Langley would not be applied to liens void under the
Texas constitution. Templin, 867 F.2d at 242. The case involved the sham sale of the
residence of Templin and her then-husband, Billy Bob Biggs, to one Nelson, who then
mortgaged it to a bank which had been involved in the whole rotten scheme. Templin,
867 F.2d at 240. The effect of these machinations was that the loan appeared to be a
valid lien. Templin, 867 F.2d at 241 n.2. Templin sought to defend the foreclosure
action on grounds that the lien, as a void obligation, could not be trumped by section
1823(e). Templin, 867 F.2d at 241-42. After rejecting Langley's dictum, the court went
on that, even if the dictum were granted some effect, it should be read not to create a
blanket exception for void agreements but only when the proof of voidness would not
rest, as it did in Templin, on secret agreements openly connived at. Templin, 867 F.2d
at 242.
Templin's rejection of the "no asset" dictum was in its turn rejected by another
panel in Patterson v. FDIC, 918 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1990). A borrower had executed a
deed of trust containing an untrue recital that the encumbered property was not her
homestead. Patterson, 918 F.2d at 541-42. The court held that the voiding provisions
of the constitution prevailed because the homestead right "'exist[s] independent of
any agreement between the parties.'" Patterson, 918 F.2d at 543. Templin was distin-
guished because the borrower's claim was not based on any "scheme or bank repre-
sentation." Patterson, 918 F.2d at 545. The idea that an "agreement to void" is invalid
remains alive and well. (Nonetheless, as a sop to Templin, the court did refer to fraud
in the factum as an "alleged" defense, in its later analysis of Patterson's fraud in the
factum claim. Patterson, 918 F.2d at 546.)
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asset is void, if there is some form of culpable conduct. 86 Further,
consistent with the '34 Act cases, where the law creates exceptions to
the rule of voidness, if the facts are consistent with such exception, the
"void" contract is not void at all, and the insurer will prevail.1 7
186. In Buchanan v. FSLIC, 935 F.2d 83 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005
(1991), the Templin treatment was given common law D'Oench. The debtor had exe-
cuted an agreement for improvements, that represented that the work had com-
menced after the signing of the contract, although such was not the case. Id. at 84.
This, if true, would have taken the lien outside of the homestead laws. Id. at 84 & n.2.
The court held that a borrower who executed a contract containing a false representa-
tion was sufficiently reckless to trigger liability under common law D'Oench, avoiding
expressly, but without explanation, the application of section 1823(e). Id. at 85 & n.4,
86. The court, in contrast to other Fifth Circuit decisions, seemed to focus on bor-
rower culpability as a determinative factor. Id. at 85-86. It is certainly worthy of note
that, in contrast to Patterson's insistence that an agreement containing a misrepresen-
tation was not sufficient to take a void contract out of section 1823(e), the absence of
a technical asset was insufficient to protect from common law D'Oench.
187. This seems to be the response of the bankruptcy courts to the welter of rulings
on the homestead exemption. The courts have determined that the rulings in Tem-
plin, Patterson, and Buchanan may be best understood as extensions of traditional
exceptions to the homestead law, although none of those decisions had rested itself on
those exceptions, apart from a reference to "simulated sale" in Patterson's explication
of Templin. Patterson, 918 F.2d at 545. Thus, in Napier v. FDIC (In re Napier), 144
B.R. 719 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992), the judge pigeonholed the Templin and Buchanan
decisions into sham sale and mechanic's lien exceptions to the homestead law. Napier,
144 B.R. at 724-25 & nn.5, 6. Having done so, the court held the lien void under
Patterson. In Stephens v FDIC (In re Stephens), 149 B.R. 414 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1992), the court confronted the tension among the precedents head on and deter-
mined that it was Texas law that made the decisions comprehensible. In Patterson, the
court pointed out, the disclaimer of homestead had absolutely no effect under Texas
law. Stephens, 149 B.R. at 418-19. In contrast, the representation of Buchanan as to
the time her improvements had been completed would, if true, have taken the lien out
of the homestead exemption, and in fact estoppel from assertion of homestead under
the circumstances was recognized in Texas caselaw. Stephens, 149 B.R. at 418.
A similar approach, in which presumptions crafted in favor of the insurers in the
D'Oench context are brought to bear on state law precedent to protect the insurers
was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in another decision which did not, at least nominally,
involve D'Oench. In Smith v. United National Bank-Denton (In re Smith), 966 F.2d
973 (5th Cir. 1992), the court found itself faced with yet another case of invalid
mechanics' liens. The homeowners had entered into an agreement with a bank and a
contractor under which a loan, facially appearing to be for improvements to their
homestead was made. In fact no work was done or ever intended to be done. The
lower courts determined that D'Oench barred any defense based on the voidness of
the lien. Smith, 966 F.2d at 975. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit chose to determine the
case solely on the basis of state court precedents under which a party who had assisted
in the creation of a facially valid mechanics' lien was estopped to assert its invalidity
against a subsequent good faith purchaser. In determining that the FDIC and United
National were innocent assignees, the court relied on a state court federal holder in
due course case. Smith, 966 F.2d at 977-78 (citing NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Campise,
788 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)); cf FDIC v. McCullough, 911 F.2d 593, 602
(11th Cir. 1990) (holding that where document was defectively notarized, because a
holder in due course would have taken free under Alabama law, D'Oench applied),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991); Milligan v. Gilmore Meyer Inc., 775 F. Supp. 400,
407-09 (S.D. Ga. 1991) (following McCullough in holding that a voidable deed was no
defense to the RTC).
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2. Assets Voided After Contract Formation
Contracts may also be voided after their formation. It stands to
reason that such should be so, otherwise the insurer would inherit not
merely the assets of the bank as they existed at the time of takeover,
but all loans ever made by that bank, even if the borrower had fully
performed all of its obligations years before. At the same time, limita-
tions must exist, else a borrower could, merely by exercising its option
to void a voidable agreement, circumvent Langley.188 A review of the
cases reveals that they are congruent with the hypotheses developed
in the context of contracts assertedly void ab initio. Assets may be
voided by means of entry of judgment prior to the insolvency of the
bank, frequently on grounds that could not have prevailed against
D'Oench. The cases have recognized that the insurer takes nothing
because it can have no right, title, or interest in the voided asset. Simi-
lar results have generally obtained where the "asset" has otherwise
been voided prior to insolvency. Where the asset is purported to be
voided by agreement, as with an accord and satisfaction or release of
188. It has been argued by a commentator that, should the defrauded party elect to
rescind the transaction, there would then be no asset to be reached and the D'Oench
doctrine and section 1823(e) thus evaded. See Michael J. Barry, Note, Ways Around
the Wrath. Exploring the Remaining Exceptions to the D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine and
Section 1823(e), 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1127 (1993). This ingenious approach, pace Mr.
Barry, has been addressed, not least by his own circuit court years before he pub-
lished, and has been found wanting. Compare Barry, supra, at 1147 ("The judgement
does not render the note void, the manifestation of the election to assert to power [to
rescind] does. Therefore summary judgement in favor of the FDIC in a case where it
intervenes in a lawsuit in which a borrower has already elected recission ... is not
appropriate. The court must first determine whether the borrower had the right to
rescind the note against the bank. If he did, the FDIC acquired nothing. Currently,
no court has recognized this distinction." (emphasis added)) with Dendinger v. First
Nat'l Corp., 16 F.3d 99, 101-02 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting claim that because assets
were voidable, and election to void made before insolvency FDIC took no asset and
section 1823(e) did not apply); Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., 937 F.2d 845, 855-
56 (3d Cir. 1991) (using the Kimbell Foods analysis, described supra note 53, to deter-
mine that California law of recision was preempted by D'Oench and thus an asset
remained to be reached) and Maniar v. Capital Bank, No. C-89-2774 MIHP, 1993 WL
515880 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1993) (holding that recision does not void instrument until
judgment is entered) and McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 772 F. Supp. 1128, 1133-34
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding claim for recision subject to D'Oench and section 1823(e))
and Grant County Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. RTC, 770 F. Supp. 1374, 1379-82 (E.D. Ark.
1991) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 968 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1992) and Shuler v. RTC,
757 F. Supp. 761, 767 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (same). But cf Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984
F.2d 1571, 1584 (10th Cir. 1993) (issue of whether legal recision was accomplished by
tender of property prior to FDIC takeover not reached because it was raised for the
first time on appeal).
Perhaps the best explanation for why this should be was provided in Maniar v.
Capital Bank, No. C-89-2774 MHP, 1993 WL 515880 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1993), which
rejected claims that unilateral recision accompanied by a tender of the consideration
voided the asset on the grounds that "the recision is not irrevocable and the contract
is not void until the court's final determination... In the instant case, '[t]he bank
therefore had and could transfer to the FDIC voidable title, which is enough to consti-
tute 'title or interest' in the note.' " Maniar, 1993 WL 515880, at *3 (citation omitted).
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continuing guaranty, a more complex problem is presented. If the as-
set is void, then statutory D'Oench will not apply, but if statutory
D'Oench applies, the asset will not be void. The Fifth Circuit has re-
cently proposed a solution to this koan by performing an in limine
review of the existence of an asset under the looser documentation
requirements of common law D'Oench, a result consistent with cases
on the defense of payment and also with the Texas homestead cases.
D'Oench has been held inapplicable to assets voided prior to insol-
vency by entry of judgment or other acts of the bank or others. For
judgments, the question arises in the context of the availability of the
D'Oench defenses for the first time on appeal. The results of these
cases echo the classifications applicable to statutory violations de-
scribed in part III.A.1 above. As an ordinary matter, if the bank has
prevailed below, there is no bar to raising the D'Oench defenses on
appeal.'89 Likewise, where the bank is merely mulcted in damages,
but the asset remains, so too does the power to raise the defense on
appeal.' 90 If a judgment voids the asset, by granting recision, the judg-
ment will prevail and D'Oench may not be raised on appeal. 19' The
rule is not confined to voiding by judgment, because similar results
have been seen where the borrower has asserted that other acts,
189. Metro N. State Bank v. Gaskin, 34 F.3d 589, 595 n.14 (8th Cir. 1994); McMil-
Ian v. MBank Fort Worth, N.A., 4 F.3d 362, 368 (5th Cir. 1993); 5300 Memorial Inves-
tors, Ltd. v. RTC (In re 5300 Memorial Investors, Ltd.), 973 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir.
1992); FDIC v. Hadid, 947 F.2d 1153, 1157 (4th Cir. 1991). But cf. Gray v. FDIC, 841
S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that if the events rendering the instrument
void befell before insolvency, regardless of the outcome below, then D'Oench may
not be raised on appeal).
190. Baumann v. Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1514 (11th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1936 (1992); RTC v. Foust, 869 P.2d 183, 195 & n.10
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
191. Thurman v. FDIC, 889 F.2d 1441, 1445-47 (5th Cir. 1989); Olney Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Trinity Banc Say. Ass'n, 885 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 1989); Grubb v. FDIC,
868 F.2d 1151, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 1989).
One court has, however, held that mere entry of an appealable judgment is insuffi-
cient to render the underlying agreement void for purposes of D'Oench. After all,
even without D'Oench, the judgment could always have been reversed, and thus suffi-
cient value remains in the asset for D'Oench to apply. FDIC v. Govaert (In re Geri
Zahn, Inc.), 25 F.3d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir. 1994). More troubling, the same court held
that the judgment constituted an "agreement" which was barred by section 1823(e)
because it was not "executed" contemporaneously with the "asset" sued upon.
Govaert, 25 F.3d at 1544-45. These propositions seem to misconstrue the nature of
the "no asset" exception. While it is true, in some sense, that an appealable judgment
is not without economic value, the key fact is that the judgment does not represent an
"agreement" which diminishes the interest of the insurer in the underlying "asset,"
but rather an independent determination by a court as to the rights of the parties
under that asset. The "contemporaneity" requirement applies to agreements affecting
an asset, yet it is on the asset prong which the exception relies.
The other extreme may also be reached. One court has held that when it, itself,
upon earlier motion rendered judgment in favor of the RTC, the note being reduced
to judgment was no longer an asset. Thus D'Oench no longer provided a bar to coun-
terclaims of fraud in connection with the making of the note. Abrams v. RTC, No. 89
C 3020, 1993 WL 276095 (N.D. 111. July 21, 1993).
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whether of the bank or a third party, have rendered the obligation
void. 92
Not all loans go unrepaid, even those made by failed banks, and
borrowers will claim, often with justice, that they are being made to
pay twice. A particularly egregious case was FDIC v. Kasal,93 in
which a bank officer filched money from a borrower's account, in the
guise of applying payment to the borrower's loan and those of sundry
of his relatives, whom he had convinced to sign the notes to allow the
bank to comply with loans-to-one-borrower regulations." The court
held that the arrangement under which monies to be applied to pay-
192. An example is the Prann case, a puzzling maze of sloppy business practices
and Roman law principles. FDIC v. Prann, 694 F. Supp. 1027, 1034-35 & n.12 (D.P.R.
1988), aff'd sub nom. FDIC v. Bracero & Rivera, Inc., 895 F. 2d 824 (1st Cir. 1990). A
loan was assumed by a new borrower, who used the infusion of cash to pay off the
note of the previous debtor, while pledging the paid off note to the bank, possibly in
an attempt to give the bank security while avoiding the costs of closing and recording
a new mortgage. Id. at 1032-38, 1033 n.10. When the FDIC sought to enforce the
pledged note against the original debtor, it successfully interposed as a defense the
fact that, as shown by the bank's own records, the second borrower had paid off the
loan, and thus rendered the asset void. Id. at 1037-38. See also Centex-Simpson Con-
str. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 795 F. Supp. 35, 41 (D. Me. 1992) (intercepting
application of D'Oench where performing surety was subrogated to payment rights of
defaulting subcontractor, because security interest of bank never attached to pay-
ments deposited in subcontractor's account and in the absence of an asset, D'Oench
could not be invoked); FDIC v. Percival, 752 F. Supp. 313, 317, 321-22 (D. Neb. 1990)
(holding that because bank failed to notify guarantor of impending disposition of col-
lateral, guaranty was voided before FDIC takeover). But cf. FDIC v. Zook Bros. Con-
str. Co., 973 F.2d 1448, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that because "federal
common law" applied, Illinois precedents voiding guaranty in absence of notice to
guarantor of alterations of terms of underlying debt did not apply). The court in
Zook Brothers seemed to misconstrue the no-asset exception as requiring evidence of
the voiding condition be contained in the loan file. See Zook, 973 F.2d at 1452-53.
Thus, under the Ninth Circuit's thinking, the fraud in the factum exception would not
apply, absent documentation. It does not appear that Justice Scalia would agree. See
supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (discussing fraud in the factum dictum).
The rule would, of course, be different for a federal holder in due course. Compare
Prann, 694 F. Supp. at 1037-38 (allowing defense of payment against section 1823(e)
where payment of loan was shown in bank records) with FDIC v. World Univ. Inc.,
978 F.2d 10, 15-17 (1st Cir. 1992) (distinguishing FDIC v. Bracero & Rivera, Inc., 895
F. 2d 824 (1st Cir. 1990), the decision affirming Prann, where FDIC was holder in due
course and alleged payment not documented in bank's files).
193. 913 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991). But cf. FDIC v.
Sather, 488 N.W.2d 260, 261, 265-66 (Minn. 1992) (denying liability under D'Oench
where bank officer embezzled monies by forging notes under line of credit; distin-
guishing Kasal in that officer left "paper trail" in bank records, and embezzlement
was not an agreement for purposes of section 1823(e)). Other cases have similarly
barred payment defenses, although in less outrageous circumstances. FDIC v. Wright,
942 F.2d 1089, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1937 (1992); FDIC v.
Houran Plaza Assocs., Civ. A. No. 91-7986, 1992 WL 158409, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 30,
1992); cf FDIC v. Betancourt, 865 F. Supp. 1035, 1041-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding
that where borrower asserted that check paid to bank over a year prior to making of
notes was to be applied to all of borrowers indebtedness, and thus that notes had been
paid, D'Oench and section 1823(e) barred defense).
194. Kasal, 913 F.2d at 488-89.
19951 1389
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ment of the loans were netted from the borrower's account was a se-
cret agreement, for purposes of both statutory and common law
D'Oench, not only as to the relatives, but also as to the borrower him-
self.195 The decision seems ill-founded. The court made no reference
to any particular mode of payment being required by the terms of the
notes, so that reference to payment by netting funds seems no less
acceptable than any other means. Carried to its logical conclusion, the
decision in Kasal implies that one could not pay one's loan by a check
drawn on the creditor bank. After all, the check represents an order
of the bank to net funds, as surely as did Kasal's arrangement. Other
courts have, fortunately, recognized that payment is an in limine fact
question of the continuing existence of the "asset."'19 6
When an agreement to void an asset is implicated, the situation be-
comes more complex. The hypothesis derived from the Texas home-
stead cases that an agreement to void an asset is subject to D'Oench is
reinforced by an examination of cases involving accords and satisfac-
tions. An accord and satisfaction presents a peculiar variation on the
problem of void assets under section 1823(e) and, by extension, com-
mon law D'Oench.' 9 Clearly, an accord is an agreement that, at least
in executory form, may adversely affect the interests of the insurer in
an underlying asset.198 Because the accord when performed results in
the utter elimination of the asset, the satisfaction may provide a de-
195. Kasal, 913 F.2d at 490-92.
196. Commerce Fed. Say. Bank v. FDIC, 872 F.2d 1240, 1244-46 (6th Cir. 1989)
(holding that under section 1823(e), where a mortgage contained a "dragnet" clause
subjecting the property to the lien of the bank with respect to all indebtedness of the
borrower, if the original loan was, in fact and in the records of the bank, paid off
before additional indebtedness was incurred, the mortgage was voided by perform-
ance and recourse to the property under the dragnet clause could not be had); FDIC
v. Prann, 694 F. Supp. 1027, 1037-38 (D.P.R. 1988) (holding that where records of
bank indicated that debt of assignor had been paid by assuming debtor, no asset is
implicated and section 1823(e) does not apply), aff'd sub nom. FDIC v. Bracero &
Rivera, Inc. 895 F.2d 824 (1st Cir. 1990); FDIC v. Kuang Hsung Chuang, 690 F. Supp.
192, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that where defense of payment is raised under com-
mon law D'Oench, bank records and receipts in the hands of debtor may be examined
to determine amount of liability). Indeed, the Kasal court itself implied that had the
thief left a paper trail, common law D'Oench at least would not have applied. Kasal,
913 F.2d at 492.
197. Because it is not an effective defense against an ordinary holder in due course,
accord and satisfaction has no parallel effect under the federal holder in due course
doctrine. FDIC v. Manatt, 688 F. Supp. 1327, 1331-32 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd on dif-
ferent grounds, 922 F.2d 486 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991).
198. Thus, courts have distinguished cases in which the accord remains a mere exec-
utory agreement adversely affecting the interests of the insurer from those in which
the satisfaction has been performed. FDIC v. Longley I Realty Trust, 988 F.2d 270,
274 (1st Cir. 1993); RTC v. Teem Partnership, 770 F. Supp. 1439, 1445 (D. Colo. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 977 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1992); RTC v. Crow, 763 F. Supp. 887,
893-94 & n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1991); Danbury Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Natale, No. 30 54 10,
1992 WL 335754, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1992); cf FDIC v. Rouse, 859 F.
Supp. 234, 237 n.6 (E.D. La. 1994) (indicating oral agreement to execute dation en
paiement would fall afoul of D'Oench).
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fense against section 1823(e). One older case held that a performed
accord voided the asset and barred application of section 1823(e), 199 a
result not superficially discordant with Justice Scalia's later statements
in Langley.20 Other courts have insisted that any accord and satisfac-
tion, whether or not performed, must comply with section 1823(e)'s
strictures.201 This includes, in extreme cases, the requirement that the
settlement be executed contemporaneously with the obligation it is
intended to satisfy (thus effectively barring any accord and
satisfaction).2
Is a performed agreement voiding an asset to be judged by the stan-
dards of section 1823(e), rendering the asset valid in perpetuum? A
similar problem has been presented by the continuing guaranty.Y3 In
199. FDIC v. Nemecek, 641 F. Supp. 740, 742-43 (D. Kan. 1986). Even before
Langley, courts denied that a performed satisfaction took the "asset" out of section
1823(e). Public Loan Co. v. FDIC, 803 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1986). Nemecek has been
rejected even in its own District. Premier Bank v. Cohen-Esrey Properties, Inc., 859 F.
Supp. 1388,1395-96 & n.8 (D. Kan. 1994); FDIC v. National Consumer Alliance, Civ.
A. No. 93-2769-EEO, 1994 WL 326064, at *1 (D. Kan. June 20,1994); FDIC v. Cover,
714 F. Supp. 455, 458 (D. Kan. 1988).
200. See supra notes 157-59 (discussing Justice Scalia's invocation of asset
requirement).
201. FDIC v. Krause, 904 F.2d 463, 466 (8th Cir. 1990); FDIC v. Marina, 892 F.2d
1522, 1526-28 (11th Cir. 1990); FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1515-16
(11th Cir. 1984); FDIC v. Fisher, 727 F. Supp. 1306, 1311 (D. Minn. 1989); Sufield
Bank v. Berman, No. CV 900376564, 1993 WL 28891, at *5-6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
28, 1993).
202. RTC v. Crow, 763 F. Supp. 887, 893-95 (N.D. Tex. 1991); FDIC v. Manatt, 688
F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (E.D. Ark. 1988), aff'd on different grounds, 922 F.2d 486 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991); cf FDIC v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 866 (3d
Cir. 1994) (noting that workout agreement whereby new assets were to be given in
satisfaction of old could well be barred by contemporaneity requirement, but finding
it unnecessary to reach issue as agreement was too vague to be enforceable under
D'Oench); FDIC v. Delco Dev. Co., No. CV-90-303743, 1993 WL 343873, at *7
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 1993) (noting that satisfaction agreement was not executed
contemporaneously with underlying transaction).
Two members of the circuit court panel in Manatt affirmed on the grounds of lack
of board approval, not of lack of contemporaneity, and expressed some distaste for
the view that contemporaneity was required in the context of accord and satisfaction.
FDIC v. Manatt, 922 F.2d 486, 488-89 & n.4 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 501 U.S. 1250
(1991); see also RTC v. Shuffleld, No. 92-1684, 1993 WL 4822, at *2 & n.3 (8th Cir.
Jan. 13, 1993) (continuing reluctance to apply contemporaneity).
203. FDIC v. P.L.M. Int'l, Inc., 834 F.2d 248,252-54 (1st Cir. 1987); FDIC v. Haupt
(In re Estate of Thies), 463 N.W.2d 40 (Iowa 1990). If the asset is voided in accord-
ance with the rights of the guarantor to do so by notice, under the express terms of
the guaranty, the release should be given effect, because this is the invocation of an
express right under the terms of the asset. FDIC v. Panefab P.R., Inc., 739 F.2d 26,
29-30 (1st Cir. 1984); see also FDIC v. Venture Contractors, Inc., 825 F.2d 143, 150 &
n.9 (7th Cir. 1987) (dictum); cf. FDIC v. O'Malley, 618 N.E.2d 818, 829 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (stating that general release which did not refer to guaranty was too vague to
operate as a cancellation in accordance with the terms of the guaranty), aff'd, No.
76106, 1994 WL 587659 (M1l. Oct. 27, 1994). But see FDIC v. Virginia Crossings Part-
nership, 909 F.2d 306, 312-13 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that even if cancellation notice
had complied with terms of guaranties, it still would have been ineffective because it
did not comply with section 1823(e)). How the Virginia Crossings court expected a
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that context, the solution to the conundrum was recently propounded
in FDIC v. McFarland.2°4 The court examined the purported release
under the less stringent documentation standard of common law
D'Oench and, having satisfied itself that the release was documented
in the bank's files, determined that under the "no asset" exception
section 1823(e) did not apply.2 °5 Just as in the Texas homestead cases,
the lesson is that while section 1823(e) may not apply in the absence
of an asset, common law D'Oench may.
This use of common law D'Oench may also apply to cases involving
sale or other transfer. The decisions are rather confusing, but appar-
ently so long as the transaction is documented in the bank's files, the
more rigorous requirements of section 1823(e) need not be met.20 6
notice of cancellation to be executed contemporaneously with the acquisition of the
asset is unclear. It appears a release by the bank, even if issued in accordance with
the terms of the guaranty, must comply with section 1823(e). FDIC v. O'Malley, 618
N.E.2d 818, 827-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), aff'd, No. 76106, 1994 WL 587659 (Ill. Oct. 27,
1994); cf. Bank One Tex. Nat'l Ass'n v. Morrison, 26 F.3d 544, 549-51 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that where section 1823(e)-compliant loan documents evidenced that loan
was not subject to "continuing" guaranty, D'Oench did not bar assertion that guar-
anty had been released).
204. 33 F.3d 532,538 (5th Cir. 1994) (The McFarland case is discussed below at text
accompanying notes 291-92.); cf. FDIC v. Box, No. 05-92-02747-CV, 1993 WL 480217,
at *2-3 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1993) (allowing proof of satisfaction of note by refer-
ence to internal bank memoranda not compliant with section 1823(e)). But see FDIC
v. Bravo Leather Corp., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
88,151, at 96,488 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 1990) (holding common law D'Oench did not
apply, because "D'Oench estops a defendant from basing a defense to a note on a
secret 'side' agreement, not a subsequent agreement by an innocent defendant to can-
cel a guaranty in its entirety for consideration"), vacated on motion for reconsidera-
tion sub nom. FDIC v. Engel, 746 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The issue is less
pressing, of course, where the entire case is subject to a less rigorous documentation
standard under common law D'Oench. See First Heights Bank v. Gutierrez, 852
S.W.2d 596, 607-08 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
205. McFarland, 33 F.3d at 538-39.
206. Apparently neither the retention of equitable or record title will suffice to
bring the bank's former asset within the reach of section 1823(e) or D'Oench.
In Texas Commerce Bank v. United Savings Ass'n, 789 F. Supp. 848 (S.D. Tex.
1992), management of the bank had transferred funds to a trustee to be held to pay
employee bonuses. The transaction was fully memorialized in the records of the
bank, and had been approved by the board in the presence of regulatory officials.
When the bank was taken over, the FDIC sought to retrieve the funds, claiming that
the transfer was void under D'Oench. The court replied:
[T]he alleged D'Oench Duhme doctrine is not relevant here. Only if the
beneficiaries were trying to enforce the trust against [the bank] or the FDIC
would D'Oench Duhme apply. Neither the trust nor the plan is an agree-
ment that tends to diminish the right, title, or interest of the FDIC in any
asset it acquired. The trust corpus is not an asset of the FDIC. Texas Com-
merce, as trustee, holds legal title to the funds.
Id. at 851 (citation omitted). The court was later willing to proclaim that the FDIC
had an enforceable reversionary interest in the trust after the bonus funds had been
paid. Id. at 853-54.
A similar situation was presented in Integon Life Insurance Corp. v. Southmark
Heritage Retirement Corp., 813 F. Supp. 783 (N.D. Ala. 992). The bank had sold its
interest in certain land to an affiliated company, but due to error, the deed was never
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All the foregoing serve as defenses, as shields against attempts by
the insurer to use D'Oench as a sword. Yet the situation being re-
versed and the bank the party defendant, the same courts turn away
and state that no asset is required.
B. Affirmative Claims in the Absence of an Asset
Courts have confronted situations in which affirmative claims that
are unrelated to a particular asset have been made against the insurer.
One court has held that section 1823(e) applies not only to defenses
and claims against a particular asset, but also to a diminution of the
receivership estate generally. Similarly, courts have held that a sub-
sidiary is an "asset" for purposes of section 1823(e), meaning that any
affirmative claim against the subsidiary must comply with the statute.
Neither of these approaches survives close examination of the lan-
guage of the statute. FIRREA enacted section 1821(d)(9)(A), a pro-
vision subjecting affirmative claims against the receiver to the
strictures of section 1823(e). The new provision has been little ap-
plied. Those courts examining the provision closely have concluded it
is a codification of the mirror image rule, and thus an asset remains
necessary for its application. Such assetless affirmative claims have
also been allowed under common law D'Oench, although the majority
of cases have dealt with agreements to lend or paid-off loans, where
an asset was to have existed or formerly did exist.
1. Under Section 1823(e)
One court has taken the position that in affirmative claims against
the bank, section 1823(e) is freed from the constraints imposed by the
"no asset" exception. The court took the view that an agreement that
increases the liabilities of the bank diminishes the insurer's interests in
the bank's "assets" in aggregate.' 7 The theory appears to be that the
recorded, record title thus remaining in the bank, although the intention to sell the
property was memorialized in a letter from the CEO of the bank to the regulators.
The buyer made application to the insurer for a replacement deed, and the insurer,
delighted at this found asset, defended its rights to the land on the basis of D'Oench
and section 1823(e). Id at 786, 788 n.15. The court denied the defense, because the
property (having been sold) was not listed as an asset of the bank when the receiver
took over. "The absence of the listing of the subject property as an asset precludes
RTC from claiming the property." Id. at 790. Hoisting the insurer by its own statutory
petard, the court noted that "[tihe property was not listed 'continuously... [as] an
official record' of San Jacinto/Southmark Heritage because Southmark had sold it ."
Id at 790 (alterations in original). See also Falk v. Mt. Whitney Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5
F.3d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1993) (denying summary judgment to FDIC because where
portion of property had been conveyed in error to mortgagor, and reconveyance of
land executed, although not recorded, and without a showing of the absence of the
request for reconveyance and supporting documentation from the bank files, FDIC
had not demonstrated it had an interest in property at time of bank failure).
207. In Covell v. Photo Images, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 308 (D. Kan. 1991), in a series of
complex and malodorous transactions, the plaintiff had lent money to Dinges, with
the understanding that he was to use the monies to reduce his debt to the bank. In
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insurer inherits a pie consisting of the "assets" of the bank, and any
additional claim against the bank slices the pie more thinly. The
agreement thus diminishes the insurer's slice and, therefore, its inter-
est in each of the assets. Some courts have adopted a variation of this
argument when confronting claims that section 1823(e) protects sub-
sidiaries of banks. Their view is that a subsidiary is an asset of the
bank, and an agreement diminishing that asset should lie within the
agis of the section.20 8
Neither expansion of the reach of section 1823(e) proves sustaina-
ble when measured against the language of the statute itself, because
the results yielded are so bizarre that even Congress could not have
intended them. It is true that section 1823(e) refers to assets and it is
return, the bank was to lend a company controlled by Dinges and a bank officer a
large sum of money, one-half of which was to be lent by the company back to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff duly lent the money, and received nothing in return. Id. at 309-
10. Covell asserted that because he was merely claiming against the receivership es-
tate, his oral agreements did not diminish the interests of the FDIC in any particular
asset, and thus that neither D'Oench nor section 1823(e) would apply. The court
summarily rejected this argument, holding that because the return of Covell's money
would increase the liabilities of the bank, both D'Oench and section 1823(e) should
apply. Id. at 312 (citing Castleglen, Inc. v. Commonwealth Say. Ass'n, 728 F. Supp.
656 (D. Utah 1989)), aff'd sub nom. Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir.
1993)). Castleglen is somewhat inapposite: there a bank was seeking reimbursement
for draws made under a letter of credit. Castleglen, 728 F. Supp. at 671. Another case
using broad diminution of "assets" language came in the procedural posture of the
insurer opposing a motion to remand from federal to state court, in the context of a
holding that the D'Oench and section 1823(e) defenses presented a colorable issue of
federal law necessary to prevent remand. Reding v. FDIC, 942 F.2d 1254, 1259 (8th
Cir. 1991) ("The debtors' claims... clearly tend to diminish the assets acquired by the
FDIC." (emphasis added)).
One sui generis variation on this theme even stated that because banking regula-
tions would have required collateral be set aside against an extension of credit by a
bank to its affiliate, it was these "woulda, coulda, shoulda" assets that were dimin-
ished, permitting the invocation of section 1823(e). Murphy v. FDIC, 12 F.3d 1485,
1491-92 (9th Cir. 1993), vacated, 38 F.3d 1490 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane). Fortunately,
the Ninth Circuit, en banc, was able to distinguish an asset from a liability. Murphy v.
FDIC, 38 F.3d 1490 (9th Cir. 1994).
Such a redefinition was rejected in Agri Export Cooperative v. Universal Savings
Association, 767 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Tex. 1991), where the RTC defended against lia-
bility under a letter of credit, "contend[ing] that section 1823(e) should shield the
insuring entity from any types of claims against the failed financial institution,
whether or not related to any particular asset, which do not meet the recording re-
quirements of the statute-in other words, should apply to any claim against the 'the
assets' of the corporation." Id. at 833. The court rejected this contention because
precedent made it quite clear that the section did not apply in the absence of an
"asset" to be diminished. Id. See also FDIC v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850 (3d Cir. 1994)
(distinguishing Agri Export); Bender v. CenTrust Mortgage Corp., 833 F. Supp. 1525,
1530-32 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (refusing to hold employment contract subject to D'Oench
without further fact-finding and briefing).
208. Poff v. Oak Tree Mortgage Corp., Civ. A. No. 91-4347, 1994 WL 144284 (E.D.
La. Apr. 15, 1994); Lesal Interiors, Inc. v. RTC, 834 F. Supp. 721, 729-30 (D.N.J.
1993); Alexandria Assocs. v. Mitchell Co., 800 F. Supp. 1412, 1422-23 (S.D. Miss.
1992), rev'd on other grounds, 2 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1993). But see Beener v. LaSala,
813 F. Supp. 303, 308-10 (D.N.J. 1993).
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true that a claim may well diminish the assets of a receivership. Note,
however, that the former section 1823(e)(2), now 1823(e)(1)(B), re-
quires that to survive section 1823(e), any agreement must have been
executed contemporaneously with the acquisition of "such asset." If
section 1823(e) embraces the assets of the bank generally rather than
a particularized asset only agreements executed simultaneously with
each increase or alteration in the assets of the bank as a whole are
valid against the insurer. Thus, each time a deposit was taken, a loan
was made, or bond acquired by the bank, every person having busi-
ness with the bank, whether borrower or creditor, would be required
to troop down to the bank, all simultaneously to execute a novation of
their respective agreements, else none of their agreements would be
valid against a receiver. This does not, to put it mildly, seem to be a
reasonable reading of the statutory provision.
The results of applying section 1823(e) to subsidiaries are similarly
strange. In essence, no contract made with a subsidiary of a bank
would be valid against that subsidiary unless it were entered into at
the exact moment when the parent organized or acquired an interest
in the subsidiary. Thus, unless one actually attended the meeting of
incorporators and caused the subsidiary to execute one's agreement at
the time the shares were handed over to the bank, one could never
enforce one's agreement. Surely this cannot be taken to be a proper
construction of the statute. -°9
2. Under Section 1821(d)(9)(A)
Another possible source of statutory D'Oench protection against
affirmative claims unrelated to an asset is found in section
1821(d)(9)(A). 210 Under this section, no claim arising from or sub-
209. Nonetheless, in passing, the court in Lesal Interiors refused to even entertain a
claim by the plaintiff that "section 1823(e)(2)[, now section 1823(e)(1)(B),] indicates
that a failed institution cannot itself be considered an 'asset' under the statute." Lesal
Interiors, Inc. v. RTC, 834 F. Supp. 721, 730 n.6 (D.NJ. 1993). The court stated that
"[s]ince this theory is not propounded by defendants, it need not be addressed fur-
ther." Id. at 730 n.6.
210.
(9) Agreement as basis of claim.
(A) Requirements.
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), any agreement which does not
meet the requirements set forth in section 1823(e) of this title shall not form
the basis of, or substantially comprise, a claim against the receiver or the
Corporation.
(B) Exception to contemporaneous execution requirement. Notwithstand-
ing section 1823(e)(2)[, now 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1)(B) ], of this title, any
agreement relating to an extension of credit between a Federal home loan
bank or Federal Reserve bank and any insured depository institution which
was executed before the extension of credit by such bank to such institution
shall be treated as having been executed contemporaneously with such ex-
tension of credit for purposes of subparagraph (A).
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9) (Supp. V 1993).
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stantially comprised of an agreement is valid against the receiver of a
bank unless the agreement complies with the requirements of section
1823(e). Most courts applying the provision have done so in situations
covered by the mirror image and artful pleading rules, and have cited
section 1821(d)(9)(A) as additional support for application of these
rules .2 1 Nonetheless, some courts have applied it where no asset was
present. Courts have done this in conjunction with precedents permit-
ting the extension of D'Oench to affirmative claims even without an
asset, with section 1821(d)(9)(A) supplying additional grounds for the
decision."21 Certain courts have, however, applied section
1821(d)(9)(A) on its own bottom,2 13 while other courts have held that
the section has no application in the absence of an asset.2 14 While it is
211. FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1488-89 (10th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Murray, 935
F.2d 89, 94 (5th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Adam, 803 F. Supp. 1225, 1233 (S.D. Tex. 1992);
FDIC v. Orrill, 771 F. Supp. 777, 780-81 (E.D. La. 1991), aff'd sub nom. American
Bank & Trust v. Orrill, 978 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1992); Alarcon v. Williams, 772 F. Supp.
334, 342 n.15 (E.D. Mich. 1991). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has indicated that section
1821(d)(9)(A) was a codification of the mirror-image rule, still nascent at FIRREA's
passage. Thigpen v. Sparks, 983 F.2d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1993). But see Hawke Assocs.
v. City Fed. Say. Bank, 787 F. Supp. 423, 427-28 (D.N.J. 1991) (applying section
1821(d)(9)(A) without explicit reference to asset to leases which did not comply with
section 1823(e)).
212. For example in Jackson v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1992), a case in which a
would-be borrower otherwise unobligated to the bank asserted breach of an agree-
ment to lend, the court, while referencing "FIRREA" (by which it apparently meant
section 1821(d)(9)(A)), relied primarily on Bell & Murphy and Associates v. In-
terfirst Bank Gateway, 894 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990) and
Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1989), two common law D'Oench cases, to
rebut Jackson's contention that there must be an asset somewhere involved in order
for the invocation of D'Oench. Jackson, 981 F.2d at 732, 733-35; see also Covell v.
Photo Images, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 308, 312 (D. Kan 1991) (holding that section 1823(c)
had no asset requirement, and applying section 1821(d)(9)(A) to a pure creditor
claim). But see Fox & Lazo-Atl. Commercial Group v. RTC, 862 F. Supp. 1233, 1241
(D.N.J. 1994) (holding that, because section 1821(d)(9)(A) expressly covered affirma-
tive claims against the insurer, resort to common law D'Oench was no longer proper,
as being in derogation of the powers of the legislature).
213. RTC v. Allen, 16 F.3d 568, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1994); Fox & Lazo-Atl. Commer-
cial Group v. RTC, 862 F. Supp. 1233, 1242 (D.N.J. 1994); OPS Shopping Ctr. v.
FDIC, No. 89-30142-RV, 1992 WL 489719, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 1992), aff'd on
different grounds, 992 F.2d 306 (11th Cir. 1993); McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 772 F.
Supp. 1128, 1135-40 (N.D. Cal. 1991); cf. Carico v. First Nat'l Bank, 734 F. Supp. 768,
769-70 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (applying section 1821(d)(9)(A) to bar claims based on a
bank's breach of an oral agreement to honor certain rubber checks, without any asset
in esse being implicated).
It should be noted that the Eleventh Circuit in affirming the result of the District
Court in OPS Shopping explicitly refused to reach the issue of whether or not section
1821(d)(9)(A) contained an asset requirement. OPS Shopping Ctr. v. FDIC, 992 F.2d
306, 309 n.3 (11th Cir. 1993).
214. John v. RTC, 39 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 1994); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
FDIC, 32 F.3d 592, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Thigpen v. Sparks, 983 F.2d 644, 648-49 (5th
Cir. 1993); Stebbins Realty Corp. v. FDIC, Civ. No. 91-568-JD, 1994 WL 287742
(D.N.H. June 29, 1994); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v.
FDIC (In re NBW Commercial Paper Litig.), 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1464-65 (D.D.C.
1992); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. American Bankers Ins. Co., [1991-92 Trans-
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clear that section 1821(d)(9) applies to the claims of secured credi-
tors, 215 and has been so applied in one case,216 it is equally clear that a
secured creditor of a bank is, in the words of section 1823(e), claiming
an interest in an identifiable asset. Resort to the maxims of statutory
construction implies that an asset test should be implied in section
fer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 88,676, at 98,691-92 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 17,
1991); Tuxedo Beach Club Corp. v. City Fed. Say. Bank, 749 F. Supp. 635, 646 (D.NJ.
1990) ("In most cases... 'the FDIC... asserted or defended the validity... a particu-
lar.., obligation....' In these cases .... section 1821(d)(9)(A) bars all claims which
are based on or substantially comprised of a 'side agreement' ...... "). Other courts
seem to have assumed that an asset need be implicated. See Oliver v. RTC, 747 F.
Supp. 1351, 1353 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (barring affirmative tort claims against RTC based
on oral agreement because "[s]uch agreement falls within the scope of § 1823(e), i.e.,
it is an agreement that tends to diminish or defeat the interest of RTC in the mortgage
and loan. By virtue of § 1821, then, this agreement cannot form the basis of or sub-
stantially comprise a claim" (emphasis added)), affd, 955 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1992).
215. This is based on 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9)(B) (Supp. V 1993), which provides
that section 1821(d)(9)(A) does not apply to federal reserve banks or federal home
loan banks. Thus, section 1821(d)(9)(A) applies to at least some creditors, exclusio
unius est inclusio alterius, so to speak. It is worthy of note, however, that parallel
references in FIRREA exempting these two institutions from the operation of its pro-
visions appear to relate to the secured nature of their lending activities. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(e)(13) (Supp. V 1993) (ability of receiver to avoid contracts does not affect
loans and security interests of federal reserve banks or federal home loan banks).
Thus, claims that section 1821(d)(9)(A) can apply to no class of creditors are clearly
incorrect, and insofar as the North Arkansas case described in the following footnote
merely states that a claim against an asset of a bank based on a lien is subject to at
least some of the strictures of section 1823(e), it is clearly correct.
216. The Eighth Circuit, in North Arkansas Medical Center v. Barrett, 962 F.2d 780
(8th Cir. 1992), applied section 1821(d)(9)(A) to the claims of a quondam secured
creditor to its rights against its collateral, a bond owned by the bank. The Medical
Center had deposited monies well over the federally insured limit, but required that
the bank obtain collateral to secure the deposits, which was replaced at varying times,
the final incarnation being the "November FHLMC certificate." This agreement was
never approved by the board or loan committee. The FDIC refused to honor the
security interest and treated the Medical Center as a general creditor, resulting in a
large loss. Id. at 782-84. In answering the Medical Center's contention that statutory
D'Oench did not apply to creditors, the court began with the plain language of the
statute, and noted that "[t]he Medical Center's claim of a security interest in the No-
vember FHLMC certificate arises from an agreement that, if enforced, would tend to
diminish the FDIC's interest in the November FHLMC certificate which it acquired as
receiver of an insured institution." Id. at 787 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
The court thus grounded its opinion in the unexceptionable principle that a lien is an
interest in an asset, although the case has been seen by some, with approval or disap-
proval, to stand for the proposition that section 1821(d)(9)(A) places the strictures of
section 1823(e) on all creditors, without reference to an asset, or the broader proposi-
tion that D'Oench (in some form) applies to creditors. Hatten v. FDIC, No. 91-1008,
1992 WL 149904, at *1 (10th Cir. June 26, 1992); Cote d'Azur Homeowners Ass'n v.
Venture Corp., 846 F. Supp. 827,839 n.23 (N.D. Cal. 1994). In any event, the FDIC's
victory in North Arkansas proved Pyrrhic. Outrage at the FDIC's use of D'Oench to
deny payment of deposits to a local governmental hospital district resulted in an
FDIC policy statement promising never to do it again, followed by Congressional
action to make certain that word was kept. The Riegle Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 317, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(108 Stat.) 2160, 2223; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-652, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1977, 2004.
1398 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
1821(d)(9)(A). 217  Further, the absence of discussion of section
1821(d)(9)(A) in FIRREA's legislative history has discouraged courts
from applying it to avoid all affirmative claims against the receiver-
ship. 18 It is also possible that Congress in fact may act on the ques-
tion, retroactively reading an asset test into section 1821(d)(9)(A) and
possibly back into section 1823(e) and common law D'Oench.219
217. Essentially, claims that the language should be so read attempt to read the
introductory paragraph of section 1823(e) out of the equation, and to enforce only
"each subparagraph of section [1823(e)]," (or, to be utterly up-to-date, section
1823(e)(1)). 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1993); see Fox & Lazo-Atl. Commer-
cial Group v. RTC, 862 F. Supp. 1233, 1242 (D.N.J. 1994) ("This court agrees that
subsection 1821(d)(9)(A)'s reference to 'the requirements set forth in section 1823(e)
of this title' means that the four procedural requirements of section 1823(e)(currently
section 1823(e)(1)] must be met for any agreement to form the basis of a claim. Even
though the.., contract at issue here is not an 'agreement which tends to diminish or
defeat the interest of the [RTC] in any asset acquired by it .... '" (second alteration
in original)). This is exactly what 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(6)(A) requires with respect to
contracts for deed. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1993). In construing a statute,
one must assume that Congress chose its language with care, and that when different
language is chosen, it is chosen to express a different meaning.
218. Thigpen v. Sparks, 983 F.2d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 1993); American Fed'n of State,
County & Mun. Employees v. FDIC (In re NBW Commercial Paper Litig.), 826 F.
Supp. 1448, 1465 (D.D.C. 1992).
219. Legislation to this effect has been introduced in both houses. The twin bills
are H.R. 4146, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), and S. 1725, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
Each of the bills would delete the current reference to "any agreement which does
not meet the requirements set forth in [1823(e)]" and insert the words "any agree-
ment which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the [Federal Deposit Insurance]
Corporation in any asset acquired by the Corporation as security for a loan, by a
purchase or as receiver of an insured depository institution, and which does not meet
the requirements of [section 1823(e)]" after the word agreement in the introductory
paragraph of section 1821(d)(9)(A). H.R. 4146, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 1725,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The intended scope of the legislation, as delineated by
its House and Senate sponsors, appears to be broad, requiring the presence of an
asset for section 1823(e) and common law D'Oench. 140 Cong. Rec. E-567, E-567-68
(daily ed. March 24, 1994) (statement of Rep. McCollum on introduction of H.R.
4146); 139 Cong. Rec. S16478, S16478-50 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Cohen on introduction of S. 1725). It does not appear to cover the separate bridge-
bank D'Oench powers under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(4)(I) (Supp. V 1993).
The legislation was introduced at the urging of "Citizens and Business for D'Oench
Duhme Reform." This group, and Senator Cohen, one of the sponsors of the bill,
appear to believe that the impact of the passage of the legislation would go well be-
yond requiring an asset for all D'Oench cases, permitting the assertion of counter-
claims related to an asset. This may be seen by their championing of the cause of the
Sweeneys. 140 Cong. Rec. S10,874, S10,874-75 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1994) (remarks of
Sen. Cohen on Sweeney case and S. 1725); Interview with Dr. David Hess, President,
Citizens and Business for D'Oench Duhme Reform (WBSM, New Bedford, Mass. ra-
dio broadcast, June 28, 1994) (tape available from Citizens and Business for D'Oench
Duhme Reform, 9417 Georgetown Pike, Great Falls, Virginia 22066). These were the
plaintiffs in the convoluted case of Sweeney v. RTC, 16 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 291 (1994). The Sweeneys were attempting to enforce a Massachusetts
deceptive trade practices claim arising from an agreement to lend additional funds
(or, possibly, a state court judgment on such claim) against the FDIC. Sweeney, 16
F.3d at 4-5.
Dr. Hess, having won his battle, has not ceased his war. See Motorcity of Jackson-
ville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 39 F.3d 292, 298 (11th Cir. 1994); Telephone interview
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In any case, the consequences of reading the specific asset require-
ment out of section 1821(d)(9)(A) are startling, and do not bode well
for the insurers in their capacity as deposit insurers. The receiver is
commanded by section 1821(d)(9)(A) that it should not pay any claim
that does not comply with section 1823(e). Among the claims that the
receiver is to pay are those of depositors. The FDIC, in its capacity as
deposit insurer, is entitled, as subrogee, to receive the fruits of deposi-
tor claims to the extent of its deposit insurance claims payments 220
Because we assume that the same word used in the same statute re-
tains the same meaning in both places, the "claims" to which FDIC-
Corporate is subrogated under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g) are the same
claims payment of which is limited by section 1823(e). So if Granny
neglected to have her Christmas Club account ratified by the Board or
a Loan Committee, she also should have no rights against the receiv-
ership estate. Not to worry, she will of course get her widow's mite
from FDIC-Corporate as insurer of the bank's deposits.221 But FDIC-
Corporate, which would ordinarily get at least some of its money back
from the receiver as subrogee of Granny's rights, will find itself with-
out a farthing: its rights as subrogee are no better than Granny's.
3. Under Common Law D'Oench
Even if statutory D'Oench does not provide protection in the ab-
sence of an asset, common law D'Oench may. A number of courts
have expressly so held,' and this seems to be the modem trend. 23
with Dr. David Hess, President, Citizens and Business for D'Oench Duhme Reform
(Jan. 19, 1995) (confirmation of interview on file with Fordham Law Review) [herein-
after "Telephone interview"]. Indeed, Dr. Hess is pressing for legislation to be intro-
duced in the 104th Congress that would have broader scope, intended to cover not
only "non-asset" cases, but also to codify the holdings of certain of the "ordinary
banking business" cases exempting vendors from the reach of D'Oench, to codify the
"free standing tort" exception for the nation not just that portion of it embraced by
the 11th Circuit, and to reverse the specific holding of Langley that intentional fraud
by the bank is an "agreement." Telephone interview. In addition, such legislation
would rank protected claims pari passu with those of depositors, rather than
subordinated as they would be under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11) (Supp. V 1993), and
would, like H.R. 4146 and S. 1725, have retroactive effect. Telephone interview.
220. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g) (Supp. V 1993).
221. The claims for payment of deposits by FDIC-Corporate are governed by 12
U.S.C. § 1821(0 (Supp. V 1993), while 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(9) (Supp. V 1993) relates
solely to the insurer in receiver capacity.
222. This approach was adopted by Judge Lamberth in his scholarly opinion in
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. FDIC (In re NBW
Commercial Paper Litigation), 826 F. Supp. 1448 (D.D.C. 1992). The court first de-
cided that statutory D'Oench (both section 1823(e) and 1821(d)(9)(A)) contained an
asset requirement. ld. at 1463-65. But, turning its attention to common law D'Oench,
the court held that
D'Oench can best be described as a safety net; § 1823(e) and
§ 1821(d)(9)(A) are Congress's attempts to codify.., the policy represented
by D'Oench, but D'Oench remains to cover situations which fall through the
cracks .... [Tjhe same equitable principle that generated the original
D'Oench case and ... § 1823(e) demands that the investor not be able to
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While the change seems to have been marred by an absence of analy-
assert . . . [undocumented] agreement[s unrelated to assets] against the
FDIC.
Id. at 1466. The opinion determined that D'Oench was, at bottom, a risk-allocation
device-the risk that oral agreements will go unperformed and oral representations
prove false is to be placed on the bank's counterparty, who is in a position to insist
that all be documented, rather than on the depositors and insurers, who are in no
position to control the lies and broken promises of the debtor or insured. Thus the
relevant test is whether the bank's counterparty could, by diligence, have protected
itself from the consequences of the oral agreement. See also Winterbrook Realty, Inc.
v. FDIC, 820 F. Supp. 27 (D.N.H. 1993) (following In re NBW in denying claim for
payment for real estate brokerage commissions based on unwritten agreement).
NBW is echoed by other cases. See Cote d'Azur Homeowners Ass'n v. Venture
Corp., 846 F. Supp. 827, 836-40 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Cohen v. RTC, No. CIV. 90-1065-
R(P), 1993 WL 282051 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 1993); Bartram v. FDIC, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d.
614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Outer Banks Contractors, Inc. v. Daniels & Daniels Constr.,
Inc., 433 S.E.2d 759, 766 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); see also Becherer v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 755,774 n.9 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (dictum). A
particularly thoughtful analysis of why D'Oench should not be limited by an asset
requirement may be found in Hall v. FDIC, 920 F.2d 334, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1231 (1991).
223. Perhaps the best-known of these decisions is Vernon v. RTC, 907 F.2d 1101
(11th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Vernon 1], in which the court refused to extend D'Oench
to affirmative securities law and RICO claims unrelated to any asset. Id. at 1103-04.
The court reasoned that the invocation of the doctrine would be in derogation of the
receiver's statutory duty to pay all valid claims of the institution, because many valid
claims, such as tort claims, would be valid without necessarily being recorded. Id. at
1107-08. In its own Circuit, Vernon I has apparently been confined to "free standing
tort claims," although the original decision made no such limitation. See supra note
148. Outside the Eleventh Circuit, other courts have grounded the refusal to extend
the doctrine on similar concerns; not only valid tort claims, but also many valid con-
tract claims would also be unrecorded. "The bank's gardener, window washer and
garbage collector have a claim for services rendered whether or not they had written
contracts." Ramins & Sons v. RTC, No. CIV. A. 92-4919, 1993 WL 210551, at *2
(E.D. Pa. June 15, 1993). Other judges have also refused to apply common law
D'Oench to non-asset-related claims, in many cases in factual situations similar to
those which would trigger other D'Oench exceptions. See Fletcher Village Condomin-
ium Assoc. v. FDIC, 864 F. Supp. 259, 262 (D. Mass. 1994); Beener v. LaSala, 813 F.
Supp. 303 (D.N.J. 1993) (non-banking business); Topolnycky v. Ukrainian Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 799 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (free-standing tort); Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc. v. American Bankers Ins. Co., [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 88,676, at 98,691-92 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 1991) (third-party agree-
ment); Central Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 771 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. La. 1991) (free-standing
tort); Agri Export Coop. v. Universal Say. Ass'n, 767 F. Supp. 824, 832 (S.D. Tex.
1991); Thomka v. Financial Corp. of Am., 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382, 388-90 (Cal. Ct. App.)
(non-banking business).
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sis and some interesting use of precedent, 4 particularly in those cases
involving loan participations,2 it must now be taken as fait accompli.
224. The extension of the common law doctrine appears to have resulted, in many
cases, from an application of a series of precedents in which claims did in fact involve
assets to those which did not, with the mirror-image rule being the vector. Thus,
claims that violation of agreements to lend further monies served as a defense to the
obligation to pay monies already lent were extended to bar claims against the bank
arising from oral promises to lend to parties not then obligated. In Bell & Murphy
and Associates v. FDIC, 894 F.2d 750,753 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 895 (1990),
the court characterized Bell & Murphy's assertion that D'Oench did not bar its
breach-of-agreement-to-lend claim because the claim did not diminish the right of the
FDIC in a particular asset as "meritless in fight of [its] recent holding in Beighley that
the D'Oench, Duhme rule bars affirmative claims based upon unrecorded agreements
to extend future loans." Note, however, that in Bell & Murphy there was concededly
an existing asset and the plaintiffs were doing no more than mounting a preemptive
strike and claiming that the agreement to lend did not "diminish the value of Bell &
Murphy's admitted outstanding debt to [the defunct bank]." Bell & Murphy, 894 F.2d
at 753. Because under common law D'Oench principles, it is the tendency to under-
state the value of an asset which is the focus of attention, this trick of pleading re-
ceived deservedly short shrift. The case Bell & Murphy relied upon, Beighley v.
FDIC, 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1989), had involved interposition of an agreement to
make future loans by a party liable on a note. Beighley v. FDIC, 676 F. Supp. 130, 131
(N.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1989). Indeed, the Beighley panel had
expressly described the rule of common law D'Oench as providing "substantial pro-
tection from oral side agreements, not reflected in a bank's records, that would dimin-
ish the FDIC's interest in an asset." Beighley, 868 F.2d at 784 (emphasis added). A
further extension came in Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1990), another case
in which borrowers brought suit claiming that a promise to lend further monies had
been made. The court stated that "[t]he agreement need not implicate a specific obli-
gation, such as a note or other asset held by the FDIC." Bowen, 915 F.2d at 1016. For
this proposition the court cited Bell & Murphy, Beighley, and FSLIC v. Murray, 853
F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1988). A few lines earlier, however, the court had described the
rule as being applicable to borrowers. See Bowen, 915 F.2d at 1015-16. Thus, Bowen
can be read to mean no more than that the agreement to lend need not represent a
direct attack on the note, for, if it followed the precedents it pretended to, the rule is
one of looking through pleadings which studiously avoid mention of the asset in order
to evade D'Oench. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit "followed" Bell & Murphy and
Beighley in holding that there need be no asset in the hands of the receiver for com-
mon law D'Oench to apply, even where there was no pre-existing borrowing relation-
ship, and thus no asset in the hands of the insurer. Jackson v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 730 (5th
Cir. 1992).
225. The source of these precedents was a series of cases in which purchasers of
participations in loans from a bank claimed that the participations were in some wise
fraudulent, but in which an offset against assets of the defunct bank was claimed, or in
which other policy reasons counseled against liability by the defunct bank. See Royal
Bank of Can. v. FDIC, 733 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 n.9 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (citing FDIC v.
State Bank, 893 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1990), and First State Bank v. City & County Bank,
872 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1989)). The cases cited are inapposite. See FDIC v. State Bank,
893 F.2d 139, 143 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (denying right of bank which
purchased fraudulent participation to offset its damages against assets of the defunct
bank because, while setoff was not per se barred, "[a] particular setoff may encounter
problems under § 1823(e) even though there is no absolute ban. The debt assertedly
set off against the FDIC's asset may have come into being as a result of an 'agreement'
not reflected in either bank's books. When that happens, § 1823(e) may interdict the
setoff .... ." (first emphasis in original, the remainder added)); Fast State Bank v. City
& County Bank, 872 F.2d 707, 717 (6th Cir. 1989) (denying right of plaintiff to assert
right to put participation to defunct bank on the grounds that, while not all oral agree-
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This is not to state that entirely asset-berift claims are to be in-
cluded. Before announcing an utter surrender of the principle of as-
set-relatedness, it should be observed that the vast majority of cases
have related to an asset in posse, as in an agreement to lend, or where
an asset formerly existed. 6 The courts have sometimes come to the
conclusion that an agreement to lend itself constitutes an asset.z 7 Not
all cases subscribe to this theory, but, as to agreements to create an
asset, whether agreements to make loans, reimbursement agreements
under letters of credit or agreements to honor overdrafts, granting the
protections of common law D'Oench is consistent with the treatment
of voidness defenses. Perhaps this can best be seen as the alpha to the
accord and satisfaction omega: if an agreement to destroy an asset
cannot be enforced, then presumably neither can the breach of an un-
documented agreement to create one.
The common law doctrine has not always been limited to such
claims. In a small minority of cases, the courts have applied the doc-
trine to matters entirely unrelated to assets-in-posse or -in-esse, such
as personnel matters.228 The doctrine has even been applied, in ex-
ments were barred by D'Oench, plaintiff First State had represented to the FDIC in
regulatory reports that participations were non-recourse and thus that "the mislead-
ing nature of First State's behavior does serve as a proper basis for denying enforce-
ment of the oral agreement" (emphasis added)); see also FDIC v. Texarkana Nat'l
Bank, 874 F.2d 264, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding D'Oench bars participating bank
from setting off against funds of defunct bank on grounds that participation purchases
were fraudulently induced), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1043 (1990). Nonetheless, courts
have cited First State for the proposition that D'Oench applies to any agreement
which increases the liabilities of a defunct bank. Torke v. FDIC, 761 F. Supp. 754, 756
(D. Colo. 1991). A D'Oench-derived prudential rule like that of First State seems to
be at work in First City National Bank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 730 F. Supp. 501
(E.D.N.Y. 1990), in which the court dismissed a RICO claim, at least partially on
D'Oench grounds, but primarily because RICO treble damages would have come out
of the hide of innocent depositors. Any claim that the decision was grounded in
D'Oench is undercut by the fact that the court allowed the plaintiffs leave to replead
against FDIC-Corporate, which should have been protected by D'Oench and section
1823(e) if the decision had truly been dependent upon those doctrines. See First City,
730 F. Supp. at 510-11
226. Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 39 F.3d 292, 298 n.7 (11th
Cir. 1994); Robinowitz v. Gibraltar Say., 23 F.3d 951 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 725 (1995); Hall v. FDIC, 920 F.2d 334, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501
U.S. 1231 (1991).
227. Some of these decisions have apparently been grounded in the economic value
of the breached agreement to lend. Hall v. FDIC, 920 F.2d 334,339-40 (6th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1231 (1991); Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 856 F. Supp. 111
(N.D.N.Y. 1994). Other cases have stated that an agreement to lend represents an
asset without providing any clear rationale. Franklin Asaph Ltd. Partnership v. FDIC,
794 F. Supp. 402, 407 (D.D.C. 1992); see also American Fed. of State, County & Mun.
Employees v. FDIC (In re NBW Commercial Paper Litig.), 826 F. Supp. 1448, 1464
(D.D.C. 1992) (dictum).
228. Poff v. Oak Tree Mortgage Corp., Civ. A. No. 91-4347, 1993 WL 144284 (E.D.
La. Apr. 15, 1994); Pyle v. Meritor Say. Bank, 821 F. Supp. 1072, 1076-77 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (holding that FDIC's D'Oench defense to claim of breach of employment con-
tract created colorable issue of federal law allowing removal to federal court). But see
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treme cases, to claims relating to deposits.3 9 The federal policy, in-
tended to protect depositors and creditors of the bank, has turned on
its own.231 Some of the deposit cases are, however, explicable as be-
ing asset based, as where the claim is wrongful setoff, because the
funds of the borrower in the hands of the bank in essence constitute
additional security for its loans.231
C. Exceptions Grounded in the Written Text of an Asset
D'Oench does not utterly bar claims that a bank breached written
obligations under an agreement, although the insurer pleads its cases
as if it did. 32 What D'Oench bars are not claims of breach of con-
tract, but claims that the contract is other than that which is held in
the files of the bank, and, in the case of section 1823(e), duly author-
Bender v. CenTrust Mortgage Corp., 833 F. Supp. 1525, 1529-32 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (re-
fusing, in the absence of factual record, to reach novel legal issue of application of
doctrine to claim of breach of employment contract).
229. Claims have been brought sounding in tort, as in the fraud asseverated in
Bruneau v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2413 (1993).
The court dealt with claims of an uninsured depositor that she had been promised by
a teller that all of her funds would be covered by pointing to D'Oench and section
1823(e) and refusing the claim. Bruneau, 981 F.2d at 177-78. Other courts in examin-
ing Bruneau have dealt with the claims for what they were: an attempt to plead tort
to subvert the obligation of the receiver to make pro rata distributions of bank assets.
See Branch v. FDIC, 825 F. Supp. 384,416-17 (D. Mass. 1993). Not all deposit-related
claims have been related to attempts to subvert the regime of deposit insurance. Hat-
ten v. FDIC, No. 91-1008, 1992 WL 149904, at *1 (10th Cir. June 26, 1992) (holding
that where depositor had ordered bank to liquidate CD and pay over proceeds to
third parties in return for a note, and the note was never made, claim against bank for
conversion of deposits was barred by D'Oench and section 1823(e), because no "as-
set" need be implicated). Other deposit related tort cases have involved funds pur-
portedly held in trust for persons other than named depositors under undocumented
arrangements. Tort claims arising from payment of the funds to the named owners
have lead to mixed results. One circuit has held, almost without comment, that the
claims were subject to section 1821(d)(9)(A). See RTC v. Allen, 16 F.3d 568, 574-75
(4th Cir. 1994). A neighboring circuit has held that the affirmative claims under an
under-documented escrow arrangement would be covered, if at all, by common law
D'Oench, which did not apply. See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FDIC, 32 F.3d
592 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
230. "The FDIC's 'core' mission is to protect the interests of a failed bank's deposi-
tors. Both D'Oench Duhme and § 1823(e) are intended to serve this objective.... To
invoke D'Oench Duhme as a bar to depositors' claims would defeat the very purpose
of the doctrine." Fletcher Village Condominium Ass'n v. FDIC, 864 F. Supp. 259,262
(D. Mass. 1994) (citations omitted).
231. See Hill v. Samuel Cabot, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-11926-Z, 1993 WL 343673 (D.
Mass. Aug. 26, 1993) (holding that where money was escrowed, but CD's were
pledged in violation of escrow agreement, and liquidated, D'Oench was implicated
whether by a claim against specific assets or general assets and, that as the taking of
deposits was ordinary banking business, D'Oench would apply).
232. See FDIC v. Vernon Real Estate Invs. Ltd., 798 F. Supp. 1009, 1014 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) ("Plaintiff contends that 'In]one of the counterclaims ... are reflected in the
records of CITYTRUST'.... These claims arise not from any extrinsic or secret
agreement but directly from the text of the... [c]ontract.").
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ized and executed .2 3 Thus, the focus of D'Oench is on contract for-
mation, and, in the course of performance of contracts, on
amendments, waivers, and assertions of estoppel, as these would
change the provisions of the contract from those that the insurer
knew. To do otherwise would be to alter the language of section
1823(e) from "no agreement shall be valid unless" to "no agreement
shall be valid. Period." The terms of the agreement constituting the
"asset" owned by the insurer define the contours of the asset and are
not agreements adversely affecting the insurer's interest in such asset.
The "exception" really provides that the insurer may not, by selecting
those covenants it wishes to enforce and characterizing the others as
barred, recast the asset.z 4 As Chief Judge Posner has remarked,
"One may doubt whether section 1823(e) ha[s] any application-that
would be like arguing that the FDIC could ignore the due date in a
promissory note it had bought from a troubled bank, and call the loan
immediately."" 5
The principle has been honored in the bilateral agreement excep-
tion, which recognizes that the FDIC, in enforcing an asset, is bound
by the terms of that asset. Exactly how explicit those terms must be is
an open question. While it is clear that attempting to piece together
or imply covenants out of isolated clauses in the contract is forbidden,
233. As the Eleventh Circuit made clear:
[Tihe D'Oench doctrine does not protect federal agencies where bilateral
obligations are evident on the face of the documents at issue. . . . Bank
examiners cannot be misled by documents that evidence the true obligations
of the parties .... Examiners are fully aware that any agreement could be
breached, and the likelihood of this occurring must be taken into account in
an evaluation of an institution's assets and liabilities. Thus, the protections
provided to the deposit insurance fund by the D'Oench doctrine would not
be furthered by allowing financial institutions to breach valid agreements or
to carry them out in bad faith.
Baumann v. Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1517 (11th Cir. 1991)
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1936 (1992).
234. It has been implied by one court that this so-called "exception" may not have
survived Langley, that the requirements of section 1823(e) as described in Langley are
certain and categorical and that a covenant not complying would thus be barred.
Castleglen, Inc. v. Commonwealth Sav. Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. 656, 668-69 (D. Utah.
1989), aff'd sub nom. Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
235. FDIC v. O'Neil, 809 F.2d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 1987). A similar "shape of the
asset" argument may be found in FDIC v. RepublicBank, Lubbock, N.A., 883 F.2d
427 (5th Cir. 1989). The FDIC was attempting to claim that its mortgage was senior
to that of another lender on the grounds that a subordination agreement executed in
connection with the same transaction was invalid under section 1823(e), even though
the deed of trust it sought to enforce recited on its face that it was subordinated. The
court refused to go along, stating that because the FDIC's lien had always been
subordinate, the agreement did no more than define the contours of the asset. Repub-
licBank, 883 F.2d at 429; see also First Hartford Partners II v. FDIC, No. 93 Civ. 0933
(RPP), 1993 WL 426846, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1993) ("[T]he ... [a]greement does
not 'tend to diminish or defeat the interest' of the FDIC... in any asset acquired by
it as receiver, a prerequisite for the application of section 1823(e), but merely imposes
affirmative financing obligations... and sets forth procedures governing the relation-
ship between the parties.").
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other courts have gone further, imposing a rule that requires absolute
explicitness, or even further, excluding external evidence in explana-
tion of ambiguity in contracts.
The mirror image of the debate over how written a written covenant
must be is the fate of unwritten covenants implied by law in various
sorts of contracts. A particular point of dispute has been the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Many courts have, consistent with their
treatment of other unwritten rights, recognized the covenant if, and so
far as, it is not a means of artfully pleading a D'Oench-barred
agreement.
1. The Bilateral Obligations Exception
This willingness to hold the insurer to the written terms of its asset
is known as the bilateral obligations, or Howell, 36 exception. The
Howell exception provides that the insurer remains subject to de-
fenses grounded in the written terms of the asset it seeks to enforce,
even if the asset (and those covenants it contains) does not technically
comply with section 1823(e). This exception has been recognized
fairly broadly 37 and has been applied to situations other than purely
236. This exception is normally associated with the decision of the Seventh Circuit
in Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1981), although that case
actually derived the principle from Riverside Park Realty Co. v. FDIC, 465 F. Supp.
305 (M.D. Tenn. 1978). Howell, 655 F.2d at 747. Howell entered into an agreement
with Continental to lease equipment. Continental sold the leases to a bank in order
to get the money to purchase the equipment, but dissipated the funds and never paid
for what it purported to lease. The court rejected FDIC-Corporate's assertion that
D'Oench and section 1823(e) barred Howell's defense that ownership of the property
by Continental was an implicit condition precedent to her obligation to pay the rent.
Id. at 744-45. The court distinguished cases in which the FDIC was attempting to
enforce unilateral obligations to pay, as "inapplicable... where the document the
FDIC seeks to enforce is one ... which facially manifests bilateral obligations and
serves as the basis of the lessee's defense." Id. at 746. "'When, however, the asset
upon which the FDIC is attempting to recover is the very same agreement that the
makers allege has been breached by the FDIC's assignors, § 1823(e) does not apply.'"
Id. at 747 (quoting Riverside Park, 465 F. Supp. at 313).
The term "bilateral obligations" is perhaps slightly misleading, because the distinc-
tion can also be seen even where the obligation of the maker is unilateral, as in a note.
Where it is clear from the face of the note that the maker signed on behalf of a
juridical person, neither D'Oench nor section 1823(e) would apply to impose personal
liability. FDIC v. Tennesseans for Tyree, 886 F.2d 771, 777 (6th Cir. 1989).
237. FDIC v. McFarland, 33 F.3d 532, 537 (5th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Liberty Homes,
Inc., No. 90-2255, 1991 WL 163055, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 23, 1991); FDIC v. Panelfab
P.R., Inc., 739 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (indicating that where notice of termination
of guaranty given in accordance with its terms, section 1823(e) did not apply); FDIC
v. O'Flahaven, 857 F. Supp. 154 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding defense of failure of consider-
ation grounded in breach of bank's obligations to disburse loan proceeds survives
D'Oench); FDIC v. Eltrex Int'l Corp., No. CIV. 91-434-JD, 1994 WL 258673, at *5
(D.N.H. Feb. 1, 1994); First Hartford Partners II v. FDIC, No. 93 Civ. 0933 (RPP),
1993 WL 426846, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1993); Holden v. FDIC, No. Civ. A. 91-
11737-Z, 1993 WL 81459, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 3, 1993); FDIC v. Vernon Real Estate
Invs., Ltd., 798 F. Supp. 1009, 1014-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); National Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. FDIC, 837 S.W.2d 373, 381-82 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that representations in applica-
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defensive actions.238 The exception is similarly recognized in common
law D'Oench," 9 although the scope of documents allowed to be intro-
duced, encompassing so-called "integral loan documents," is perhaps
broader than under the statutory analogue.240 It is apparently untrue,
tion for insurance were incorporated in policy when issued, and that their truth was an
express condition to payment under the policy, and insurer could defend liability
based upon their falsity); see also FDIC v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 725 F.2d 634, 639
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984) (dictum). But see AmWest Say. Ass'n v.
Farmers Mkt. of Odessa, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (indicating
that D'Oench bars all claims, without distinguishing side agreements from post-con-
tract-formation performance).
238. It has been applied even where the attempt to enforce is brought in separate
and collateral proceedings, as where the RTC has sued under the agreement and lost
and the RTC's opponent seeks reimbursement of legal fees under a loser-pays provi-
sion of the contract. RTC v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 1342, 1344,
1347-48 (N.D. Ill. 1992). The rule has also been said to run in favor of third-party
beneficiaries of a contract, who may rely on the written terms of the agreement as a
source of rights. Yankee Bank for Fin. & Say. v. Task Assocs., 731 F. Supp. 64, 68-69
(N.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that rights of mechanic's lienors arose from failure of bank
to comply with its own loan agreement, and thus were not barred by common law
D'Oench). Nonetheless, the "bilateral agreement" exception is not a "get-out-of-
D'Oench-free card;" parties seeking to avoid D'Oench by claiming that an oral con-
tract imposed bilateral obligations will be bitterly and properly disappointed. Com-
munity Bank v. FDIC, 984 F.2d 254, 258-59 (8th Cir. 1993); Covell v. Photo Images,
Inc., 768 F. Supp. 308, 311-12 (D. Kan. 1991).
239. FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 17 F.3d 715,719 (4th Cir. 1994);
FSLIC v. Mackie, 962 F.2d 1144, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1992); Grant County Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. RTC, 770 F. Supp. 1374, 1379-82 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (holding that where omis-
sions constituted breach of written warranty and expressly assumed fiduciary duty,
recision and setoff were not barred by common law D'Oench or section 1823(e)),
rev'd on other grounds, 968 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1992); Royal Bank of Can. v. FDIC, 733
F. Supp. 1091, 1098 n.13 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Yankee Bank for Fin. & Say. v. Task As-
socs., 731 F. Supp. 64, 68-69 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); FSLIC v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 100
B.R. 321, 326 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989).
240. See Thigpen v. Sparks, 983 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1993) (indicating that
whether representation letter was part of the contract, and thus integral for purposes
of common law D'Oench, was to be determined in accordance with state law princi-
ples); RTC v. Oaks Apartments Joint Venture, 966 F.2d 995, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1992)
(allowing court to consider, under common law D'Oench, effect of guaranty agree-
ment making several the liability of partners if it was found to be an integral loan
document kept in the loan file); FDIC v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231, 1238-39 (5th Cir.
1991); FDIC v. Waggoner, 999 F.2d 826, 828 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The FDIC's argument
that D'Oench, Duhme prevents consideration of the terms of the two original notes, is
in effect, that D'Oench, Duhme is a parole evidence rule. This contention takes the
doctrine too far."); FDIC v. Smith, 848 F. Supp. 1053, 1056-58 (D. Mass. 1994);
Erbafina v. FDIC, 855 F. Supp. 9, 12 (D. Mass. 1994); see also Levy v. FDIC, 7 F.3d
1054, 1057-58 (1st Cir. 1993) (dictum); cf Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Allied Tower,
Ltd., 874 P.2d 36, 39-40 (Okl. 1994) (holding that D'Oench and section 1823(e), while
not limited to claims against an asset, were limited to agreements between banks and
their customers which were in derogation of a preexisting contract, and refusing to
apply doctrine to avoid effect of estoppel letter promising not to renegotiate lease
given by bank to insurance company as lender to bank's landlord). But cf. Lassiter v.
RTC, 610 So. 2d 531 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring loan approval letter suffi-
cient under common law D'Oench to pass section 1823(e) tests in order to provide
defense). Nonetheless, what is "integral" remains a difficult hurdle; mere reference to
the same subject matter is insufficient. Cardente v. Fleet Bank, 796 F. Supp. 603, 612
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at least under common law D'Oench, that the bilateral obligation
must be evidenced in exactly the same piece of paper. What is or is
not "integral," however, is yet obscure, and has granted one court li-
cense to propose the subversion and overthrow of Langley.41
The bilateral obligations exception is subject to significant restric-
tions. These restrictions have developed significantly from their ori-
gins in holdings that an unsigned agreement not in file could be
bootstrapped by incorporation-by-reference into D'Oench compliance
and that obscure and cryptic references do not a covenant make.4
(D. Me. 1992). Courts have, in general, not read the exception expansively enough to
allow in unreferenced scraps of paper linked by mere parol. See FDIC v. Plato, 981
F.2d 852, 856-57 (5th Cir. 1993). If a document merely represents a directive or notice
under the asset, and does not vary its terms, it should be considered. See Swedbank
(Sparbankemas Bank) v. FDIC, No. 93-1338, 1994 WL 183542 (lst Cir. May 13,
1994) (letter was not a disbursement directive, because it varied rights of bank under
agreement, and therefore was an "agreement" subject to section 1823(e)).
The federal holder in due course doctrine permits no such defense, except, perhaps,
in the limited situation posited by Chief Judge Posner, see supra note 235 and accom-
panying text, because the entire point of negotiable instruments is to create contracts
payable without regard to defenses available on the underlying contract for which the
promise to pay is given. See FDIC v. Adam, 803 F. Supp. 1225, 1228-29 (S.D. Tex.
1992); Burns v. RTC, 880 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
241. This exception is found in FDIC v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 947 F.2d 196
(6th Cir. 1991). Aetna had issued a bankers blanket bond to a bank but when the
bank failed the insurer refused to pay. It insisted that the insurance application con-
tained misrepresentations and that in the absence of a truthful application, it was
under no obligation to make the FDIC whole for the peculations of the bank officers.
Id. at 199. Pointing out that the UCC sections cited by Justice Scalia in Langley re-
lated solely to negotiable instruments, Judge Guy held that "[w]hen extrapolated to
the context of insurance bonds, the logic of the Langley decision unravels." Id. at 205.
Thus section 1823(e) should be confined to negotiable instruments or "agreements
which differ from negotiable instruments in only minor respects." Id. at 206 n.9. He
went on to state that the insurance policy imposed bilateral obligations on the parties,
one of which was not to lie on the application therefor, and that the case thus fell
within the bilateral obligation exception to D'Oench even though the insurance con-
tract did not on its face contain any provision providing it would be invalid if there
had been misrepresentation in the application. Id. at 206-07. Interestingly enough,
Judge Guy seemed to go out of his way to come to this conclusion, because the bond
was arguably void ab initio. Id. at 205 n.7. His brother judges refused to join Judge
Guy on this frolic, preferring to hold that the insurance application had complied with
section 1823(e). Id. at 210-11 (Nelson, J., dissenting and concurring); see also National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 837 S.W.2d 373, 381 (Tenn. 1992) (following Judge Nel-
son's Aetna dissent). But see FDIC v. Oldenburg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1551-53 (10th Cir.
1994) (disagreeing with both Aetna opinions). Courts have attempted to explain away
the Aetna decision as relying on the potential defense that the bond was void ab initio
under Tennessee law. See RTC v. Townsend Assocs., 840 F. Supp. 1127, 1138 (E.D.
Mich. 1993). A careful examination of the Aetna case, however, reveals this to be
incorrect.
242. Limitations on the budding bilateral obligations exception were put in place by
Judge Posner in FDIC v. O'Neil, 809 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1987). O'Neil claimed that
because his note was by its terms made "subject to" an (unexecuted) agreement refer-
enced in the note, and because the unexecuted agreement had (arguably) imposed
certain duties on the lending bank, that the agreement had been incorporated by ref-
erence in the asset sought to be enforced, and that the duties of the bank implied in
the incorporated agreement had not been performed, he fell within the Howell excep-
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Many cases have held that the records of the bank must contain a
written agreement, not merely writings from which an oral agreement
could be inferred.243 Likewise, where the writings express an intent,
but not a covenant, an oral agreement to carry out the intent is not
thereby transformed into a writing. 2"
These restrictions have continued to expand. The restriction on am-
biguous covenants has grown to encompass a requirement that the
covenant therein to be enforced must be manifest beyond peradven-
ture245 so that it would be detectable by Chief Judge Posner's incuri-
tion. O'Neil, 809 F.2d at 352-53. Judge Posner was quick to distinguish the two cases:
Howell involved clear obligations on the face of the very agreement sought to be
enforced, not another agreement with ambiguous duties which, unexecuted, did not
comply with section 1823(e).
If we accepted [defendant's] argument, this would imply that when the ap-
praiser came across the promissory note he would have had to conduct an
inquiry into the whereabouts, status, and terms of the "certain agreement,"
mentioned in (but not a part of) the note. Yet even if he located the agree-
ment it might not occur to him to inquire whether the bank's had... [per-
formed the implied duties], because the agreement does not in terms require
such [performance]. Maybe such a requirement is implicit, but this would be
apparent only to one who had steeped himself in the negotiations leading up
to the drafting of the agreement. The FDIC is not required to go so far.
O'Neil, 809 F.2d at 353-54.
The limitations on incorporation by reference have not been unanimously adopted.
Indeed, one of the ironies of O'Neil is that Riverside Park, from which Howell derived
its reasoning entire, rejected an FDIC claim that breach of an agreement incorporated
by reference in the document FDIC sought to enforce was irrelevant to liability. Riv-
erside Park Realty Co. v. FDIC, 465 F. Supp. 305, 313 (M.D. Tenn. 1978); see also
Commercial Properties Dev. Corp. v. RTC, Civ. A. No. 92-3194, 1993 WL 541851, at
*3 (E.D. La. Dec. 20, 1993); Albuquerque Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Deville, 615 So.
2d 1002, 1007 & n.1 (La. Ct. App. 1993). But see FDIC v. Friedland, 758 F. Supp. 941,
944 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). This principle applies where the incorporation is a result of
contract law, as well as where a provision is explicitly inserted. FDIC v. Waggoner,
999 F.2d 826, 828-31 (5th Cir. 1993).
The bilateral agreement exception may also be purely defensive in character, at
least where the asset has been acquired by FDIC-Corporate in a purchase and as-
sumption transaction. The value of the asset lives after the bank at the Corporate
level, while the liability remains interred with its bones in the receivership. See UTigo
v. FDIC, 847 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1988).
243. Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC, 984 F.2d 1571, 1579 (10th Cir. 1993); RTC v. Kolea,
866 F. Supp. 197, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 755, 773-74 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Torke v. FDIC, 761 F. Supp.
754, 757 (D. Colo. 1991); Beighley v. FDIC, 679 F. Supp. 625, 627 (N.D. Tex. 1988),
aff'd, 868 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1989).
244. FDIC v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 864-65 (3d Cir. 1994); Sweeney v. RTC, 16
F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 291 (1994); FSLIC v. Gemini Manage-
ment, 921 F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1990); FSLIC v. Tvo Rivers Assocs., 880 F.2d 1267,
1275-76 (11th Cir. 1989).
245. FDIC v. Bay Street Dev. Corp., 32 F.3d 636, 639-40 (1st Cir. 1994); RTC v.
Daddona, 9 F.3d 312, 319 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he basic structure of that agreement-
its essential terms-must also appear plainly on the face of [the] obligation."); Inn at
Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 856 F. Supp. 111 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); Armstrong v. RTC, 623
N.E.2d 291, 298 (Ill. 1993) ("[N]either document requires a bank examiner to con-
clude that the writings explicitly represented the actual agreement between the
parties.").
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ous drone, the "prudent bank examiner." z  The insistence on
absolute clarity can result in judges' refusal to follow the traditional
rule in construing contracts: a clear contract is for the court and an
ambiguous one for the trier of fact. Here, both are for the court: if
the covenant is clear, its import will be determined by the judge, and if
it is unclear, then it is eliminated.247 Not all courts have followed this
novel departure from traditional contract doctrine.28 Further,
D'Oench does not require that the judge construe the language of the
contract favorably to the insurer, nor does it bar reference to outside
evidence when the contract is blatantly self-contradictory. 249 This ap-
This doctrine has been a particular favorite of the Ninth Circuit. See FDIC v. Lud-
wig Family Trust, No. 92-16842, 1993 WL 362273, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 1993);
Walden v. RTC, No. 91-16322, 1992 WL 354213, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 1992); FDIC
v. Zook Bros. Constr. Co., 973 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1992). It may even have
taken on a life of its own, separate and apart from D'Oench or section 1823(e). See
FDIC v. Ludwig Family Trust, No. 92-16842, 1993 WL 362273, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 17,
1993) (Canby, J., concurring).
In addition, the principle has been applied to other bank records, such as board
minutes, when they may be consulted under common law D'Oench. See Armstrong v.
RTC, 623 N.E.2d 291, 299 (IMI. 1993).
246. Fair v. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 733 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (N.D. Tex. 1990); see
also RTC v. Camp, 965 F.2d 25, 30 (5th Cir. 1992) (dictum).
The argument can cut against the party invoking D'Oench. In a common law
D'Oench case, the court upheld a "prudent bank examiner" jury instruction which
allowed reference to all of the documents in file, against the insurer's claim that only
the documents embodying the terms of the loan could be considered. First Heights
Bank v. Gutierrez, 852 S.W.2d 596, 607-08 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
247. Lesal Interiors, Inc. v. RTC, 834 F. Supp. 721, 731-32 (D.NJ. 1993), explicitly
stated that an ambiguity in a contract renders it an insufficient writing for purposes of
section 1823(e). Cf. Reisig v. RTC, 806 P.2d 397, 400 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
D'Oench bars admission of parol to explain ambiguity).
248. FDIC v. O'Flahaven, 857 F. Supp. 154 (D.N.H. 1994); FDIC v. Parker Equi-
ties, No. CIV 92-1437-FR, 1993 WL 391342, at *3 (D. Or. Oct. 1, 1993); Security Say.
Bank v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 1342, 1349 (D. Minn. 1990); Royal
Bank of Can. v. FDIC, 733 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 n.13 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Centerbank v.
Sachs, No. CV91-037054, 1994 WL 33630, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 1994). In-
deed, O'Neil itself does not stand for the proposition that D'Oench is a principle of
construction, as Chief Judge Posner noted that "[t]he fact that there was an interpre-
tive issue in Howell could not defeat Mrs. Howell's claim; a written obligation does
not become unwritten just because there is a question about its meaning." FDIC v.
O'Neil, 809 F.2d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 1987).
This does not, however, give license to the insurer's opponent to manufacture ambi-
guity by resort to D'Oench-barred evidence in pursuit of a favorable construction. See
Nutro Prods. Corp. v. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 35 F.3d 1021, 1027 (5th Cir. 1994);
FDIC v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 725 F.2d 634, 639-40 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
829 (1984); cf FDIC v. Singh, 977 F.2d 18, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating, in dictum,
that where documents were clear on their faces, and could be harmoniously con-
strued, spirit of D'Oench required that implications of ambiguity or extrinsic evidence
of intent would not be entertained).
249. D'Oench cannot apparently be used to create a legal construction of unambig-
uous language favorable to the insurer. See FDIC v. White, 820 F. Supp. 1423, 1428
(N.D. Ga. 1993). Nor does it prevent the preservation of a fact question when the
documents are blatantly self-contradictory. See Erbafina v. FDIC, 855 F. Supp. 9, 12
(D. Mass. 1994).
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pears to carve the "asset" into two parts: the asset itself, which con-
sists of the agreements manifest on its face, and the "agreement,"
which consists of those covenants that are imperceptible to a prudent
bank examiner.
Such a view seems difficult to sustain. From the perspective of com-
mon law D'Oench, it seems difficult to equate poor draftsmanship
with lending oneself to a scheme to deceive. While the harsh rule that
a complete failure to record representations and agreements will de-
bar their use against the bank is justifiable where a complete failure
has occurred, the rule is harder to justify where the borrower has ar-
guably made an attempt to alert the examiners. Perhaps the borrower
could have written more clearly; but then again perhaps the bank ex-
aminer could have inquired. The proposition becomes even more ab-
surd when section 1823(e) is applied: the rule, in essence, states that
the asset has become an agreement that diminishes the insurer's inter-
est in itself. The contours of the asset are what they are: if that is a
question of fact rather than of law, it does not diminish nor increase
the rights of the insurer. Indeed, that recourse to fact outside of an
asset may be necessary to determine the very existence of an asset-a
proposition inherent in the fraud in the factum rule-militates in
favor of allowing proof of the assets extent to seek the same source.
2. Written Agreements, Unwritten Terms
Even prudent bank examiners are thought to know the law. A vari-
ety of unwritten clauses and covenants are implied into every agree-
ment by the surrounding law." 0  Most typically, and least
controversially, have been those relating to the lending against secur-
ity, particularly personalty. Defenses based on impairment of collat-
eral,251 unreasonable liquidation," 2 and lack of notice of disposition
of collateral1 3 may survive D'Oench. Indeed, where a guarantor has
waived the right to notification of disposition of collateral, but such
right cannot lawfully be waived, the insurer may not insist the instru-
ment controls; even in the context of D'Oench, law still overrides boil-
250. See John v. RTC, 39 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 1994) (denying that where contract
was silent on defects to house, but state common law required disclosure of known
defects, silence was an agreement by fraudulent omission and common law D'Oench
would be implicated).
251. New Conn. Bank & Trust Co. v. Stadium Management Corp., 132 B.R. 205,
207 (D. Mass. 1991).
252. The defense, while proof against D'Oench, is generally found to fail on state
law or the facts. RTC v. Carr, 13 F.3d 425, 429-30 (1st Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Payne, 973
F.2d 403, 410 (5th Cir. 1992); Texas Refrigeration Supply, Inc. v. FDIC, 953 F.2d 975,
982-83 (5th Cir. 1992). The defense may even prevail against a federal holder in due
course. Roquemore v. National Commerce Bank, 837 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992).
253. Lake Forest Devs. v. FDIC, 989 F.2d 197, 201-02 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 385 (1993); FDIC v. Percival, 752 F. Supp. 313, 317 (D. Neb. 1990).
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erplate2 54 Far more troubling have been claims brought under the
UCC or common law "covenants of good faith and fair dealing" im-
plied in all contracts.- 5 Plaintiffs have often sought to circumvent
D'Oench by reference to these covenants, pleading that failure to
abide by an unwritten agreement served as a breach of the unwritten
covenant implied by law in a written agreement. These bootstrap at-
tempts to enforce unrecorded understandings 6 or permit waivers or
amendments in accordance with such understandings- 7 have been
dealt with harshly. Other cases have recognized good-faith claims, but
only when they are founded on written agreements. The covenant is
enforceable where the complaint is that the rights of the bank, as
shown in the agreement, were exercised with improper purpose or so
as to deny the fruits of the contract to the other party.258 Other courts
254. See FDIC v. Payne, 973 F.2d 403,408-09 (5th Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Percival, 752
F. Supp. 313, 327-28 (D. Neb. 1990).
255. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990). As with all "personal" defenses, the federal holder in
due course doctrine bars the claim from following the note to one who takes as a
federal holder in due course. See AmWest Say. Ass'n v. Farmers Mkt. of Odessa, Inc.,
753 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (W.D. Tex. 1990); FDIC v. Byrne, 736 F. Supp. 727,730 (N.D.
Tex. 1990).
256. FDIC v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1994); Lake Forest Devs. v.
FDIC, 989 F.2d 197,201 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 385 (1993); Bowen v. FDIC,
915 F.2d 1013, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 1990); Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 856 F. Supp.
111, 117-18 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); RTC v. Wilson, 851 F. Supp. 141, 144-45 (D.NJ. 1994);
FDIC v. Villemaire, 849 F. Supp. 116, 121 (D. Mass. 1994); Washington Properties
Ltd. Partnership v. RTC, 796 F. Supp. 542,546 (D.D.C. 1992); New Me. Nat'l Bank v.
Benner, 774 F. Supp. 36, 39-40 (D. Me. 1991); RTC v. Wellington Dev. Group, 761 F.
Supp. 731, 733, 735-36 (D. Colo. 1991).
257. Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Amberley Huntsville, Ltd., 934 F.2d 1201,
1209 (11th Cir. 1991); Ostroff v. FDIC, 847 F. Supp. 270, 274-77 (D.R.I. 1994); New
Me. Nat'l Bank v. Benner, 774 F. Supp. 36, 39-40 (D. Me. 1991); Demakes Enters.,
Inc. v. FDIC, 143 B.R. 304, 309 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
258. FSLIC v. Mackie, 962 F.2d 1144, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1992); Baumann v. Savers
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 934 F.2d 1506, 1517-18 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1936 (1992); Morris v. Azzi, 866 F. Supp. 149, 155 (D.NJ. 1994); First Tex. Say.
Ass'n v. Comprop Inv. Properties Ltd., 752 F. Supp. 1568, 1573-75 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
An interesting variation on this theme may be found in Beitzell & Co. v. FDIC (In
re Beitzell & Co.), 163 B.R. 637 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1993), in which the borrower alleged
that the bank, in order to curry favor with the Teamsters Union, withdrew consent to
sell certain inventory, refused to honor draws on the borrower's line of credit, and
falsely declared the borrower to be in default on its debt. Beitzell, 163 B.R. at 644-45.
The court held that claims of breach of UCC covenant of good faith could proceed
because claims for refusal of consent were based on unreasonableness of act not with-
drawal of unwritten agreement, and Washington Properties Ltd. Partnership v. RTC,
796 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1992), was distinguishable as the UCC was statutory rather
than judge-made law. Beitzell, 163 B.R. at 649-52. The holding in Beitzell is distin-
guishable from that in Swift v. 7son in that the court indicated that custom, which the
memory of man runneth not to the contrary, would also fall before the federal com-
mon law. Compare Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (Story, J.) with
Beitzell, 163 B.R. at 651. Another approach was taken by the court in New Bank of
New England v. Callahan, 798 F. Supp. 73, 77 (D.N.H. 1992), which stated that
D'Oench covered only "agreements" and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
being implied by state law, was not an agreement at all. The recognition of a right to
sue on the duty of good faith may also trigger other rights, where breach of the cove-
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have held that such claims are barred as a matter of law, without ref-
erence to whether they represent artful pleading, but such cases seem
to have misapplied precedent.25 9 The more specific good faith obliga-
tions on noteholders who seek to exercise rights of acceleration have
also been recognized on the same basis as their more general rela-
tives.260 As with their contract counterparts, tortious acts constituting
breaches of a duty imposed by compliant agreements have normally
been allowed to survive D'Oench.26'
nant constitutes a violation of state deceptive trade practices law. Desmond v. FDIC,
798 F. Supp. 829, 844 (D. Mass. 1992).
259. The court in FDIC v. Rusconi, 808 F. Supp. 30 (D. Me. 1992), stated, in dic-
tum, that such claims have been held as barred as a matter of law. Rusconi, 808 F.
Supp. at 43 (citing Clay v. FDIC, 934 F.2d 69, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1991), Mainland Say.
Ass'n v. Riverfront Assocs., 872 F.2d 955, 956 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890
(1989), RTC v. Colorado 126 Partnership, 746 F. Supp. 35 (D. Colo. 1990) and FSLIC
v. Locke, 718 F. Supp. 573, 582 (W.D. Tex. 1989)). With one exception, the cases on
which Rusconi relies do not bear out this sweeping statement. The exception, RTC v.
Colorado 126 Partnership, is not a model of clarity. The court insisted that "good
faith" as a personal defense, was barred by D'Oench. Colorado 126, 746 F. Supp. at
37. This is of course a correct statement of the law, assuming that the defenses arose
from a non-compliant agreement. The Colorado 126 opinion is somewhat terse.
Nonetheless, the court quoted the defendant as stating that his claims arose from the
fact that the bank "among other actions participated in the transaction at issue and
failed to disclosed [sic] the true value of the property being acquired, related transac-
tions, and [the bank's] profit and actual participation in the transaction." Id. at 36
(quoting motion of defendant). Thus it appears that the claim is based in fraud in the
inducement constituting a breach of the covenant. See also FDIC v. Smith, 848 F.
Supp. 1053 (D. Mass. 1994) (following Rusconi); McDonald v. Foster Mortgage Corp.,
834 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (indicating, in dictum, that claims of breach
of covenant are barred as a matter of law).
A similar principle may be at stake in NCNB Texas National Bank v. Goldencrest
Joint Venture, 761 F. Supp. 32 (N.D. Tex. 1990), the court barred claims of the breach
of the covenant as arising from "unrecorded actions and representations of employees
of RepublicBank", and noted that "[nlo documents to substantiate these claims have
been produced in response to the motion for summary judgement," without making
clear whether the breach alleged was in formation or performance of the contract.
Goldencrest, 761 F. Supp. at 34.
260. FDIC v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850 (3d. Cir. 1994); Texas Refrigeration Supply, Inc.
v. FDIC, 953 F.2d 975, 981-82 (5th Cir. 1992). The reasonableness of acceleration is,
of course, measured by the terms of the original notes, not those notes as amended by
D'Oench-barred agreements. Savers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Amberley Huntsville,
Ltd., 934 F.2d 1201, 1209 (11th Cir. 1991).
261. Hanson v. FDIC, 13 F.3d 1247, 1250-52 & n.10 (8th Cir. 1994); New Bank of
New Eng. v. Callahan, 798 F. Supp. 73, 76-77 (D.N.H. 1992); RTC v. Wellington Dev.
Group, 761 F. Supp. 731,738 (D. Colo. 1991). This survival of torts rights would apply
to statutory tort claims, state and federal. See FSLIC v. Mackie, 962 F.2d 1144, 1151
(5th Cir. 1992); Holden v. FDIC, No. 91-11737-Z, 1993 WL 81459, at *3 (D. Mass.
Mar. 3, 1993); CMF Va. Land, L.P. v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. 90, 94-95 (E.D. Va. 1992);
Grant County Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. RTC, 770 F. Supp. 1374, 1379-82 (E.D. Ark.
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 968 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1992); Tuxedo Beach Club Corp.
v. City Fed. Sav. Bank, 749 F. Supp. 635, 648 n.12 (D.N.J. 1990).
Perhaps the most celebrated statement of the rule is the case of Astrup v. Midwest
Federal Savings Bank, 886 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir. 1989), wherein a finding of breach of
fiduciary duty under a written agreement was affirmed where a bank subsidiary had
breached its duty to its coventurer. See Astrup, 886 F.2d at 1058. It is clear that in the
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IV. A CONSiSTENT ANALYTiCAL FRAMEWORK FOR
D'OENCH CASES
Considerable confusion has been engendered by the application of
the D'Oench doctrines. The volume of litigation attendant upon the
thrift crisis, the lack of guidance from the Court or the Capitol, and
the desire of the courts to pitch in and do their bit to protect the bank-
ing system262 have all generated an inchoate body of law, the exact
application of which unclear from circuit to circuit, district to district,
and within the same district.32 Whether the doctrine is equitable or
unjust or good or bad public policy is beyond the scope of this Note.
But any law, unclear in its application and incapable of producing con-
sistent results, is in some sense incapable of producing justice.
This Note suggests that proper analytic framework for any D'Oench
problem, whether it be under common law or statutory D'Oench, is
based around the twin concepts of "asset" and "agreement."
First, the condition defeating the interests of the insurer must arise
from an "agreement" or "scheme." Because the concepts of "agree-
ment" under statutory D'Oench and "scheme" for purposes of com-
mon law D'Oench appear to have become coterminous, the
"agreement" analysis may proceed identically.
Thus, in either case, the threshold inquiry is whether what is pled by
the insurer's opponent, by way of offense or defense, constitutes an
agreement or a scheme. The inquiry is not whether such-and-such a
cause of action is barred by D'Oench. The doctrine is neither limited
nor expanded by a "tyranny of labels": '  all defenses and causes of
context of these facts, the developer was asserting a claim under a partnership agree-
ment, which was not asserted to be invalid under D'Oench, although the case contains
broad language that D'Oench does not bar any tort claim. "That doctrine affords no
protection against tort claims against a financial institution, whether for personal inju-
ries to a motorist in a collision with an armored car bringing money to the S. & L
office, or for insider profits in a sale of securities violating Securities and Exchange
regulations ... ." l at 1059-60.
262. See FDIC v. Gemini Management, 921 F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1990) ("As the
Savings and Loan crisis in which this nation is mired continues to unfold, regulators
are discovering abuses the D'Oench Court could not have imagined or predicted. The
FSLIC's ability to evaluate the financial condition of troubled thrift institutions de-
pends, now more than ever, upon the protective shield of D'Oench."); Milligan v.
Gilmore Meyer Inc., 775 F. Supp. 400, 410 (S.D. Ga. 1991) ("The result is harsh.
Nevertheless, 'fa]s pitiful as the Plaintiff's situation may be, a more compelling con-
sideration, in view of the monstrous national debt burden imposed by the spate of
recent bank failures, is the sanctity and uniform application of the D'Oench doctrine
and [12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)].' ").
263. Compare Beener v. LaSala, 813 F. Supp. 303, 309 (D.NJ. 1993) ("D'Oench,
however, is generally applicable only where a side agreement is inextricably inter-
twined with a particular loan or other asset .") with Lesal Interiors, Inc. v. RTC, 834 F.
Supp. 721, 730 (D.NJ. 1993) ("[Pllaintiff's contention that the instant case does not
involve a specific asset, and therefore falls outside the scope of D'Oench and section
1823(e), fails.").
264. See FDIC v. O'Flahaven, 857 F. Supp. 154 (D.N.H. 1994).
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action, contract2 65 and tort alike,2 66 and remedies, at law or in eq-
uity,2 67 are barred and none are barred, depending on whether the
cause of action is pled to give effect to a forbidden "agreement" or
"scheme." The inquiry is properly whether the facts averred as sup-
porting the cause of action would, were they pled in contract as a de-
fense to liability, constitute an agreement for purposes of D'Oench. A
party who affirmatively sues the receiver for fraud is barred, tort or
no, because the facts, were they pled as a defense to the contract,
would be barred as mere fraud in the inducement. On the other hand,
a party who sues the receiver because he was run over by an armored
car is not engaged in artful pleading, and the cause of action may pro-
ceed. Judge Lamberth provided a lesson in the subtleties of these
principles in American Federation of State, County & Municipal Em-
ployees v. FDIC (In re NBW Commercial Paper Litigation).268 He al-
lowed claims for failure to comply with the registration requirements
of the '33 Act, yet barred claims for selling the securities by means of
misrepresentations; the former claims arose independent of any agree-
ment, while the latter arose from misrepresentations and were barred
by the artful pleading rule.2 69
Once an agreement is found, the court must inquire as to whether
the alleged agreement is in fact, an agreement/scheme for purposes of
D'Oench. The inquiry has two faces: first, the agreement must relate
to ordinary banking transactions of the type that one would reason-
ably expect to be recorded in the records of a loan committee or the
board, in the case of statutory D'Oench or the loan files generally, in
the case of common law D'Oench. Thus, for example, personnel mat-
ters2 70 or matters relating to the sale of subsidiaries or securities2 71
would not be expected to be so recorded and thus fall outside of the
scope of D'Oench. If the goal of D'Oench is to allow the insurers to
rely on bank records with respect to important transactions rather
than to provide a mask for a right to disclaim any and all contracts of
the bank, the rule should protect only the reasonable expectations of
the insurers as to what should be in those files. This is certainly true
for common law D'Oench, where the appeal to the reliance interest of
265. See supra notes 92-113 (discussing various contract defenses and causes of ac-
tion which have been held barred by D'Oench).
266. See supra notes 133-47 (discussing various tort causes of action which have
been held barred by D'Oench).
267. See supra notes 151-55 (discussing equitable subordination and other equitable
remedies).
268. 826 F. Supp. 1448 (D.D.C. 1992).
269. Id. at 1467-70.
270. Bender v. CenTrust Mortgage Corp., 833 F. Supp. 1525 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (not-
ing that section 1823(e) by implication relates to financial transactions, and refusing to
extend the doctrine to an employment contract without further fact-finding and
briefing).
271. See supra notes 114-24 (discussing "ordinary banking transactions"
requirement).
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the insurers is direct. Such was the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in
Alexandria Associates, Ltd. v. Mitchell Co.2' A requirement that all
transactions of the bank's subsidiaries be approved by the bank's
board would render impossible that body's ability to set policy. The
principle similarly extends to the D'Oench statutes, as is shown in the
case of Thigpen v. Sparks,2' in which the "agreement" required by
section 1823(e), and thus by section 1821(d)(9)(A), was limited to
agreements relating to assets, those that one would expect to be re-
corded in the loan files of the bank.27 4
Second, was the transaction entered into with a bank? If the so-
called agreement was not entered into with the bank, or under such
circumstances as to put the parties on notice that a bank would be
involved, the agreement cannot be avoided merely because the under-
lying asset was assigned to the bank. Such was the conclusion of the
court in Park Tucson Investors Ltd. Partnership v. Ali,V5 where notes
were made to the promoter of a real estate venture and later, unbe-
knownst to borrowers, pledged to a bank. When the borrowers
sought to avoid payment on grounds of fraud in the inducement, the
court held that common law D'Oench did not bar the claim, because
the borrowers could not have lent themselves to a scheme without
knowledge of involvement of the bank.27 6 Further, the agreement
with the promoter was outside of the broad scope of section 1823(e),
because it was impossible that the borrowers could have caused exe-
cution and approval of the promoter's representations.,
Even if an agreement is asserted, the court must determine if there
was, at the time the bank was taken over, an "asset" to which it re-
lated. Here, the statutory and common law forms of the doctrine
company. The statutory forms of the rule require it by their very
terms. Regardless of how deeply the insurer may have been deceived,
the absence of an asset should negate the application of the rule. ' 8 In
the case of the common law doctrine, while case law does apply the
doctrine in the absence of an asset, in the vast majority of cases the
application is limited to situations in which there had been, was, or
was to be an asset.279 Such an approach serves to harmonize the ap-
proach to asset questions across the spectrum, and creates a uniform
272. 2 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1993). The case is discussed in more detail supra note 114.
273. 983 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1993). The case is discussed in more detail supra note
114.
274. See Thigpen, 983 F.2d at 649.
275. 770 F. Supp. 531, 536-38 (D. Ariz. 1991).
276. Id at 537-38.
277. Ia at 538.
278. See supra notes 207-21 (discussing "asset" requirements of section 1823(e) and
section 1821(d)(9)(A)).
279. See supra notes 222-31 (discussing cases in which common law D'Oench was
applied in the absence of an asset).
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rule for situations in which an asset is asserted to be void ab initio or
to have been voided after creation.
The existence of an asset may be negated by defects in contract for-
mation sufficiently serious to have rendered the asset void ab initio,280
or by subsequent acts that have voided the asset. If it is the former
that is averred, the court must examine the defect to determine
whether it is sufficient to render the instrument uniformly and without
exception void: if there is an exception, for innocent purchasers or the
like, the asset is not, for purposes of D'Oench, void, and the defense
must fail.281 Further, where the voiding condition is intentionally cre-
ated, while statutory D'Oench may fail, common law D'Oench should
continue to protect,28 as it does in situations in which the asset is
asserted to be voided by later action.
If the asset is asserted to be void by actions after contract forma-
tion, the court must determine whether the alleged voidness is a result
of an agreement between the borrower and the bank, as in the case of
accords and satisfactions and releases of liability. In such case, the
inquiry is in limine to determine if statutory D'Oench will apply: evi-
dence, that might be excluded by statutory D'Oench were it to be ap-
plied, is competent to prove voidness. The inquiry remains limited by
common law D'Oench. Thus, the courts will examine the files of the
bank to determine if, under the common law rule's looser standards,
an asset exists or not.28 3 If the instrument is voided by the action of a
third party, such as a state court or an assuming borrower, no agree-
ment or scheme is implicated, and the doctrine cannot be invoked.284
Such is the effect, when taken together, of the decisions of the Fifth
Circuit in Templin v. Weisgram,'28 5 Buchanan v. FSLIC,286 and Patter-
son v. FDIC.287 Although the former case is better remembered for its
rejection of the Langley dictum,2 8 its statements relating to the exist-
ence of a scheme as permitting the invocation of D'Oench survived
the implicit rejection of its anti-Langley language in Patterson.289 Yet,
as was shown in the Buchanan case, even in the absence of an asset,
common law D'Oench will apply to block defenses to an asset that
would otherwise apply. The application of the principle to voiding
280. See supra notes 157-77 (discussing "real" defenses).
281. See supra notes 181-87 (discussing statutes rendering assets "void").
282. See supra note 185 (discussing modification of Templin v. Weisgram by
Patterson).
283. See supra notes 196, 204-06 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which
resort to banking files was made to determine the existence of an asset).
284. See supra notes 183-87.
285. 867 F.2d 240 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). The case is discussed
supra note 185.
286. 935 F.2d 83 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005 (1991). The case is discussed
supra note 186.
287. 918 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1990). The case is discussed supra note 185.
288. Templin, 867 F.2d at 241-42.
289. Patterson, 918 F.2d at 545.
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circumstances arising after contract formation may be seen in another
Fifth Circuit case, FDIC v. McFarland ,29 in which the no-asset excep-
tion was held to apply to a release of liability on a guaranty found in
the records of the bank, where the release was so documented in the
bank's records as to put the insurer on notice of the release.291
A distinction must be drawn between "agreements" and covenants
and conditions constituting the contours of an asset. D'Oench serves
to protect the insurers from the consequences of defects in contract
formation or documentation, not of performance. The doctrine does
not protect from the risks that the bank will not perform its properly
documented obligations, negating the obligation of its counterparty to
perform thereunder.2" Thus, in the case Yankee Bank for Finance &
Savings v. Task Associates293 the court rejected a claim that a bank's
lien should not be subordinated to those of mechanics; the bank had
covenanted to pay the mechanics and, having breached that obliga-
tion, was liable for the consequences, even to a third-party benefici-
ary. The court reasoned that
[i]t would be incorrect to classify all failures by banks in FDIC re-
ceivership to comply with the terms of contracts to which they are
parties as unwritten modifications to those agreements. If such
were the case, the FDIC as a receiver could raise D'Oench as an
effective defense to any claim by any party that the bank in receiv-
ership had breached a written agreement. Such an anomalous legal
result does not arise from D'Oench and its progeny.294
This is the true lesson of the "bilateral obligations" exception. If
the agreement is contained in or manifest on the face of the contract
being enforced, it is not an agreement affecting the asset, it is a term
of the asset itself. To hold otherwise is to permit the insurer to rewrite
the terms of that which it holds, selecting those covenants that it finds
advantageous and rejecting those that it finds inconvenient. Such rea-
soning renders it clear why those courts who reject their traditional
duty to construe contracts and determine whether they are ambiguous
are permitting the insurers a similar liberty. If the contract terms em-
bodied are ambiguous, this does not render them forbidden side
agreements, but rather results in a question of fact as to what are the
exact provisions of the asset held by the insurer. 295 The courts, in sub-
stituting a "prudent bank examiner" standard for their own judgment
are going entirely too far. Even Chief Judge Posner, from whose deci-
sion in FDIC v. O'Nei1296 this pernicious doctrine is alleged to have
290. 33 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 1994).
291. Id at 538-39.
292. See supra notes 232-41 (discussing bilateral agreement exception).
293. 731 F. Supp. 64 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
294. See Yankee Bank, 731 F. Supp. at 69.
295. See supra notes 248-49 (discussing cases in which ambiguity of terms has not
been held to invoke D'Oench).
296. 809 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1987).
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sprung, noted that "a written obligation does not become unwritten
just because there is a question about its meaning." 297 The views of
the District Court in Security Savings Bank v. Green Tree Acceptance,
Inc. 298 are more sound. There the court refused to read D'Oench as
an absolute right of the insurer to impose its favored interpretation on
ambiguous language; the question remained for the jury, and the exact
contours of the asset held by the insurer awaited its verdict. 299 In the
same vein, the rejection of duties imposed on contracting parties as a
matter of law or covenants inherent in all contracts as constituting
unwritten agreements, also rewrite the nature of the asset held.30°
Such covenants inhere in the asset itself, and the insurer may not avail
itself of that which is agreeable in the law, and bar resort to that which
it finds onerous.
CONCLUSION
The manner in which the D'Oenches interact is nothing if not
opaque. Nonetheless, by recognizing the limitations of each: the asset
restriction for section 1823(e), and section 1821(d)(9)(A), and the
broader access to documentation allowed by the common law doc-
trine, it is possible to render principled decisions under these laws. If
these statutes are to fulfill their purported purpose of encouraging
parties to document their agreements and allow reliance by bank reg-
ulators on the records of the regulated, consistency must be the goal
of decisions under both the D'Oenches.
297. O'Neil, 809 F.2d at 354.
298. 739 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Minn. 1990)
299. Id. at 1349.
300. See supra notes 251-54 (discussing duties of secured parties) and notes 255-60
(discussing covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
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